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ABSTRACT

Although rather recently-emerged principle in the history of international environmental law, arguably, the precautionary principle is more controversial than other principles.  Many questions are still unanswered which make further examination of the precautionary principle necessary.  In relation to the Law of the Sea, the precautionary principle has been summoned to restrict various marine activities relating to marine pollution, fisheries, and transports of radioactive and hazardous substances, etc.

Indeed, the purpose of this study is to examine the present state of affairs regarding the implementation of the precautionary principle in the Law of the Sea, with a particular focus on marine pollution, in order to find a relationship therein.  The thesis begins with an introduction into the history and some basic importance of the precautionary principle under general international law.  It exemplifies the requirements for state practice as accepted custom, which would also be the applied standard for ultimately evaluating whether the precautionary principle has evolved into a rule of customary international law.  Furthermore, in the subsequent part of the thesis, the implementations of the precautionary principle will be scrutinised through the (in-depth) analysis of treaties, declarations, resolutions, national laws and strategies (of Thailand, especially), which will paint numerous pictures of how the precautionary principle has been put into practice over the years.  Finally, the main findings of these two parts are summarised.

The study shows that despite its ambiguity, the precautionary principle has direct and primary relevance for environmental protection.  It recognises a legal character in the concept further than legislative processes, and a flexibility of interpretation within legal rules to boost environmental protection both at the international and national levels.  A large number of publications on the precautionary principle have been made over recent years, but the need for explanation still remains.  It is not claimed, but merely hoped that the outcomes of this study will put certain things in order.
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(i)  General Overview
The international environmental law, consists of those substantive, procedural and institutional rules of international law which have as their main objective the protection of the environment, is very much lively and has been thriving more increasingly than many other bodies of international law.​[1]​  The International Court of Justice (ICJ or World Court) noted upon this development in its 1997 Gabcikovo-Nagymaros judgement:  

Throughout the ages, mankind has, for economic and other reasons, constantly interfered with nature.  In the past, this was often done without consideration of the effect upon the environment.  Owing to new scientific insight and to a growing awareness of the risks for mankind—for present and future generations—of pursuit of such interventions at an unconsidered and unabated pace, new norms and standards have been developed, set forth in a great number of instruments during the last two decades.  Such new norms have to be taken into consideration, and such new standards given proper weight, not only when States contemplate new activities but also when continuing activities begun in the past.  This need to reconcile economic development with protection of the environment is aptly expressed in the concept of sustainable development.​[2]​

Along with the interrelated “intergenerational equity” and “sustainable development” notions mentioned here by the ICJ, both of which demonstrate the idea that development must meet the needs of the present generation of human beings without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own,​[3]​ many other concepts or principles have been developing, including the “common concern of humankind” and “common but differentiated obligations” concepts and the “precautionary principle”.​[4]​  Of all these, the precautionary principle may well have the furthest reaching implications for states’ behaviour.​[5]​  In the words of the Bergen Ministerial Declaration:

In order to achieve sustainable development, policies must be based on the precautionary principle.  Environmental measures must anticipate, prevent and attack the causes of environmental degradation.  Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty should not be used as a reason for postponing measures to prevent environmental degradation.​[6]​

Even though explicit precautionary language came out on the international arena only in the mid-1980s, currently the precautionary principle can be said to be a central principle of international environmental law, as well as “intrinsic to international environmental policy.”​[7]​  This speedy development of the principle is well-captured by Malcolm Shaw when he portrayed the dynamics of international law as “a continuing tension between those rules already established and the constantly evolving forces that seek changes within the system.”​[8]​  It is also this evolution that will be dwelt on in the present study.  More particularly, it will try to present a general idea of the rise of the precautionary principle in international law and attempt to establish the stage of legal development in which the principle finds itself at present.  As will become increasingly clear below, a rather wide-ranging literature on these issues has already existed.  However, the pictures drawn in most individual academic contributions, though competently done, are short of comprehensiveness.  

The precautionary approach has been depended upon when it comes to measures to protect other environmental media, especially the marine environment which is the main focus of this study.  “At the Third North Sea Conference (1990), Ministers pledged to continue to apply the precautionary principle.  The 1990 Bergen Ministerial Declaration on Sustainable Development in the EEC Region was the first international instrument to treat the principle as one of general application and linked to sustainable development. Since that time, numerous environmental treaties, including some which are of global application on environmental matters of broad concern and applicable to almost all human activities, have adopted the precautionary principle or its underlying rationale.”​[9]​

Following this introduction will be Part I of the thesis; chapter 1 of the thesis sets out the history and some basic considerations of the precautionary principle.  It will outline the nature and background of the emergence of the precautionary principle, as well as looking at its brief but remarkable history in international law.  Chapter 2 then pinpoints the place at present occupied by the precautionary principle in the international legal order and to that end, inter alia, deals with the important question of whether or not today the principle is to be considered a binding norm of customary international law.  It also describes the basics for state practice as established custom, which would also be the practical standard for ultimately assessing whether the precautionary principle has developed into a rule of customary international law.  Chapter 3 will focus specifically to the precautionary principle in the Law of the Sea and the protection of the marine environment.  It will illustrate the extent to which an international legal regime for the control of marine pollution from ships has developed since 1972, and the degree to which it has proved effective. In addition, the relevant international and regional conventions, most notably the MARPOL 73/78 Convention, will be analysed to display how they have improved the protection of the marine environment.  Chapters 4 and 5 will constitute Part II of the thesis.  They will then look into how the precautionary principle has been implemented in the environmental law and policy of Thailand as well as in the Law of the Sea and the protection of the marine environment in Thailand and South East Asian region, national legislations and regional agreements will be scrutinised. Final conclusions will be drawn in Chapter 6.




(ii) The Purpose of the Study (Hypothesis)

The aim of this study is to analyse the concept of precautionary principle in international environmental law, and emphasise its importance for environmental protection in order to find a common understanding, and to extract evidence of its acceptance as part of customary international law.  It will also attempt to examine the present state of affairs regarding the implementation of the precautionary principle in Thailand and South-East Asia, whether or not the principle has been incorporated into Thai environmental law and policy, especially in the law of the sea and the protection of marine environment.  This is important because marine pollution is still one of the pressing subjects, and marine transport accounts for around 90% of trading activities in recent years.  As it is, it is the premise of this study that the precautionary principle is an important general principle of international environmental law.  The origins, evolution and status of the principle in public international law have been researched at length.​[10]​  States have expressly endorsed the precautionary principle in the provisions of at least 58 legally binding agreements​[11]​ and in many dozens of declarations, resolutions and action programmes with a bearing on the environment.​[12]​  In line with developments at the international level, increasing numbers of states are implementing the principle within their domestic jurisdictions.​[13]​  There is, moreover, copious evidence that the precautionary principle, at some point in the past two decades, has attained the status of customary international law.​[14]​  Whichever way, the precautionary principle has apparently not been adopted by states “for the fun of it”,
as Ireland put it in the MOX Plant OSPAR Arbitration,​[15]​ and its significance in international law is unlikely to diminish in the immediate future.​[16]​  

Because the precautionary principle is relatively new, nevertheless well-recognised, in the international community, its controversial and critical nature provides very fertile grounds for further research and development.  The debate on the legal implications of the precautionary principle that is taking place at the international level as well as within many nation states, has led to varying interpretations.  Many questions, as in the above citation​[17]​, concern the definition and implementation of the principle.  The need for answers to these questions is, therefore, felt by proponents and opponents of the precautionary principle alike, and not in the least by the government bodies and public agencies whose job it is to apply and implement the principle.

It is an international consensus that ‘poverty and environmental degradation are closely interrelated.’​[18]​  Therefore it has been recommended that environmental protection in developing countries must be viewed as an integral part of development processes.​[19]​  In fact, the precautionary principle, as found in Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration, is widely endorsed by states; it has been applied or adopted by a growing number of international organisations and treaty bodies.    At the domestic level it informs environmental policy and law in many countries.​[20]​  Upon this premise, and recognising the constraints in applying general international environmental obligations to control marine pollution in Thailand,​[21]​ the precautionary principle is considered as providing a policy guidance for integrating environmental issues into development processes and ensuring environmental protection.  Thailand’s marine environment is chosen as a case study to examine the influence of the precautionary principle on selected laws and agreements because this case will give the research a distinct originality.  Thailand’s (and South-East Asia’s) commitment to environmental awareness will be investigated through its implementation of the precautionary principle or precautionary approach on the national level.  This thesis acknowledges that the precautionary principle involves more than just maintaining the balance between economic development and environmental protection.  The appropriate conventions will be alluded to where necessary, though the main purpose is to answer some questions as to the effectiveness of the precautionary principle and to demonstrate the values of the principle for regulating environmental activities.  Furthermore, the writer believes that precautionary principle, if implemented properly, could be an effective tool for tackling environmental problems.  The most interesting point necessary to mention here is that Thailand has not ratified international, global conventions on marine environment, e.g., UNCLOS, MARPOL 73/78, and London Convention.  The writer will attempt to prove the hypothesis that Thailand implements the precautionary principle or applies a precautionary approach into its marine pollution prevention programmes through applying certain conventions without ratifying them. These conventions, however, had gained customary law status, and included the precautionary principle or applied a precautionary approach rather than a principle, and Thailand is bound by them accordingly through the working of international customary law.   









(iii)  Methodology  

As this thesis is predominantly a legal research project with theoretical as well as practical aspects and analysis, the methodology employed is based on documentary research of texts, internet resources and practice gathered through field research conducted in Thailand, including interviews with a number of Thai government officials in Bangkok.  The methodology, therefore, combines the desk study and analysis of various academic works, international agreements, ‘soft law’ instruments and reports relating to environmental protection and precautionary principle, as well as its practical implementation in Thailand and South-East Asia through regional policies, plans, instruments and national policies, action plans and legislations.  




















PART I:  

THE NATURE, LEGAL STATUS OF THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE AND ITS APPLICATION IN MARINE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW












CHAPTER 1

THE NATURE OF PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE

The Origins of the Precautionary Principle

The precautionary principle has been given a great deal amount of attention from domestic and international lawyers in the past few decades or so, turning into one of the most well-known and well-discussed international environmental rules.  With the principle becoming established in international environmental protection and resource management regimes, and spreading over into areas of health and international trade, its reviews and examinations may be called for.  The most popular quoted version of the principle is found in the 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development as Principle 15:​[22]​

“Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental degradation.”

In some other European languages, the precautionary principle is spoken of as principe de precaution, principio de precaution, Vorsorgeprinzip, voorzorg(s)beginsel, fore-var prinsippet and forsiktighetsprincip.​[23]​  In English, it is also known as the “principle of precautionary action.”​[24]​  At its most rudimentary, the precautionary principle is a principle of public decision-making which demands decision-makers where there are ‘threats’ of environmental or health harm not to rely on ‘lack of full scientific certainty’ as an excuse for not employing measures to prevent such harm.​[25]​  Conventional histories trace the precautionary principle’s birth as an explicit principle (Vorsorgeprinzip) in West German environmental policy of the late 1970s​[26]​ although ‘precautionary-type’ policies clearly have existed in many jurisdictions​[27]​ and theoretical traditions long before​[28]​  Many of the concepts highlighting the precautionary principle comes before the term’s origin.  For example, the core of the principle is described in a number of cautionary sayings such as “an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure”, “better safe than sorry”, and “look before you leap”.  In the 1980s the principle was incorporated in many international agreements and began to gain a high profile in international environmental law.​[29]​  The first international approval of the precautionary principle was recognised in The World Charter for Nature, which was adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1982.  The precautionary principle specifies that if an action or policy has a tendency of causing harm to the public or to the environment, and without scientific consensus that the action or policy is harmless, the burden of proof that it is harmless will be placed on those who support taking the action.  Policy makers can rely on the principle to make discretionary decisions in circumstances where there is evidence of potential harm without full scientific proof.  The principle entails that there is a social obligation to protect the public from contact to harm, when scientific investigation revealed a probable risk.  These protections can be eased only if further scientific discoveries appear that offer sound evidence that harm will not come about.  In this context, the principle was considered as being a way to stop sovereign states from relying on lack of ‘full proof’ as a justification for doing nothing and the principle was seen as particularly important in agreements such as the Ministerial Declaration on the Second International Conference of the Protection of the North Sea in 1987 and the Montreal Protocol on the Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer.​[30]​   In 1992 the principle was incorporated in the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development (Principle 15), and it was among the principles of general rights and obligations of national authorities at the UN Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED).  Simultaneously, it was adopted under the Convention of Biological Diversity and Convention on Climate Change.  This symbolised a defining moment in its application.  Its inclusion as a soft law principle not only gave the principle high-level legitimacy but also, due to the ‘think globally, act locally’ ideals of Agenda 21, a means by which the principle was supported in national jurisdictions.​[31]​   With that said, the Rio Declaration was not the only reason for the principle’s fast recognition in national and supranational jurisdictions in the 1990s.  The principle and precautionary-type idea were being developed independently in a number of jurisdictions, often as part of taking a more sophisticated approach to the problems of scientific uncertainty.​[32]​  The principle was a sobering answer to the overzealous promotion of ‘sound science’ in public policy​[33]​ and to decision-makers placing profound reliance on certain regulatory assumptions such as that of ‘assimilative capacity’ in relation to marine pollution.​[34]​   During the 1990s the principle was included in law and policy a number of different jurisdictions, including the European Union​[35]​, Australia​[36]​, Canada​[37]​, and India​[38]​, as well as most European States.​[39]​  In some cases the principle was seen in discrete regulatory schemes but in many cases it was interpreted as a broad guiding principle.​[40]​  In the EU the principle was incorporated into what is now Article 174(2) of the Treaty Establishing the European Community as one of four principles that Community policy on the environment ‘shall be based on’.  Due to the operation of the integration principle in Article 6 of that same Treaty, the principle is now found to apply to all policies of the EU.​[41]​  

In all these jurisdictions, various different actors have been engaged in the principle’s application and the mode of implementation has often been a combination of legislative reform, policy development and ad hoc litigation.​[42]​  It is now a general practice in many jurisdictions for decisions to be made pursuant to the precautionary principle and public decision makers have extensive experience with applying it.​[43]​  Similarly, the case law relating to the principle is a huge one, much of its subject matters being when and how public decision-makers should apply the principle.​[44]​  Furthermore, the principle has also given rise to a debate about what are suitable regulatory strategies in situations of scientific uncertainty.​[45]​   The examples of the precautionary principle in operation are copious and include examples in the field of mobile phone regulation​[46]​; fisheries​[47]​; impact assessment​[48]​; biotechnology regulation​[49]​; food safety​[50]​; and the regulation of animal foodstuffs.​[51]​  The principle has continued to play a role in international environmental law, mainly in relation to the protection of the commons.​[52]​  More importantly, the principle has increasingly become the centre of transnational trade disputes where states have relied on it in derogating from their international trade responsibilities.​[53]​  It has been argued in a number of judgements of the World Trade Organisation (WTO)’s Dispute Appellate Body​[54]​, has been the subject of debate in ongoing WTO discussion, and has obtained greater attention by international standard-setting bodies such as the Codex Alimentarius.​[55]​  In 2000 the principle was also adopted under the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, which not only rendered it substantial legal force, but also set up a jointly supportive relationship between trade law and international environmental law.​[56]​  

What is obvious from this history is that the precautionary principle can be operationalised.  Its worthiness is to be recognised​[57]​, and can be seen in the fact that it has been welcomed by several mainstream actors in numerous jurisdictions.  The principle is not a making of one culture, one agenda or one ideology.  Its endorsement has been because it is a sound principle of public decision-making and its realistic success can be viewed in the fact that the principle has been implemented in many different legal cultures and the end result has been a large body of practice and discourse.​[58]​  “The inclusion of the principle has not been an exercise in mere symbolism.”​[59]​

Yet despite the increased popularity and establishment of the principle, it has not been without criticisms.  It is helpful to emphasise three common criticisms and their counterarguments to give some sentiment about the state of the literature.  In particular we would argue that much of the criticism has tended to be too basic and ignored the reality of precautionary practices.​[60]​

First, there are those from industrial sector, who argue that the principle is always a no-risk and non-science based principle.​[61]​  In practice, however, decision-makers relying on the precautionary principle have really paid more attention to science and contemplated a wider array of possible regulatory responses.​[62]​  Thus, for example, the EU considers science as an important and legitimate element in the decision-making process.​[63]​  Second, there are those that argue that the principle fails to offer clear guidance to decision makers​[64]​ and that this fact, along with many diverse formulations of it, demonstrates its lack of internal coherence.​[65]​  This is an argument that largely ignores the principle’s legal status as a legal principle (and that it is thus intrinsically flexible) as well as the influence of legal culture.​[66]​  Finally, there are those that fear that the principle is a means of justifying arbitrary action or ulterior motives because decision-makers do not need to depend on the ‘facts’  for making decisions.​[67]​  Such a statement, however, fails to notice the reality that in cases of scientific uncertainty, what is an ‘arbitrary decision’ is open to question, and relying on the ‘facts’ in such cases is greatly problematic.​[68]​  In saying that much of the criticism of the precautionary principle is unwise, we are not saying that the principle does not need to be carefully considered or that there are no real challenges involved in its implementation.  Somewhat, we are saying that criticism of the principle has tended to be pointed at the issue of whether the principle is either practical and/or acceptable when it is clear when examining law and policy in many different jurisdictions that it is both.​[69]​  In other words, critical discourse about the principle has tended to consider it in prospective terms as something that could be implemented into regulatory regimes rather than what it is—a well-worked and much-applied principle.​[70]​


Precautionary Principle v Precautionary Approach

A discussion of the precautionary principle would not be complete without brief indication to the difference between the precautionary principle and the precautionary approach.  As mentioned above, the principle is also known as the ‘principle of precautionary action’.  Whereas this is widely regarded as an appropriate substitute for “precautionary principle”, some confusion encircles the latter’s relationship with the term “precautionary approach”.  This term is chosen by some, in order to evade the more severe versions of the precautionary principle that demand absolute environmental protection.​[71]​  When looking at the application of the precautionary principle to high sea fisheries, Professor Orrega Vicuna writes that:

 Since scientific uncertaintfy is normally the rule in fisheries management a straightforward application of the precautionary principle would have resulted in the impossibilities of proceeding with any activity relating to marine fisheries.  It is on these grounds that the concept of the “precautionary approach” surfaced with a view to provide a more flexible tool for the specific needs of fisheries management.​[72]​

After citing the first part of this very passage in his Separate Opinion regarding the International Tribunal on the Law of the Sea’s 1999 Southern Bluefin Tuna Cases, Judge Ad Hoc Ivan Shearer goes on to state that the difference between “principle” and “approach” is confirmed by the wording of Article 6 of the 1995 Agreement on Straddling and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks,​[73]​ which obliges parties to apply the “precautionary approach”.​[74]​  In another Separate Opinion annexed to the Tribunal’s Order, Judge Laing expresses the view that, in the context of the case, “adopting an approach, rather than a principle imports a certain degree of flexibility and tends, though not dispositively, to underscore reticence about making premature pronouncements about desirable normative structures.”​[75]​  ITLOS Judge Treves also seems to associate the term “principle” with legally binding, customary status, as opposed to the allegedly more neutral “approach”.​[76]​

Nevertheless, whatever reasons may exist for letting one term take precedence over the other, the basis in state practice for a distinction between the basic characteristics or legal consequences of application of the “approach” as opposed to those of the “principle” is extremely narrow.  Rather, the terms are used synonymously in this respect.  Consequently, a strict, hierarchical distinction of the different terminology does not appear to find a solid foundation in international law.  To further illustrate this, the version of the precautionary principle most often cited is Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration (1992), which itself refers to the “precautionary approach”.​[77]​

“In order to protect the environment, the precautionary approach shall be widely applied by States according to their capabilities.  Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental degradation.”

As Garcia indicated, “the wording, largely similar to that of the principle, is delicately different in that: (1) it acknowledges that local capabilities to apply the approach may vary, and (2) it requires cost-effectiveness in applying the approach, e.g., taking economic and social costs into account.”​[78]​  The ‘approach’ is generally seen as a softening of the ‘principle’.  Recuerda has stated that the difference between the ‘precautionary principle’ and a ‘precautionary approach’ is diffuse and, in some circumstances, controversial.​[79]​  In the discussions of international declarations, the United States has disagreed with the use of the term ‘principle’ because this term comes with particular implications in legal language, due to the fact that a ‘principle of law’ is a source of law.  This means that it is necessary, so a court is able to nullify or endorse a decision through the application of the precautionary principle.​[80]​  This gives a meaning that the precautionary principle is not a simple idea but a source of law.  This in fact suggests the legal status of the precautionary principle in the European Union.  A precautionary approach is seen as “a particular ‘lenses’ used to detect risk that every sensible person possesses.”​[81]​

For instance, the Programme for the Further Implementation of Agenda 21 that was adopted without a vote by the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) in 1997 speaks of the progress made “in incorporating the principles contained in the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development including [..] the precautionary principle.”​[82]​  By way of another example, the text of the 1995 Global Programme of Action for the Protection of the Marine Environment from Land-Based Activities refers three times to the “precautionary approach”​[83]​ and another three times to the “precautionary principle”,​[84]​ while nothing in the document insinuates that different concepts are meant.​[85]​  Indicative is also that the very same Straddling Stocks Agreement that is used by some to justify a distinction, characterises the “precautionary approach” as a “general principle”.​[86]​  All this leads Mascher to conclude notably also with regard to fisheries management that “there is nothing to suggest that the terms ‘precautionary principle’ and ‘precautionary approach’ cannot be used interchangeably.”​[87]​  The majority of authors seem to share this opinion by using them as equivalents.​[88]​  So does this study.  Nevertheless, it must be emphasised here that, after some thorough examinations in the case of Thailand, the author found no evidence of an explicit inclusion of the precautionary principle within Thailand’s national environmental laws.  As a consequence, the author would suggest that a precautionary approach rather than the precautionary principle is being applied in the Thailand context.  





It should be mention that two significant features of the precautionary principle are its great variety of formulations and the array of consequences it could entail, each of these ranging from purely ecocentric to purely anthropocentric.​[89]​  Environmental NGOs and a number of publicists have expressed the polarities of this spectrum in terms of “strong” and “weak” versions of the principle.  As Catherine Tinker formulates it:

[A]t it strongest, the precautionary principle may be interpreted to prohibit virtually all use of natural resources and all human activities of any kind in certain ecosystems.  Such a moratorium could continue indefinitely, until such time as sufficient scientific knowledge develops about the effects of such activities or use.  At its weakest, the precautionary principle may be mere hortatory language intended to guide states as they adopt national legislation and plans, allowing a permissive approach to use of resources and human activities and a balancing of interests which may favour development and quality of life choices over conservation of biodiversity or other preventive action.​[90]​

Strong precaution maintains that regulation is demanded whenever a possible risk to health, safety, or the environment occurs, even though the supporting evidence is inconclusive and even though the economic costs of regulation are considerable.  A strong mode of the precautionary principle, for instance, would require measures to reduce the risk of environmental harm brought on by climate change by including a focus on cutting down or preventing the emission of greenhouse gases.  In 1982, the United Nations World Charter for Nature demonstrated the first international endorsement to the strong mode of the principle, stating that when “potential adverse effects are not fully understood, the activities should not proceed.”  The extensively publicised Wingspread Declaration, from a meeting of environmentalists in 1998, is another example of the strong version.​[91]​  ‘Strong precaution’ can also be called a “no-regrets” principle, where costs are not contemplated in preventative action.

Weak precaution maintains that lack of scientific evidence does not stop action if damage would otherwise be grave and irreversible.  Humans carry out weak precaution on a daily basis, and often incur costs, to avoid dangers that are far from certain:  we do not walk in quite dangerous places at night, we exercise, we buy smoke alarms, we fasten our seatbelts etc.  The weak version [of the precautionary principle] is the least restricted and allows preventive measures to be taken in spite of uncertainty, but does not demand them, examples include Principle 15 of Rio Declaration 1992; United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 1992 etc.  In order to satisfy the threshold of harm, there must be some evidence relating to both the likelihood of occurrence and the seriousness of outcomes.  Some, but not all, call for consideration of the costs of precautionary measures.  Weak formulations do not prevent weighing up benefits against the costs.  Other factors apart from scientific uncertainty, e.g. economic considerations, may provide reasonable grounds for postponing action.  Under weak versions, the requirement to justify the need for action (the burden of proof) normally falls on those advocating precautionary action.  Liability for environmental harm is, however, not mentioned.

Strong versions validate or demand precautionary measures and some also create liability for environmental harm, which is in effect a strong form of “polluter-pays principle”.​[92]​  For example, the Earth Charter states: “When knowledge is limited apply a precautionary approach…Place the burden of proof on those who argue that a proposed activity will not cause significant harm, and make the responsible parties liable for environmental harm.”  Reversal of the burden of proof requires those proposing an activity to prove that the product, process, or technology is sufficiently “safe” before consent is granted.  Demanding evidence of “no environmental harm” prior to any action proceeds implies that the public is not willing to accept any environmental risk, regardless of what economic or social benefits may come about.​[93]​  At the extreme, such a requirement could involve bans and prohibitions on entire classes of potentially threatening activities or substances.​[94]​  Over time, there has been a slow change of the precautionary principle from what illustrates in the Rio Declaration to a stronger form that possibly acts as restriction on development when there is a lack of certain evidence that it will not cause harm.​[95]​

The weak version of the precautionary principle does not appear to trigger controversy.  The strong version, however, has been given harsh and very sophisticated criticisms by Sunstein, the detailed presentation of which goes beyond the scopes of this chapter.  Sunstein started his analysis by defining the precautionary principle as “hopelessly-vague”.​[96]​  The strong version is not restricted to threats of serious or irreversible damage and includes the reversal of the burden of proof.  It may be stated, however, that the separation into these two forms is not always grasped by scholars and experts, and often the two types are merged together.​[97]​

Sunstein also argues broadly that the tendency to rely on the precautionary principle results from cognitive and emotional responses which excessively stress highly visible or readily visualisable risks which have a low likelihood of occurrence, thus encouraging fear and provoking regulatory responses which are disproportionate with the risk.​[98]​  Sunstein examines the relationship between the precautionary principle and cost-benefit analysis (CBA), and gives a conclusion that the CBA is more beneficial in its implementation as it provides a more coherent approach and is more flexible in embracing a broader spectrum of issues than the precautionary principle.  The chronic presence of the precautionary principle is often a result of its tactical use by self-interested political actors.  It is possibly worth displaying Sunstein’s reasons for his extensive criticism of this principle: 

“[I]have argued not that the precautionary principle leads in the wrong directions, but if it is taken for all that it is worth, it leads in no direction at all.  The reason is that risks of one kind or another are on all sides of regulatory choices, and it is therefore impossible, in most real-world cases, to avoid running a foul of the principle.  Frequently, risk regulation creates a (speculative) risk from substitute risks or from foregone risk-reduction opportunities.  And because of the (speculative) mortality and morbidity effects of costly regulation, any regulation—if it is costly—threatens to run a foul of the precautionary principle.  We have seen that both regulation and non-regulation seem to be forbidden in cases involving nuclear power, arsenic, global warming, and genetic modification of food.  The precautionary principle seems to offer guidance only because people blind themselves to certain aspects of the risk situation, focusing on a mere subset of the hazards that are at stake.  To some extent, those who endorse the principle are responding to salutary political or moral motivations that it might be thought to embody.  Well-organised private groups sometimes demand conclusive proof of harm as a precondition for regulation; the demand should be resisted because a probability of harm is, under many circumstances, a sufficient reason to act.  Both individuals and societies sometimes have a tendency to neglect the future; the precautionary principle might be understood as a warning against that form of neglect.  There are good reasons to incorporate distributional considerations into risk regulation; the precautionary principle, as applied, is a crude and sometimes perverse method of promoting those various goals, not least because it might be, and has been, urged in situations in which the principle threatens to injure future generations and harm rather than help those who are most disadvantaged.  A rational system of risk regulation certainly takes precautions.  But it does not adopt the precautionary principle.”​[99]​  





The Precautionary Principle, Science and Uncertainty

“Few things in life are certain except, of course, death and taxes.”​[100]​  The idea that care and foresight are required in the face of such an uncertain future is universal and of all times.​[101]​  Precautions taken in order to avoid, or at a minimum, be prepared for dangerous events are characteristic of human (and animal) behaviour.​[102]​  Put in simple terms, there is the need for precaution because of uncertainty.  If all potential dangers could be quantitatively calculated with minimum error, then it would be rather easy to base policy decisions on quantitative risk assessments, and almost nothing else.  However, in the modern world in which global weather, aquifers and growing children still retain lots of mysteries, we believe that the best environmental policies will be updated by the best available science, but will also be directed by a principle of erring on the side of caution.

All through the centuries, precaution has been at the centre of medical and public health theory and practice and is a foundation to many of our current environmental (and public health) policies.  The precautionary principle has its origins in the German word Vorsorgeprinzip.​[103]​  Other translation of this word is the ‘foresight principle’ or ‘forecaring principle’ which has the benefit of emphasising an anticipatory action—a proactive idea rather than prevention, which appears reactive and even negative to many.​[104]​  This definition is very important to the role of science in policy and will be discussed below.

The adoption of the precautionary principle in a range of environmental policy arenas mirrors increasing attention to the recognition and management of scientific uncertainty.  Implied in most interpretations of the precautionary principle is the acknowledgement that scientific knowledge cannot adequately foresee the potential environmental consequences of human activities.  On this basis, it is argued that we should act more carefully, in particular where potential hazards have already been recognised, such as the release of toxic chemicals into the environment.  Scientific uncertainty and its management is now a key consideration for environmental policy.  Discussions about uncertainty, however, reveal the unwieldy nature of the term.  It is used to indicate different aspects of knowledge and to imply different responses; it is also used as the general catch-all signifying all cases where scientific knowledge is unclear, or where scientists themselves consider available evidence to be questionable, confusion therefore surfaces as to the exact meaning of ‘uncertainty’.​[105]​

The risk framework has been employed at length in environmental management.  However, as the arena has become more contentious, the basic assumptions involved in risk appraisal have been questioned.  This opens it up to review and reanalysis through the highlighting of previously neglected uncertainties and ignorance.  “From ecological pathways and bioaccumulation mechanisms to effects of low-level radiation on human health, the assessment of radiological hazard has moved from risk mode to that of uncertainty.”​[106]​  Whilst for advocates of risk assessment, and in particular for the institutional consortiums involved in its production, radiological risk analysis remains valid, its reliability has been largely weakened in the public mind by the analysis used by anti-nuclear groups.​[107]​  This is made difficult by the insights within the public understanding of science that institutional trust is a main factor in maintaining scientific and technical authority: the nuclear industry has been its own worst enemy in this respect, tending to take a patronising and non-negotiable attitude, so is increasingly perceived as unreliable.​[108]​  In disputed arena, then, formerly certain scientific knowledge can become uncertain as social groupings concentrate on rhetoric of scientific argument; additionally, whether knowledge is decided to be certain, amenable to risk analysis, or uncertain, changes from one social context to another.  Uncertainty as such has been emphasised in the North Sea Ministerial Conferences, and has been a standard factor in justifying precautionary approaches.  Whilst, broadly speaking, the boundaries of the North Sea ecosystem are deemed to be understood and the main factors identified (e.g. circulation patterns and the transport of pollutants are considered to be important, although this is qualified by new research which may offer different understandings or produce new questions), knowledge of the detail of the mechanisms and, in particular, the causal relationships involved, are acknowledged as incomplete and uncertain.​[109]​  The relationship between fish disease and pollution, and of the effects of nutrient inputs, falls into the category of uncertain knowledge.  Uncertain knowledge perhaps provides the clearest picture of the limitations of existing scientific practice: the detailed knowledge of fish population dynamics and natural disease occurrence are missing from the current understanding of the fish disease and pollution relationship; and are hard to come by.​[110]​  Understanding of the effects of nutrient inputs are likewise restricted by the lack of thorough knowledge.  Both cases experience the lack of long-term data sets.  Even though data were to be gathered over, say, the next 20 years, the questions for which the data are initially collected may well change by the time the data are fully collected.  But the basic problem is that scientific practice is largely organised around controlled experiments in the laboratory.  It is not possible to control real world environment conditions in the same way; in any case, these conditions alter and only broad generalisations can be offered for the effect of changing conditions.  

The discussion of ignorance, whilst not as extensive as those of risk and uncertainty, is nonetheless also recognised.  The effects of loss of biodiversity, or of climate change, are placed in at least some quarters as belonging to the realm of ignorance.  As a matter of fact, there is a growing recognition that potentially catastrophic consequences, which we cannot predict, attend our actions.  However, the policy response to ignorance is in the ambit of ‘if we don’t know it, we can’t act’, rather than adopting more flexible smaller scale policies with the ability to react more quickly to changing circumstances.​[111]​

The story so far presented is one of scientific knowledge which is necessarily provisional and socially located, which can be read as a failure of science to provide legitimacy to policy.  However, there are abundant counter-examples, where science is taken as certain, uncertainties amenable to resolution, and knowledge as complete.  The consequences of cigarette smoking and of lead pollution are now largely accepted, having moved from uncertainty to risk.​[112]​  On the same lines, responses to scientific uncertainty vary across contexts: government scientists argue that enough is known about the input of toxic chemicals to the marine environment to be able to argue for (limited and controlled) discharges, and this is accepted within at least some parts of government, although highly contested outside it.​[113]​  


As discussed above, the precautionary principle is applied in the context of scientific disagreement and the gaining of new knowledge.  In order to apply the precautionary principle appropriately, a clarification is required as to what is exactly meant by ‘scientific uncertainty’ and what types of uncertainties are pertinent for the invocation of the precautionary principle.  Any scientific information is encircled by some degree of uncertainty and this in itself is not a reason for, nor usually leads to, the invocation of the precautionary principle.






Table 1:  Overview of state of affairs in science and the possible corresponding 
                 Responses by risk management ​[114]​

Circumstances	State of affairs in science	Policy framework/regulatory action/examples
Risk	Known effects, quantifiable probabilities; uncertainties may have statistical (e.g. stochastical) nature	Risk management by defining thresholds on the basis of chosen level of protection, exercising prevention, minimisation of risk and/or precautionary minimisation of risks by feasible management measures: applying the ALARA principle etc.
Unquantifiable risk, lack of knowledge	Known effects/unknown or uncertain cause-effect relations, therefore unknown probabilities	Antibiotics in feed stuff/protection of the North Sea.  Invocation of precautionary principle is justified; preventive measures to take away the possible causes can be justified.
Epistemic uncertainty: scientific controversies, lack of knowledge	Unknown scope of effects, however, degree and/or nature of their ‘seriousness’ (in relation to the chosen level of protection) can only be estimated in qualitative terms	Invocation of precautionary principle is justified.  Example: GMOs, climate change, ozone depletion.
Hypothetical effect/imaginary risk	Arguments on the basis of a fully conjectural knowledge base, no scientific indication for their possible occurrence.	Invocation of precautionary principle is not justified.

In line with what is summarised in Table 1, four circumstances can be identified.  The first relates to ‘hypothetical effects and imaginary risk’.  A hypothetical approach which involves the identification of a wholly hypothetical risk cannot be considered as an invocation of the precautionary principle.  Both the EC guidelines on the precautionary principle and the judgement of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) (Case T70/99 Alpharma v Council (2002) ECR II-3495: for example) rule out such situations and verify that any invocation of the precautionary principle should begin with a scientific assessment of the issue.  It requires an identification of the possible adverse effects and is later followed by a risk assessment.  It is accepted that such an assessment is not necessarily either comprehensive or final in all its details.  This scientific examination can also include or build upon minority views within the scientific field.​[115]​  Yet the invocation of the precautionary principle is always scientifically informed​[116]​ and, procedurally, it is compulsory to have such an examination available before referring to the precautionary principle.

A second type of circumstance which can be identified involves with the normal situation of a defined risk, whereby the level of protection is described, and the risk (for example; the probability of the occurrence of the adverse effects multiplied by their impact) can be measured.  In such situations, the policy makers can take action with a normal risk management approach whereby, for example, thresholds can be established, risks can be either reduced or kept below a certain level, and precautionary measures can be adopted to keep particular effects well below particular thresholds by employing the ALARA (as low as reasonably achievable) principle.  The invocation of the precautionary principle is neither necessary nor relevant.​[117]​  Because a scientific consolidated basis concerning the adverse effects in question exists, one can act with preventive (in contrast to precautionary) interventions.

The situation becomes totally different when one comes across a third type of situation in which one cannot fully depend on the scientific information system as such when it comes to the estimate of possible adverse effects.  This is especially the case when an epistemic debate is going on in science:​[118]​ for example, disciplines use competing models or analogies or basic assumptions to reveal the subject matter under investigation in order to gain new knowledge.  In the case of (long-term) effects of the introduction of Genetically Modified Organisms (GMOs), for instance, biotechnologists usually refer, by analogy, to the practice of conventional plant breeding as a basis for making ‘predictions’ concerning their risks.  Ecologists, on the contrary, refer, also by analogy, to experience based on the introduction of particular species into new environments (thereby causing ‘problem’ plants and pests).​[119]​  This debate even went so far that representatives of the different disciplines rejected the relevance of each others’ knowledge base for the actual assessment of risks.  This epistemic debate concerning the (long-term) effects in terms of their predictability will need many years to be completely settled: both the analogies of the ecologists and biotechnologists are believable, but refer to a completely different (potential) scientific information base that still needs to be unveiled by ongoing research.

The possible effects of individual releases (although one needs to bear in mind the build up of many releases over time) may not be either identifiable, nor be known in their scope (in terms of possible negative indirect, long-term or delayed effects).  However, these effects might be supervisable and practical management and monitoring practices could make possible an early identification of unexpected events.  Also their degree of severity can be identified to some extent.  Particular effects may be irreversible, since if transgenes are in the environment, then they cannot be (easily) retrieved.  The situation is different from a classical risk management situation: a precautionary approach can be justified.  

Less spectacular in terms of scientific discussion, but with similar significance for the invocation of the precautionary principle, are cases relating to a fourth type of circumstance when particular cause-effect relationships cannot be scientifically established while at the same time the adverse effects are known.  The elimination of the use of particular antibiotics in feedstuffs as well as the protection of the North Sea (dumping of waste) represents some examples.  

The overview of these four types of circumstances ascertains the need to have an examination of the state of affairs in science and types of uncertainties involved.  Drawing the borderline between traditional risk management practice and the situation of an entirely hypothetical risk involves making normative choices which need to be made explicit.  But even more significantly, in the case of epistemic uncertainty, a normative relationship between the nature and the uncertainties and the possible adverse effects needs to be established in order to justify policy and regulatory intervention.​[120]​  

Indeed, application of the precautionary principle to the relationship of man with the environment appears to have been inevitable, given the steadily increasing threats posed to the environment by human activities, often surrounded by uncertainty regarding their precise effects.  Uncertainty will be inherent to much of humanity’s interplay with the environment follows from the very nature of environmental problems.  Firstly, they are often not limited to one geographical area.​[121]​  Secondly, there frequently is a time lag between the moment a human activity takes place and the moment its effects upon the environment become detectable.​[122]​  As an example the destruction of stratospheric ozone by chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) can suffice.  Thirdly, apart from these spatial and temporal dimensions of environmental problems, there is a quantitative side to the matter.  In terms of global climate change, for instance, fossil fuel combustion in one car’s engine could be considered insignificant, but in combination with thousands and thousands of other cars, the effects might take on disastrous proportions​[123]​.  Fourthly, the introduction into a river ecosystem of a particular substance might be relatively harmless in itself, but in a chemical reaction with other released substances a highly toxic mix could be formed; this is the so-called “cumulative effect”​[124]​.  Fifthly, and finally, the complex interdependencies which exist within and between ecosystems make cause and effect relationships even harder to comprehend.  For example, the cutting of one single tree might have a number of unforeseen repercussions for the whole stand of which it formed part, if it happens to be an old, high quality seed tree and fulfils the specific nesting requirements of a rare bird species.

It will be apparent that these features of environmental problem especially since they frequently interact​[125]​, often hamper the accurate determination of whether, when, where, and to what extent the environment will be adversely affected by a given activity.  Without dismissing the important role of science in the process of shaping environmental policy and law generally, in many cases it just cannot provide satisfactory answers to such questions​[126]​.  According to Tallacchini, ecological science represents “a prominent example of an uncertain science, which must cope with a wide range of unpredictabilities, lack of data, competing models and explanations.”​[127]​  This is all the more meaningful when contemplating that throughout the ages, philosophers and academics have emphasized the limitations of the more exact scientific disciplines alike, as well as those of human knowledge generally.  To keep with the present context, the scientific community entirely failed, for instance, to predict the drastic ozone-depleting effect of CFCs.​[128]​  Global climate change and depletion of biological diversity have been predicted in general terms but remain insufficiently understood.  This way, the irregularity of cause and effect relationships often lead to serious or even permanent harm to ecosystems before such relationships are fully understood.​[129]​

The introduction of the precautionary principle into environmental law and policy has highlighted the multiple uncertainties surrounding threats to the environment, of the accompanying inability of science to accurately predict the effects of human behaviour​[130]​ and, most importantly, of the need to undertake preventive action to protect the environment in the face of these uncertainties and this inability​[131]​.  A sense of urgency was furthermore provided by increasing indications that harm inflicted upon the environment can be of grave or even irreversible consequence.  The move towards a more precautionary approach was based, in other words, on the recognition that existing ignorance on many ecological facts calls for the adoption of a prudent approach towards these uncertainties.  While the knowledge of environmental hazards, however incomplete, that is available must be acted upon to prevent the latter​[132]​.  It was in the context of this growing recognition that, as early as 1966.  Sir Robert Jennings observed:

A governing principle ought to be that nothing in man’s environment should be subject to the risk of large-scale change until the natural phenomena which might be changed or obscured, have been studied, and their nature and functions established with reasonable certainty.  To act counter to this principle is recklessness of a cataclysmic order [..].​[133]​

Precautionary thinking challenges the basis of what might be referred to as the “traditional model” of environmental decision-making.  “The main feature of this model, which is founded upon the assumption that science can to a sufficient extent foretell the outcome in terms of environmental impacts of any given human activity, is that action to protect the environment is solely justified when conclusive evidence shows that such an activity will cause (substantial) damage in the absence of preventive and abatement measures.”​[134]​  Given the fact that such measures usually carry price-tags, this position follows largely from the universal desire and democratic necessity to allocate scarce financial resources in the most efficient manner.  Together with the aforementioned acknowledgement of the limitations of science and the basic assumption underlying the traditional model, realization that this approach did not provide for effective environmental protection led to an increased focus on precautionary action. This focus aimed “to overcome the usual paralysis that accompanies uncertainty” under this model​[135]​.  As a result, in spite of a danger to the environment, definite scientific evidence is currently no longer a requirement, nor is uncertainty a hindrance, for taking measures to deal with it.  

Motives for supporting a precautionary attitude to the environment vary greatly.  Obviously, entities and publicists concerned with environmental protection are among those in favour of such an approach.​[136]​  One of the reasons why NGOs such as the World Wildlife Fund (WWF), Friends of the Earth (FOE) and Greenpeace strongly back the proliferation of the precautionary principle,​[137]​ is the fact that it acknowledges the necessity of environmental preservation in its own right.  This is reflected in, e.g., Principle 15 of the Rio Declaraion:

In order to protect the environment, the precautionary approach shall be widely applied by States according to their capabilities.  Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental degradation.​[138]​

In short, as environmentalists generally fear for the future of the natural world and want to care for its wellbeing, they are likely to be fond of the precautionary principle.​[139]​Alexandre Kiss also stresses this environmental rationale of the precautionary principle, by stating that “[i]t is to be applied in those cases wherever activity may result in long lasting or irreversible damage to the environment, as well as in those cases where the benefit to be derived from a particular activity is completely out of proportion to the negative impact which that activity may have on the environment.”​[140]​

However, the precautionary approach is by no means based on ecocentric considerations alone.​[141]​  From a more anthropocentric point of view, precaution is often advocated by those willing to secure that the earth is passed on to the next generation of human beings in no worse condition than in which the present one received it​[142]​.  Indeed, in many situations the application of the precautionary principle will be an essential condition for safeguarding the environmental interests of generations still unborn.​[143]​  In relation to these interests, Gro Harlem Brundtland, chairperson of the World Commission on Environment and Development (WCED), encapsulated the principle this way:  “If we err in our decisions affecting the future of our children and our planet, let us err on the side of caution.”​[144]​  

Even in the strictest utilitarian context, where the focus is purely on the needs of the present generation of human beings, the precautionary principle hardly loses in meaning.  This was recognised, for instance, in 1973 by the United States Congress when justifying the practically absolute protection the Endangered Species Act ​[145]​confers, for precautionary reasons, upon a species of flora and fauna once it is designated as endangered or threatened:

Who knows, or can say, what potential cures for cancer or other scourges, present or future, may lie locked up in the structures of plants which may yet be undiscovered, much less analysed?  [..] Sheer self-interest impels us to be cautious.  The institutionalisation of that caution lies at the heart of the [Endangered Species Act].​[146]​
Another aspect worthy of attention here relates to the requirement for finances to be brought to bear in the most efficient way.  Whereas the “traditional model of environmental decision-making” may have been overtaken by the precautionary discussion, this economic requirement is left unaffected.  Wide of the mark, however, is the assumption that the precautionary principle recognises none of this.  On the contrary, taking into account the fundamental laws of economics, the principle “assumes that scarce financial resources may be allocated inefficiently if action is taken only after scientific certainty as to detrimental effects has been ascertained.”​[147]​  The monetary costs of most clean-up operations, for example, far exceed those of measures to prevent or reduce pollution.  The expenses of acting in a precautionary manner generally pale into insignificance beside the economic and social losses suffered from the shut-down of complete industries following failure to do so.  For instance, the fact that precaution was not applied in the area of commercial whaling until 1982 led to the almost annihilation of what was once a flourishing, global industry.  Similar arguments apply to fisheries and forestry undertakings.​[148]​  This explains why nowadays, for example in the field of fisheries management, influential multinational companies such as Unilever, alongside environmental NGOs, support the thesis that “[t]he precautionary approach [..] should apply at all times, even when stocks are abundant”​[149]​.  Because, in most cases, an ounce of precaution is worth a pound of cure.​[150]​ 

Most commentators agree that in cases of uncertainty about the effects of a human-induced development one of the most consistent applications of the precautionary principle would entail the placing of the burden of proving that the activity in question will not cause unacceptable environmental damage. This requires its opponents to show that it will before cancelling or adapting it​[151]​.  As McLaren, D. restates this, “where there is uncertainty, but good reason to suspect that a development will be damaging to the prospects for sustainability, the onus must be put on the developer to prove that this is not the case.​[152]​”  These potentially far-reaching implications of the principle have met with a measure of criticism, based essentially on two premises.  On the one hand, up to a point, every human activity could be said to have an adverse impact on the environment.  On the other hand, the very notion of a hundred per cent scientific certainty regarding environmental effects is to be dismissed as a utopian scheme​[153]​.  Thus an interpretation of the precautionary principle demanding prior conclusive proof of no harm whatsoever would seem to impose an unrealistically heavy burden on developers.

Fear of the suggestion, resulting from such an interpretation, that any development would be incompatible with precaution has on occasion provoked fierce opposition to the precautionary principle, most notably by industrial sectors involved in resource extraction, like fisheries, forestry and mining.  For such industries, “the precautionary principle holds the threat of providing a new generation of weaponry for their opponents in the environmental battlefield; namely that the principle would provide justification for a ‘zero risk/do nothing’ approach to development decisions.​[154]​”  It is partly with a view to this type of concerns that many formulations of the precautionary principle incorporate a particular threshold, e.g. in the form of a threat of “serious or irreversible” harm instead of “any” harm, that has to be met in order for the principle to be activated.​[155]​  Besides, in a number of cases where the burden of proof is envisaged as being upon the proponents of potentially harmful activities, the requirement of absolute proof is replaced by the demonstration of e.g. “a high level of probability” that no serious or irreversible damage will occur​[156]​.  Whichever way, support in current society for the precautionary approach is prevalent.  In fact, since “it moves the real burden of taking decisions from scientists to policy makers”​[157]​, precaution plays a major role in the democratization of environmental decision-making​[158]​.

The Relationship between the Precautionary Principle and the Preventive Principle

Before proceeding, a concise description of the basic features of the precautionary principle will be illustrated (again) here to set the stage and to outline the beginning of the analysis below.

The foundation of the precautionary principle—or precautionary approach, as it is often referred to—is a dual one.  That means two scientific insights explain the adoption of the precautionary principle by States.  Put simply, the first is the understanding that in many circumstances the environmental harm caused by human activities is more serious than previously thought and can be difficult, if not impossible, to reverse.  Due to the susceptibility of the environment, anthropogenic effects are very much of a long-term and sometimes irreversible nature.  The second insight forming the foundation of the precautionary principle involves the uncertainty about, and limited predictability of, the seriousness and probability of environmental impacts, which is due in a large measure to the intricacy and unpredictability of natural systems and processes.  In international law and policy, the precautionary principle constitutes a recent trend from reactive and disjointed environmental policies towards more proactive and holistic approaches.  Within this context, it is strongly linked to the ecosystem approach.​[159]​  Additionally, the application of the precautionary principle is widely regarded as vital for the achievement of sustainable development, which is normally defined as development in a way and at a rate that is appropriate for the needs of present generations of human beings without compromising the ability of future generations to meet theirs.​[160]​  The aim of the precautionary principle is the adequate protection of the environment, both for its own sake and for the benefit of mankind.​[161]​  The precautionary principle has been an obvious environmental principle and the limits of its scope in contemporary general international law mirror this.​[162]​  The characteristic statement in Principle15 of the 1992 Rio Declaration sets down the principle’s wide application by States.  On the whole, the precautionary principle requires action at an early stage in response to threats of environmental harm, including in situations of scientific uncertainty.  By applying the principle, the environment is given the benefit of the doubt: in dubio pro natura.

The precautionary principle made its definite appearance on the intergovernmental stage a little over twenty years ago, at a regional conference for the protection of the North Sea.​[163]​  This was the beginning of a rapid development.  Within five years it had been virtually universally accepted as a central principle of international environmental law, an acceptance that was finalised in Rio de Janeiro at the 1992 UN Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED).  At present, the precautionary principle can be found in a great number of intergovernmental declarations, resolutions, and action programmes and, furthermore, in or under more than sixty multilateral treaties enveloping multitude of environmental issues.  The principle has also become a well-known tenet of European Union (EU) environmental law and policy.  In response to these international developments, increasing numbers of States are implementing the precautionary principle in domestic environmental laws and policies.  

‘In dubio pro natura’ and ‘erring on the side of environmental protection’ precisely reflect the essence of the precautionary principle in international law.  In particular, the following definition of a duty of States to take precautionary action is deemed symbolic of the current state of the law:

“Wherever, on the basis of the best information available, there are reasonable grounds for concern that serious and/or irreversible harm to the environment may be caused, effective and proportional action to prevent and/or abate this harm must be taken, including in the face of scientific uncertainty regarding the cause, extent and/or probability of the potential harm.”​[164]​

As indicated by the minimum thresholds of probability (‘reasonable grounds for concern’) and gravity (‘serious and/or irreversible’) of anticipated harm, not every chance of any adverse impact is supposed to bring about action.​[165]​  As for implementation, the condition of effectiveness demands that a course of action is chosen that efficiently protects the endangered part of the environment.  The proportionality criterion requires that this course of action is compatible with the size (probability and gravity) of the risk involved, in order to avoid adoption of overly strict measures.   As a matter of general international law, there is, however, no precondition for precautionary measures to be cost-effective in the conventional, strictly economic sense.  Various guidelines help setting up what, in concrete instances, constitutes effective and proportional action.  Such action should, among other things, be (1) timely; (2) adapted to the circumstances of the case; and (3) regularly reviewed and maintained as long as necessary to prevent the harm involved, but not longer.​[166]​  There are several measures which are traditionally associated with the implementation of the precautionary principle.  These include research, environmental impact assessment (EIA), safety margins, allotment of the burden of proof to advocates of potentially harmful activities, and—the most obviously precautionary measure—the moratorium.​[167]​  All the same, any other measure may represent an appropriate implementation of the principle provided that it fulfils the requirements of effectiveness and proportionality.  

The preventative principle, which is also known as ‘prevention principle’, ‘principle of prevent(at)ive action’, ‘prevent(at)ive approach’, and ‘preventive principle’ is a primarily environmental concept.​[168]​  In particular, the preventative principle should be distinguished from the duty of States to avoid transboundary environmental harm.​[169]​  The latter represents a traditional and fundamental principle of international environmental law and was upheld in the 1972 Stockholm Declaration as the obligation of States ‘to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the environment of other states or of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction’.​[170]​  It was repeated in the Rio Declaration​[171]​ and is nearly generally believed to form part of customary international law,​[172]​ because in many circumstances this duty requires the adoption of preventative measures. 


Although both the duty to avoid transboundary harm and the preventative principle as it is usually understood authorise the adoption of preventative measures, the primary distinction between them rests in their respective objectives.  Whereas the former originates from respect for the principle of state sovereignty, the latter—like the precautionary principle—seeks to protect the environment as an end in itself.​[173]​  Accordingly, the scope of the preventative principle—again like the precautionary principle—is not limited to transboundary damage.​[174]​  Its conceptual core: namely, preventative logic,​[175]​ can be traced back at least some eighty years and can, as stated above, be viewed as being at the basis of many environmental agreements and of concrete measures aimed at, for instance, the minimisation of pollution.​[176]​  However, as a principle it has not been codified nearly as often as the duty to avoid transboundary harm, and the scarce codifications in question are largely confined to European instruments.​[177]​  Consequently, not all writers necessarily appreciate the existence per se of the preventative principle as understood here,​[178]​ and of those who do, very few claim that it has attained the status of customary international law.​[179]​  In fact, a number of writers do ascribe customary status to the duty to avoid transboundary harm but not to the preventative principle.​[180]​  In 1991, one author, while observing that the ‘self-evident truth that an ounce of prevention is better than a pound of cure, has for some time now been reflected in the international law related to the environment,’ acknowledged that ‘unto this day the notion has persisted that customary international law does not yet include such an obligation’.​[181]​  Interestingly, the 2005 arbitral award in the Iron Rhine case seems to come close to the according customary status to the preventative principle when stating that:

“Environmental law and the law on development stand not as alternatives but as mutually reinforcing, integral concepts, which require that where development may cause significant harm to the environment there is a duty to prevent, or at least mitigate, such harm (see paragraph 222).  This duty, in the opinion of the Tribunal, has now become a principle of general international law.”​[182]​

Nevertheless, the 222nd recital of the award referred to here elucidates that what is meant is, in the end, the traditional duty to prevent transboundary harm.

It would seem that up to now the preventative principle still does not present a broad customary obligation to prevent environmental harm in areas beyond and within national jurisdiction.  The precautionary principle, however, does exactly that.

In theory, a reasonably clear-cut dividing line may be drawn between preventative logic and precautionary logic, employing uncertainty as the defining criterion.  If the environmental effects of a particular activity are known, measures to avoid them may be termed preventative.  If such effects are uncertain, the same measures may also be labelled precautionary.​[183]​  As knowledge of an issue (e.g. ozone layer depletion or climate change) advances, related measures automatically become less precautionary and more preventative.​[184]​  Eventually, once all uncertainty has been removed, ‘precaution is no longer the right word.’​[185]​  Under strictly preventative logic, the taking of preventative action is conditional upon the existence of ‘certainty’ regarding the threats involved.  On the other hand, precautionary logic means acting as soon as alarm bells are ringing, even if ‘certainty’ is not yet available.​[186]​   Over time, precautionary logic therefore normally requires measures at an earlier stage than does purely preventative logic.  Precautionary logic goes beyond preventative logic, and presupposes the latter.​[187]​  Whichever way, in principle, where there is certainty, preventative logic suffices and vice versa.​[188]​

Matters are somewhat more complicated when one sticks to the relatively common position that preventative logic covers the prevention of known risks of harm.  Risk is generally construed as a function of the probability of occurrence of a certain hazard in a given period and the expected gravity of resultant harm should it occur.​[189]​  On the aforementioned view of the matter, minimisation of quantifiable risks could still be considered as preventative.  It would therefore be the presence or lack of scientifically recognised and well-understood causal relationships that identifies the distinction between preventative and precautionary logic.​[190]​  In the end, without proof and understanding of such relationships, risks cannot validly be calculated.​[191]​  As de Sadeleer explains:

“Prevention is based on certainties: it rests on cumulative experience concerning the degree of risk posed by an activity (Russian roulette, for example, involves a predictable one-in-six chance of death).  Therefore, prevention presupposes science, technical control, and the notion of an objective assessment of risks in order to reduce the probability of their occurrence.  Preventive measures are thus intended to avert risks for which the cause-and-effect relationship is already known. …Precaution, in contrast, comes into play when the probability of a suspected risk cannot be irrefutably demonstrated.  The distinction between the two…is thus the degree of uncertainty surrounding the probability of risk.  The lower the margin of uncertainty, the greater the justification for intervention as a means of prevention rather than in the name of precaution.  By contrast, precaution is used when scientific research has not yet reached a stage that allows the veil of uncertainty to be lifted.”​[192]​

From a practical viewpoint, however, a firm segregation of the two concepts is hardly operable.  One may consider, for instance, the ‘apparently unsteady distinction’ between risk and uncertainty.​[193]​  In spite of terminology such as ‘known risks’ and the like, uncertainty is obviously inherent in the very notion of risk. Also quantifiable risks, where the likelihood and nature of an anticipated impact are relatively ‘established’, still contain a degree of uncertainty.​[194]​  Furthermore, any given calculation, however correctly carried out, may be ignoring or misinterpreting environmental relationships and effects that may not yet exist or are wrongly understood​[195]​.  In this sense, action taken to combat risks can be named precautionary as much as preventative.​[196]​  The precautionary extent of any such action, for example, tackling contamination of a river as a result of an industrial accident, depends on the relative importance of the uncertainties in question:

“If both the probability of accidental pollution and the magnitude of the consequences of that pollution are known, the standards would be relatively unprecautionary, precisely because the level of uncertainty involved is relatively low.  High risks do not necessarily entail high levels of uncertainty.  However, if the probability and magnitude are relatively unknown, because, for instance, it is not known what cause and effect relationships are involved, or exactly what the nature of the involved causal relationships is, then the standards would be precautionary because of the relative uncertainties involved.”​[197]​

It may thus be argued that in the end all risk reduction measures are precautionary to some degree, although some more than others.​[198]​










The Preventative Principle and the Precautionary Principle 

At the start of this section, it is useful to recall that the preventative principle and the precautionary principle both have the same general purpose: that is, the adequate protection of the environment.  Still, they have frequently been treated as separate principles, including in the EC Treaty and a number of other (predominantly European) international legal and policy instruments that name both principles alongside each other.​[199]​

Following the stylish and, theoretically speaking, apparently firm distinction between preventative and precautionary logic as described in the previous section, commentators have frequently differentiate the preventative principle and the precautionary principle along the same lines.​[200]​  In this respect, the preventative principle—like the duty to avoid transboundary harm—is often understood to encompass the avoidance of known harm as well as known risks of harm.​[201]​  Yet, this distinction has not been translated exactly into intergovernmental practice.  As will be understood by now, preventative and precautionary logic do not neatly overlap with, respectively, the preventative and precautionary principles.  Likewise, the difference between preventative logic and precautionary logic does not exactly correspond to the difference between the preventative principle and the precautionary principle.  And even if it did, States would obviously still meet with difficulties to decide when to rely on the preventative and when on the precautionary principle, considering the practical intricacy of distinguishing between preventative and precautionary action.​[202]​  As Haigh put it: ‘Since there is likely to be uncertainty when uncertainty disappears there will also be uncertainty about whether to talk of the principle of precaution rather than of prevention.’​[203]​

Without surprise, in national and international discussion, States have not always distinguished sharply between the preventative and precautionary principles.​[204]​  A 1988 UK policy document, for example, speaks of ‘a preventive, precautionary approach’.​[205]​  The 1991 Bamako Convention, apart from mentioning ‘the precautionary principle’, makes reference to ‘the preventive, precautionary approach’,​[206]​whereas the parties to the 1992 EEA Agreement dedicated themselves to preserving the environment on the basis of ‘the principle that precautionary and preventive action should be taken’.​[207]​  Likewise, the 1992 Central American Hazardous Wastes Agreement refers to ‘el enfoque preventivo y precautorio’.​[208]​  A similar lack of distinction can be met, inter alia, in several provisions of Agenda 21​[209]​ and the 1996 Protocol to the London Convention on marine dumping.​[210]​  Prevention and precaution seem to be presented in these instruments as two sides of the same coin, with an unclear dividing line between them at best.​[211]​

However, a question—the answer to which is evidently important for present purposes—is whether uncertainty is actually a requirement for the applicability of the precautionary principle.  This is strictly related to the question of whether the precautionary principle demands action because of uncertainty or in spite of uncertainty.  The answer is that the practice of States and common sense alike do support the latter option.  Indeed, as described earlier, the role of uncertainty in environmental affairs plays an important part of the rationale of the precautionary principle.  Even so, it is not correct to say that the existence of uncertainty is a prerequisite for application of the principle.  On the contrary, the requirement of proportionality requires that the level of precautionary measures correspond to the likelihood and expected gravity of harm.  Thus, when there is certainty—assuming such a thing exists—that harm will occur if preventative measures are not taken, then taking action is clearly justified.  If the thresholds of harm and likelihood are crossed, effective and proportional measures must be taken, whether there is uncertainty or not.​[212]​  It is a clarification, not a condition.  The right question is therefore not how much uncertainty must there be for the precautionary principle to apply, but how much uncertainty may there be.  The answer to the latter question may be given by referring to the minimum threshold of likelihood: ‘reasonable grounds for concern’.  It is thus possible to imagine cases where there is too much uncertainty for the principle to apply.  On the other hand, there can never be too much certainty of harmfulness for the principle to be applicable.

Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration, and the many other provisions of international and national instruments that are either similarly expressed or directly refer to Principle 15, assume that where environmental harm is threatened, ‘lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing’ preventative measures.​[213]​  That means, action to ward off potential hazards may not be obstructed by uncertainty.  Put yet another way, the trigger for any measures that may be required by the precautionary principle is obviously the fear that damage may be caused, and not the scientific uncertainty itself.  Hence, according to these provisions, the precautionary principle requires action in spite of uncertainty, not because of it.

Other instruments assert this premise more explicitly. For instance, in the 1992 Baltic Sea Convention the precautionary principle has been specified to require preventative action when there is reason to assume that emissions of substances or energy into the marine environment may be harmful, ‘even when there is no conclusive evidence of a causal relationship between inputs and their alleged effects’.​[214]​  This is an obvious case of action despite uncertainty.  Similarly, the 2002 ASEAN Haze Pollution Agreement stipulates that ‘where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage from transboundary haze pollution, even without full scientific certainty, precautionary measures shall be taken by Parties concerned’.​[215]​  The 1992 OSPAR Convention,​[216]​ the 1996 London Protocol,​[217]​ the 1997 Trilateral Wadden Sea Plan,​[218]​ the European Commission’s 2000 Communication on the principle,​[219]​ and several intergovernmental declarations on the protection of the oceans include similar formulations.​[220]​  Examples of such formulations at the national level include a 1984 judgement of the German Federal Administrative Court,​[221]​ the 1996 report of the US President’s Council on Sustainable Development,​[222]​ a Belgian federal act of 1999 on the protection of the marine environment,​[223]​ and several UK policy instruments.​[224]​  

On all these occasions, the precautionary principle very much suggests the assumption that preventative and abatement action is always appropriate where there is adequately qualified threat of environmental harm.  The principle accompanies this by the explicit elucidation that this is so even when scientific proof in relation to this threat and its potential effects is not present.  The definition of the precautionary principle in the 1990 Bergen Declaration points at the same direction: 

“In order to achieve sustainable development, policies must be based on the precautionary principle.  Environmental measures must anticipate, prevent and attack the causes of environmental degradation.  Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty should not be used as a reason for postponing measures to prevent environmental degradation.”​[225]​

A short summary from the above quote is that environmental degradation must be prevented.  That scientific uncertainty may not hinder this prevention is a separate addition.  Yet another variation on the same theme is provided by formulations in the vein of the 2002 International Law Association (ILA) New Delhi Declaration on Sustainable Development, which states that the precautionary principle commits States ‘to avoid human activity which may cause significant harm to human health, natural resources or ecosystems, including in the face of scientific uncertainty’.​[226]​

Now that preventative action proper is evidently viewed as within the bounds of the precautionary principle just as much as precautionary action proper, where does this leave the preventative principle?  Whilst precautionary logic presupposes preventative logic—in the sense that not only uncertain hazards but of course also ‘certain’ hazards are to be dealt with—so the precautionary principle may perhaps be considered as presupposing, as it were, the preventative principle.  That is, the latter might be deemed ‘a necessary corollary to the former’.​[227]​  It seems to do more justice to the pertinent practice of States, however, to view the precautionary principle as an expanded version of the preventative principle,​[228]​ as effectively comprising the latter, or—probably most accurately—as the ‘most developed form’ of prevention.​[229]​

In reality, States do not concentrate on separating the respective scopes of application of the preventative and precautionary principles and, for that matter, rarely mention the preventative principle.  Instead, they tend to rely on the precautionary principle as the flag that covers the entire cargo of preventative measures, whether taken under scientific uncertainty or not.​[230]​  For example, a 1989 Decision by the UN Environment Programme (UNEP) Governing Council Decision urged the international community to adopt the precautionary principle as the basis (not just one of the bases) of its policy on marine pollution.​[231]​  Correspondingly, the 1995 Fourth North Sea Declaration states:

“The Ministers AGREE that the objective is to ensure a sustainable, sound and healthy North Sea ecosystem.  The guiding principle for achieving this objective is the precautionary principle.  This implies the prevention of the pollution of the North Sea by continuously reducing discharges, emissions and losses of hazardous substances, thereby moving towards the target of their cessation within one generation (25 years) with the ultimate aim of concentrations in the environment near background values for naturally occurring substances and close to zero concentrations for man-made synthetic substances.”​[232]​

In fact, scores of legal instruments lay down the application of the precautionary principle while not separately mentioning the preventative principle—which can terribly be interpreted to mean that uncertain dangers are to be prevented while ‘certain’ dangers may be allowed to appear.  The Rio Declaration, for instance, does not incorporate the preventative principle as an independent principle, feeding the assumption that it is actually inherent or encompassed in Principle 15.​[233]​  By way of an explanatory sample,​[234]​ the same applies for the OSPAR Convention,​[235]​ the 1993 EU Fifth Action Programme on the Environment,​[236]​ the 2001 Albatross Agreement,​[237]​ and the 2001 Stockholm Persistent Organic Pollutants (POPs) Convention.​[238]​

Other than these multilateral agreements apparently using the precautionary principle as pars pro toto for all preventative action—whether taken under uncertainty or not—several examples can be observed in the domestic arena.  One such example is provided by the measures imposed after a fire in a chemical depot in Drachten, the Netherlands.​[239]​  Although the impacts of some of the released substances were unknown, those of several others certainly were.  Still, instead of pleading to the precautionary and preventative principles to justify a ban on the use of grass growing in the surrounding area as cow feed, the competent Dutch minister referred only to the precautionary principle.​[240]​  In Germany, it is not uncommon either to think of precaution as actually comprising prevention.​[241]​  As a final example, a judicial decision by the Indian Supreme Court also regards the concept of prevention as part and parcel of the precautionary principle, in a way very similar to the approach of the aforementioned Bergen Declaration.​[242]​

In summary, the basic answer to the questions asked at the beginning of this section is that where the precautionary principle is endorsed, the substance of the preventative principle is as well.


Conclusions

To every intent and purpose, in international environmental law the precautionary principle must be considered as having absorbed the preventative principle—or, otherwise, as being its most developed form.  One way or the other, the result is, in practice, the same.  With reference to the legal consolidation of the precautionary principle, there is, arguably, no longer any reason to maintain a separate preventative principle aimed at the prevention of ‘certain’ harm – a principle that has never had a striking independent existence in international law.  As described above, many modern environmental agreements display this new status quo by mentioning, of the two, solely the precautionary principle, while it is obviously not the parties’ intention to tackle uncertain threats, and leave ‘certain’ threats alone.  However, especially in the EU and its member States, the traditionally grown attachment to a theoretical distinction between prevention and precaution is currently still significant.  This is not about to change drastically as long as the provision of the EC Treaty, in which the two principles are quoted separately, lives on in its current form.​[243]​  It would probably assist the interest of clarity to follow general international law by adopting the precautionary principle as the sole basis for the prevention of both ‘certain’ and uncertain environmental harm.  


CHAPTER’S CONCLUSIONS

Most serious environmental crises contain a fundamental characteristic: they appear to emerge from disturbance of natural systems or cycles, the behaviour of which is only partly understood.  Global warming, ecological and health risks from GMOs, and environmental cancer risks, are hazards which still involve a great deal of uncertainty.  In compelling public decision-makers to think cautiously about the scientific uncertainties involved in health and environmental decision-making, the precautionary principle is possibly one of the most important principles of the modern era.  It is without surprise that its rise has been so remarkable and that it has rapidly become established into regulatory regimes.  The precautionary principle can at best be described by tell it apart from the preventive principle.  The precautionary principle, however, calls for environmental action at an earlier stage.  The principle acts as a tool for tackling situations where an environmental damage is likely, but scientific uncertainty relating to the impact of the vulnerable activity does not allow a precise prediction of the level of the hazards to the environment.  To close this paragraph and chapter, examination of the development of the precautionary principle—“from an uncontroversial espousal of commonsense to its emergence as a potentially forceful decision-making norm”​[244]​ led one author to conclude that “modern international law is largely precautionary.”​[245]​  Whether this is true or not, remains to be seen.​[246]​  At a minimum level, however, the emerging precautionary principle has “with such speed onto the international scene from the deliberations of the International Conferences on the Protection of the North Sea, it has now been so widely accepted in international and increasingly in national instruments that few would seek to deny its importance​[247]​.”   This being so, two important questions are left to be answered.  One is to the principle’s precise status in international law, the other to its implementation.  The former, which should logically be addressed first, will be dealt with in the following chapter.  The latter requires an examination into the legal instruments and procedures most commonly used for putting the precautionary principle into practice,​[248]​ which is somewhat beyond the scope of this thesis.


















CHAPTER 2

LEGAL STATUS OF THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE

 2.1  The Legal Status of the Precautionary Principle

There are quite a few ways in which the protection of the environment can be managed.​[249]​  These include: the curative model; the preventive model; and the anticipatory model.  Generally, it may be said that the first of these models is derived from a conceptual premise that natural resources are exhaustible and nature has to be assisted to cure itself.  The costs of such assistance are to be borne by the polluter.  However, such a policy is practicable only if implemented together with the preventive policy, in order to reduce reparation to what could be compensated.  In such a model, the risks to be dealt with are still foreseeable.​[250]​  The preventive model is based on the premise of limiting damage, while permitting a certain degree of nuisance.  This model calls for prudence in approaching the exploitation of natural resources, and its aim is to greatly reducing damage, which may only occur by accident.  It is based on the assimilative capacity of the environment,​[251]​ which cannot be exceeded, otherwise (irreversible) loss will occur.  This model is entirely based on available scientific knowledge.​[252]​  The anticipatory model is the most environmentally oriented model, which, as is inferred, materialised because of dissatisfaction with scientific predictability, ‘which comes up against staggering limits in the field of environment’, whilst in the field of environmental protection ‘the only certainty is uncertainty’.​[253]​  The precautionary principle falls exactly into the third model.  

It has also been asserted that the precautionary principle is about the burden of proof, a concept that lies behind every legal system.  It is generally accepted that those who argue something must prove it, unless the court takes judicial notice of that fact or where there is a presumption in favour of that person.​[254]​.  Thus, for instance, if the Mr. A alleges that Mrs. B stole his plants, he has to prove that fact, Mrs. B does not have any burden of proof.  Similarly, if a person alleges that a particular product or technology is safe, he has to establish that fact, those who contend otherwise do not have to establish that it is, in fact, unsafe.  This is the principle that underlies the precautionary principle.​[255]​  This does not mean that the precautionary principle actually reverses the burden of proof, as argued by some writers.​[256]​  It merely applies the burden of proof in its normal context, as mentioned in the above example: those who contend something must establish that fact.  In other words, if somebody claims that a particular product or technology is safe and does not bring about harm to public health or the environment, that person must ascertain that fact.  Society does not have to prove that such product or technology is safe.  This would be a reversal of the burden of proof.​[257]​  Marr states that:

“The precautionary principle suggests that behaviour should be subject to regulation before harm is demonstrated.  Thereby it suggests a departure from the traditional, tort-oriented approach which precludes the presumption of harm as a result of an activity of another until a party can show damage and causation.  Thus, it shifts the burden of proving harmlessness to the party who wishes to engage in the environmentally sensitive activity.  The wider implication of the reversal of the burden of proof is that it implies that human action should be assumed to be harmful to the environment unless proven otherwise, giving the environment or the resources the benefit of the doubt.”​[258]​

Marr actually made a reference to two issues here: the fact that the party who wishes to participate in an environmentally sensitive activity has to show that there is no significant environmental damage does not mean that the burden of proof is reversed; as discussed above; the party that states a fact, simply has to prove it.  The second issue concerns the presumption that an activity is harmful unless proven otherwise.  Here the complainant has the benefit of a presumption in his favour and has no initial burden of proof.  The proponent of the activity has the burden of proof to demonstrate that his activity will not create damaging effects on the environment.  Here the burden of proof is reversed because of the presumption.  This approach is adopted in relation to activities that are considered extremely hazardous in nature.​[259]​  On the standard of the burden of proof, Saunders observes that:   

“The principle does not, as some critics claim, require industry to provide absolute proof that something new is safe.  That would be an impossible demand and would indeed stop technology dead in its track, but it is not what is being demanded.  The precautionary does not deal with absolute certainty.  On the contrary, it is specifically intended for circumstances in which there is no absolute certainty.  It simply puts the burden of proof where it belongs, with the innovator.  The requirement is to demonstrate, not absolutely but beyond reasonable doubt, that what is being proposed is safe.”​[260]​

Given both the urgent need for coping with international environmental problems and their complex nature, defending the position that the precautionary action is mandated by a principle of natural law would be as easy as falling off a log.​[261]​  Nevertheless, academics of international law should look primarily for positivist authority for rules and principles.​[262]​  Accordingly, instead of justifying the precautionary principle in terms of abstract justice, some attempts will be employed (in this work) to lift some of the obscurity veiling the concept’s legal status by reference to concrete evidence in established international law, the main sources of which are:

(a)	international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules expressly recognised by the contesting States;
(b)	international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law;
(c)	the general principles of law recognised by civilised nations;
(d)	[..] judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law.​[263]​

In general, the discussion of legal issues of the precautionary principle focuses on its status in international customary law.  However, as will be demonstrated, the practice of international courts and tribunals regarding the precautionary principle is predominantly concentrated on the lengthy (and often not very enlightening) discussions whether or not it has already attained the status of international customary law or general principles of law.  It has been known that international environmental law is particularly uncertain in relation to the normative content of its norms.​[264]​  There are many factors which add to this state of affairs, one of them, for example, being the process of international law making, which in many situations is based on the principle of the balancing of the interests of all interested parties, such as the management and sharing of rights in relation to international watercourses and the responsibility of States for environmental damage, which relies to a certain degree on this principle.​[265]​  Other factors, which play a significant role in environmental norm-setting, are the competing interests and differentiation in the legal position of developed and developing States, i.e. the competing interests and differentiation are observed in the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities.​[266]​

Therefore, Dworkin’s ​[267]​rigid separation of the law into rules (as strictly binding) and principles (flexible instruments the legal context of which is unclear) met with difficulty in applying in the context of international environmental law, where a treaty may include various types of norms.​[268]​  As Boyle has explained, some treaties may create only principles but not rules, which do not have the force of hard law.  Such a treaty ‘may be potentially normative, but still “soft” in character because it expresses “principles” rather than “rules”.  They, however, should ‘not be confused with “non-binding” law’.​[269]​  As an example of this Boyle refers to the 1992 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, where such principles are contained in the text of the treaty (for example Article 3 Principles​[270]​).  Boyle also examined that the elements of Article 3 are drawn directly from the non-binding Rio Declaration on Environment and Development.  These principles are not only a part of the Climate Change Convention but also reflect principles which are emerging at the general level, common to environmental law, but which have not achieved the status of customary international law.  However, they are expressed in an aspirational manner, for example, through the use of the word ‘should’.  Their content is not certain nor precise.  They are, however, ‘relevant to interpretation and implementation of the Convention as well as creating expectations relating to matters that must be considered in good faith in the negotiation of further instruments’.​[271]​  It may thus be concluded that:

“Sustainable development, intergenerational equity, or the precautionary principle are all more convincing seen in this sense: not as binding obligations which must be complied with, but as principles, considerations or objectives to be taken account of—they may be soft, but they are still law.”​[272]​

This statement, to some extent, sums up the discussion.  The never-ending analysing of the legal character of the norms of international environmental law is a somewhat futile exercise, which in fact has very little practical importance.  No answer can be given as to whether some of the constructions (to which the precautionary principle belongs) of international environmental law are rules or principles or belong to the category of soft law.  The importance which States adhere to international obligations is not wholly conditioned by the legal nature of these obligations: ‘[t]he schematic distinction between those obligations that are and those that are not legally binding does not necessarily offer insights in the constraint obligations imposed on States’.​[273]​

Recent years have witnessed an abundance of international environmental agreements.​[274]​  For each new environmental problem, a new treaty is negotiated.​[275]​  Although, the efficacy of these treaties remains an open question, and their relative benefits versus soft law instruments are poorly understood, most scholars consider treaties to be the pre-eminent method of international environmental lawmaking.  Through the negotiation of treaties, states may develop detailed substantive rules and international supervisory machinery to address particular environmental problems.​[276]​
From what has been said in the previous chapter, it is obvious that the precautionary principle constitutes part of the fabric of environmental treaty law.  By way of a contractual obligation, it is binding for states parties to agreements containing it.​[277]​  Depending on formulation and context, this could mean that such states are “committed to adopting the precautionary principle as a general principle in fulfilling the objectives of the conventions.”​[278]​  However, in principle it leaves unaffected states which have not signed or ratified those treaties.  Moreover, a number of environmental problems have not been regulated by precautionary treaty regulations to a sufficient extent or at all.  For instance, although a body of conventional law with (potential) relevance to forest conservation exists,​[279]​ a comprehensive, global and precautionary forest regime is not in place.​[280]​  The examination of the principle’s international legal status outside the context of legally binding agreements appears therefore of more than a purely academic interest.




(a) General Principles of International Environmental Law

Resulting from its widespread acceptance in international law, the precautionary principle is frequently mentioned as one of the “general principles of international environmental law​[281]​.”  Generality in this sense refers to its possible applicability to all members of the international community, across the whole range of human activities these carry out or supervise, and in respect of the protection of all aspects of the environment.​[282]​  Like treaties with a universal scope, these general principles are typical expressions of the growing recognition by the members of the international community of global common interests.​[283]​  Significantly, characterisation of a principle or rule as such is regardless of its status in strictly legal terms.  Some general principles or rules may reflect customary law, others may reflect emerging legal obligations, and yet others might have an even less developed legal status.  In each case, nevertheless, the principle or rule is sustained by constant reference and considerable practice through recurring use or reference in an international legal framework.​[284]​  It goes without saying that the weight given to each general principle in practice will often vary according to its status in international law.  Notwithstanding this, their most basic functions they perform in any case.  “Whether or not binding, general principles of international environmental law will set the terms of international discussions and serve as a framework for negotiations.”​[285]​

General principles of international environmental law should be distinguished from the “general principles of law recognised by civilised nations​[286]​”, a category with no clear established meaning​[287]​.  Since most international environmental principles are not merely “principles of logic”, nor necessarily represent principles common to most national legal systems, they do not fit neatly within any of the proposed theories of general principles of law​[288]​.  Birnie & Boyle (& Redgwell) observe in this respect that “it has to be recognised that the most frequent use of general principles derives from the drawing of analogies with domestic law concerning rules of procedure, evidence, and jurisdiction and these are only marginally useful in an environmental context.”​[289]​  Where the precautionary principle is concerned, this might be different, particularly with regard to evidential matters.  Besides, precautionary thinking as well as explicit precaution figure more and more predominantly in national legal systems around the world.​[290]​  All things considered, however, it is not quite clear what the advantages of labelling the precautionary principle as a “general principle of law” in the sense of the ICJ Statute would be, when compared to its capacity as a general principle of international environmental law.  

(b) General Customary International Law

Thus, of the primary sources of international law listed in Article 38(1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice (ICJ), only “international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law”​[291]​, which has been defined with the framework of the International Law Association (ILA) as a body of rules which are “created and sustained by the constant and uniform practice of States and other subjects of international law in or impinging upon their international legal relations, in circumstances which give rise to a legitimate expectation of similar conduct in the future​[292]​”, remains to be discussed.  Although in mature legal systems generally considered cumbersome and relatively unimportant, to the formation of international law, and not in the last place that of the environment, custom has contributed significantly​[293]​.  Perhaps its most important feature is that rules and principles, once endowed with customary status, are legally binding on states independently of their presence or absence in treaty law​[294]​.  It can also be argued that the growing importance of treaties suggests a diminished role for customary international environmental law.  Nevertheless, many writers still consider custom an importance source of international environmental law.​[295]​  

There are several drawbacks inherent in the customary process, however.  Firstly, constituting part of public international law, “the creation of new customary rules does in the end depend on some form of consent, whether express or implied, and this remains a limitation of some importance on the use of customary law​[296]​.”  Secondly, reliance upon a customary principle could leave states in the dark as to how it is to be implemented, principles usually being more broadly phrased than other types of rules​[297]​.  This lack of specific guidance might, in turn, negatively influence the compliance pull exerted on states​[298]​.  Thirdly and closely related to this, the enforcement of customary international law does come with difficulties​[299]​.  “The traditional methods of international enforcement, such as diplomacy, international pressure and negotiations, are only effective when weaker states are in violation.  More powerful states tend to neglect customary law.  In general, states tend to neglect binding customary rules when they draft their national legislation.  In the meantime, many national constitutions and codes do not provide for the direct applicability of international customary law.  And even if they do, national judges tend to neglect customary law as they are unaware of the sources of these rules.”​[300]​  Bodansky argued that most writers on customary international environmental law instinctively assume a state of affairs where third-party dispute resolution (by courts and arbitral tribunals) is available, and subconsciously address their arguments to legal decision-makers (i.e. courts and arbitrators).​[301]​  These legal decision-makers are the real target audience for the voluminous writings on customary international environmental law.  The problem is that courts and arbitral tribunals currently play only a relatively minor role in addressing international environmental issues.​[302]​  Third-party dispute resolution has resolved few environmental problems.​[303]​  That is why Trail Smelter (USA v Canada) must bear such a heavy load in current scholarship on customary international environmental law.  The rarity of third-party dispute settlement in international law, in combination with the generality of many alleged principles of customary law has led one author to dismiss debates on their legal status as sterile.​[304]​  Fourthly, apart from these vulnerabilities in the areas of law formation, implementation and enforcement, custom is often difficult to identify from the myriad sources of state practice​[305]​, particularly in the field of environmental protection; a multi-factor analysis is required which considers a broad variety of international instruments including both binding and non-binding ones as well as the practice of states under the respective instruments​[306]​.  Consequently, according to Birnie and Boyle (& Redgwell), “the identification of customary law always has been, and remains, particularly problematical, requiring the exercise of skill, judgement and considerable research.”​[307]​ Given these difficulties, the temptation to elevate environmental principles to the customary level in the absence of thorough research is not always resisted​[308]​.  



Based on the drawbacks mentioned above and taking note of the influence on the shaping of international law that general principles of international environmental law have regardless of their (non-) binding character, Bodansky proposes that “international lawyers should spend less time debating the legal status of environmental norms and more time working to make them more precise and effective.”​[309]​  Besides the fact that, as said before, custom (not all, but in most cases) creates binding obligations on states independently of treaty-based obligations, and therefore also with regard to un(der) regulated environmental fields as well as on non-parties to relevant existing agreements.  These advantages relate, inter alia, to the extra weight given to customary norms in the drafting of more specific rules during treaty negotiations and in the interpretation of existing conventional obligations.​[310]​  Furthermore, the time-consuming procedures of convention ratification are absent, and “customary rules may more easily acquire universal application, since acquiescence will often be enough to ensure that ‘the inactive are carried along by the active’.”​[311]​  Thus, in the second-party control process (through interactions among the subjects of the legal system) customary environmental norms can and do play an important role, among other things by laying down the terms of negotiations, providing evaluative standards and working as a basis to analyse other states’ actions, and setting up an outline of principles within which negotiations may occur to expand more specific norms, frequently in treaties.​[312]​  Nearly all international environmental matters are settled through intruments such as negotiations, rather than via third-party dispute settlement or unilateral changes of behaviour.  Consider, for example, the role of the duty to prevent transboundary harm in the US-Canada acid rain dispute.  This norm did not directly constrain the United States; but it arguably had an indirect effect by providing a shared normative framework for the negotiations that led ultimately to the 1991 US-Canada Air Quality Agreement.​[313]​  To the extent the norm influenced state behaviour, it was through this indirect mechanism.  

However, there are signs of a slight increase in binding dispute settlement by courts and tribunals in the environmental field in recent years, and the establishment of an environmental chamber of the International Court of Justice, furthering opportunities for enforcement and interpretation of customary principles and rules.
Once more, the lack of a comprehensive treaty regime to combat global deforestation represents a prime example of a situation in which general principles of international environmental law could play a crucial part.  For present purposes, therefore, the investigation of whether or not the precautionary principle has passed into the corpus of customary international law is called for. 

(c) The Formation of General Customary International Law

Although writers have on occasion formulated alternative requirements​[314]​, the opinion most widely held is that a customary rule or principle obtains its law hallmark through the possession of two elements:  a given practice of states, which is followed out of the conviction that the behaviour in question is mandatory​[315]​.  These criteria of state practice and opinio juris sive necessitatis are also applied in the jurisprudence of the International Court of Justice.  In 1950 Asylum case, custom is described as a “constant and uniform usage, accepted as law.”​[316]​  Furthermore, according to the judgement in the 1969 North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, “two conditions must be fulfilled.  Not only must the acts concerned amount to a settled practice, but they must also be such, or be carried out in such a way, as to be evidence of a belief that this practice is rendered obligatory by the existence of a rule of law requiring it.”​[317]​  Reliance on these requirements is maintained consistently throughout the practice of the Court, e.g. in the 1985 Libya-Malta Continental Shelf ​[318]​and 1986 Nicaragua cases.  However, when determining in the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases whether or not the so-called “equidistance-special circumstances principle” laid down in Article 6(2) of the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf ​[319]​qualified as international custom, the ICJ laid down a third criterion by stating that “[i]t would in the first place be necessary that the provision concerned should, at all events potentially, be of a fundamentally norm-creating character such as could be regarded as forming the basis of a general rule of law.”​[320]​  It dealt with this requirement, the formulation of which apparently lacks any antecedents in international law and has not been applied by the Court in subsequent cases either, before considering those bearing upon state practice and opinio juris. ​[321]​ 

It should be noted that customary rules can form either generally, regionally or as between particular states involved in its formation​[322]​.  That the ICJ interprets Article 38(1) of its Statute to allow for regional or local customs follows from the Asylum case, which itself concerned a regional, Latin American one​[323]​.  Such rules, binding among a group of states or just two states in their relations inter se may supplement or derogate from general customary international law​[324]​.  Most writers understand the criteria formulated by the Court for the establishment of globally binding customary norms to be equally applicable to geographically more restricted ones​[325]​.  An example of a bilateral custom is provided by the right of passage over Indian territory in respect of Portuguese inland enclaves, which the ICJ found to exist as between India and Portugal in a 1960 case​[326]​.  Global customs which, in principle, bind all states​[327]​ are by far the most numerous and important, however​[328]​.
The doctrine of local and regional custom should not be confused with the exceptions associated with persistent (and subsequent) objectors to a customary norm, dealing with the contracting out of a custom by states opposing it.​[329]​  Persistent objectors are states that consistently refuse to accept a rule during the process of its formation, evidence of such objection having to be clear in order to avoid the rule’s application.​[330]​  According to some, dissent expressed with regard to an existing customary norm might also entail non-application to the state concerned, if and in so far as other states acquiesce in this practice.​[331]​  Of interest with regard to custom in the context of binding dispute settlement is that in principle courts are presumed to know the law and may apply a customary rule when it has not been expressly pleaded.  In practice, in uniformity with the trend traditionally followed in international law, the burden of proving the existence of a custom per se is usually placed upon its proponent(s).​[332]​  Evidence of this can be encountered in the jurisprudence of the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ) and its successor.​[333]​

Having said this, there still remains the concrete question of whether or not, presently, the precautionary principle embodies a “customary rule which states feel bound to follow themselves and which they wish to see applied to other states.”​[334]​  First of all attention must be focused on the normative content of the precautionary principle itself, in line with the prerequisite formulated by the ICJ in the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases.​[335]​  Hence, it must be asked whether the principle as it can be encountered in the practice of the international community is, at a minimum, of a “fundamentally norm-creating character such as could be regarded as forming the basis of a general rule of law,” i.e. whether it is, leaving aside the extent of its endorsement in terms of state practice and opinio juris, capable of becoming a binding customary obligation at all.

(d) Problems of Customary International Law and the Precautionary Principle

As may be inferred from the discussion as to the perception of the precautionary principle that neither a single, universally applicable and detailed definition of the precautionary principle, nor an exact understanding of what it requires of states in practice yet exists, this has not gone unnoticed by most writers on the topic.​[336]​  A number of those publicists have linked such deficiencies to the requirement of custom under scrutiny here, among them Birnie and Boyle, who wrote in 1992:  “Questions concerning the point at which [the principle] becomes available to any given activity remain unanswered and seriously undermine its normative character and practical utility.”  On grounds that it does not sufficiently define the concept of precaution or specify how much precaution should be taken, Bodansky had judged the principle “too vague” to serve as a regulatory standard a year before.​[337]​

However, it is submitted that the situation is not as hopeless as it is painted here.  With bearing on its definition, a number of core elements of the precautionary principle can be inferred from state practice without too much difficulty:  in the existence of a threat of (non-negligible) environmental harm together with scientific uncertainty, strict action should nevertheless be undertaken to prevent or remedy the danger concerned.​[338]​  Equally as far as its implementation is concerned, there exists a cluster of measures and procedures typically associated with a precautionary approach.​[339]​  Among other things, these include outright prohibitions of certain activities, evidentiary methods, for example those reducing or reversing the burden of proof or using conservative evidentiary presumptions.  Also relevant are requirements of clean production, best available technology (BAT) or best environmental practice (BEP), EIA procedures, safety margins and enhanced research.​[340]​  Furthermore, that nowadays the precautionary principle is not only considered as intended to guide states and international organisations in the implementation of other environmental norms, but increasingly also as being sufficiently precise and unconditional to create an actionable right in itself is evidenced by national and international case law.  

The remaining interpretative space is not, therefore, of such a nature that it can form a stumbling block in relation to the customary requirement at hand.  On the contrary, such vagueness is to a certain extent inherent in all general principles of international (environmental) law, and one of the qualities sought after in a candidate customary rule is precisely such generality.  This follows from the very formulation by the ICJ concerning the requirement of sufficiently normative character, “such as could be regarded as forming the basis of a general rule of law.”  Indeed, this “would potentially include a number of general environmental principles, [and] is less likely to apply to such highly specific requirements as those prescribed in the Protocols to the 1979 Geneva Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution concerning, inter alia, sulphur dioxide emissions.”​[341]​  As well, in the North Sea Continental Shelf judgement itself, the Court’s main reservations regarding the degree of norm-creating character of the principle of equidistance did not concern the principle as such “[c]onsidered in abstracto the equidistance principle might be said to fulfil this requirement”​[342]​, but rather the conditions it was subject to in the specific context of the treaty provision in which it was enunciated.​[343]​  Moreover, even though it found that “very considerable, still unresolved controversies as to the exact meaning and scope” still surrounded the notion of special circumstances relative to the principle of equidistance as embodied in the Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf,​[344]​ the Court judged it worthwhile to enter into an extensive examination of the other requirements of custom as they applied to the equidistance norm, thus implying that even this degree of uncertainty could not have prevented the passing of the principle into customary law were the criteria of state practice and opinio juris to be satisfied.​[345]​

Besides, problems may be encountered with regard to the practical application of virtually every legal rule or principle.​[346]​  Notwithstanding this, in the past interpretative ambiguities have not formed a bar to the evolution of some of the most fundamental norms of international law. For example, all manner of questions have had, and still have to be, answered concerning the precise meaning and practical implications of rules such as the general prohibition on the use of force in inter-state affairs.  Moreover, the principle of self-determination, although few would use this as an argument for denying them customary, and indeed jus cogens (peremptory norms) status.​[347]​  It is argued here that the precautionary principle is no vaguer than these norms.  Instead, the appropriate place to discuss the variety of interpretations given to the precautionary principle and resolve the disagreement on how to properly implement it appears to be in the context of compliance and effectiveness.​[348]​  In a more recent article Bodansky adopts this view as well, relating defects in this regard more to the relatively limited availability of adjudication and arbitration in international law, and less to the principle’s normative nature.​[349]​  When it is all said and done, it appears more than reasonable to agree with Owen McIntyre and Thomas Mosedale, who contend that any “lack of consistency does not detract from the principle’s usefulness or from the likelihood of it enjoying the status of a norm of customary international law.”​[350]​

2.2(i)  STATE PRACTICE

The material,​[351]​or objective ingredient of custom is considered by many to be the most characteristic and, indeed, the most important component of customary international law.​[352]​  In order to pose as evidence of a customary rule, nevertheless, the behaviour of states—in relation to the precautionary principle—has to satisfy certain criteria, by and large categorised under three headings: duration, uniformity or consistency, and generality.​[353]​

In regard of the first, the passage of time, will of course be a part of the evidence of generality and consistency, it was found that the jurisprudence of the World Court and general doctrine concur that this element of state conduct, although not wholly without meaning, is the least significant, in that practice must merely persist sufficiently long to allow for the demonstration of the other conditions’ fulfilment.  As one authority remarked:

The possibility has thus been reserved of recognising the rapid emergence of a new rule of customary law based on the recent practice of States.  This is particularly important in view of the extremely dynamic process of evolution in which the international community is engaged at the present stage of history.  Whether the mainspring of this evolution is to be found in the development of ideas, in social and economic factors, or in new technology, it is characteristic of our time that new problems and circumstances incessantly arise and imperatively call for legal regulation.​[354]​

Therefore, applying facts to theory, that the rise of precaution as a principle in international law has its origin not much longer ago than two decades “is not necessarily, or of itself, a bar to the formation of a new rule of customary international law.”​[355]​

The mainstream opinion held in respect of the second criterion is that complete uniformity is not required, but substantial uniformity is.​[356]​  Lacking a more specific measure, determinations in this regard are, as Brownlie observes, “very much a matter of appreciation and a tribunal will have considerable freedom of determination in many cases.”​[357]​  When assessing precautionary practice, in light of this requirement of consistency, the first thing that jumps to the eye is the myriad of different definitions of the precautionary principle used in numerous agreements, declarations, action programmes, resolutions, decisions, statutes, strategies, judgements and other sources, entailing the absence of a single definition that is both universal and exact.​[358]​ 

However, as indicated previously, in spite of these variations between the differing formulations of the principle, a uniform core message is transmitted in practically each and every one of them: in the face of a (whether or not “significant”) threat of environmental harm, preventive action ought to be taken even where relevant information on that threat and its probable effects is not conclusive.  Thus, the existing discrepancies are incomparable with, for instance, the fluctuations in state practice concerning diplomatic asylum as considered by the International Court of Justice in the Asylum case.  Therefore, the European Commission is probably right by qualifying the divergence in the terminology used in the various instruments as “of no significance.”​[359]​

A related issue is that, despite the strong association existing between a number of defined measures and the precautionary principle, considerable debate remains on the perimeters of the concrete action required by the principle in different situations.​[360]​  As with the question of definition, the delivery of definitive answers in this respect is not crucial, nor perhaps possible, at this stage.  One of the arguments on which this assertion rests is that the presence of a certain interpretative space is inherent in the principle’s capacity as a general principle of international environmental law.  Furthermore, it is instructive to have a look at the extensive discussions that have taken place in literature and before tribunals on, for instance, the crystallisation and delimitation of the precise practical implications of the prohibition of the use of force in international relations well after its establishment as a customary norm.  It suffices to say that these are not the only analogies that can be drawn between the observations made supra with regard to the customary requirement formulated by the World Court in the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases and the matter presently under scrutiny, in support of the conclusion that conflicting claims as to the consequences of the principle’s application in concrete circumstances cannot form a bar in the actual context.  Apart from this, it will be remembered that in order for precautionary practice to qualify as sufficiently uniform, instances of state conduct clearly not in keeping with the precautionary principle “should generally have been treated as breaches of that rule, not as indications of the recognition of a new rule.”​[361]​  In this respect, it is useful to recall the various incidents that occurred in the latter half of the past decade, in which state conduct apparently not in conformity with the principle was explicitly treated as such by one or more other countries.  When doing so, it should be borne in mind that, certainly in the environmental field, states generally employ explicit criticism of fellow members of the international community only as a last resort, let alone judicial proceedings, or even the threat or use of force.​[362]​  In this light, the importance of Chile’s claim, backed by full naval action, of the 1995 Japan-sponsored nuclear transport by the Pacific Pintail as “a violation of the precautionary principle,” is of the first magnitude.​[363]​  Similar arguments apply to New Zealand’s juridical action against the French nuclear tests—which, for not being in accordance with the principle, were deemed “illegal”​[364]​—and to Ireland’s 1996 contentions that in the planning process for the NIREX project,​[365]​ the British government had not complied with the requirements of the precautionary principle.  As will be recalled, later in 1996 the United Kingdom itself, by voice of its Minister of Fisheries (Tony Baldry, MP), publicly reminded the latter Danish counterpart of his obligation to abide by the precautionary principle in the regulation of North Sea fisheries​[366]​.  Finally, the arguments of Australia and New Zealand submitted in the Southern Bluefin Tuna Cases, that by implementing its experimental fishing programme Japan had breached its duties under the precautionary principle, must be mentioned here.

In the absence of a specific formula for the measuring of state practice in terms of generality (the third requirement), proof of custom “should be sought in the behaviour of a great number of States, possibly the majority of States, in any case the great majority of the interested States,”​[367]​ it was concluded that in relation to the precautionary principle such evidence ought to be looked for on a global level, in the practice of a large and representative amount of states.  If one event were to be credited with this generalisation of the principle, it would be the 1992 Earth Summit.  Indeed, in the opinion of one authority, “UNCED universalised the principle.”​[368]​  On the other hand, the number of governments that have, on occasion, objected application of the precautionary principle is very limited.  There exists more open opposition to its treatment as a binding principle, although these appear to have been displayed mainly by delegations active in the arena of international trade, most notably in connection with food standards.​[369]​  All this warrants the preliminary conclusion that the precautionary principle is carried, at a minimum, by a general practice of states.


As described above, given fulfilment of the other criteria, such a general practice can suffice for the formation of a universal custom.  The doctrine of acquiescence plays a predominant role in this phenomenon.  To contemplate its essence, an ear is lent to Harris:  “For the purpose of the formation of rules of customary international law, consent is commonly indicated by state practice not in the form of positive statements or other action approving or following the practice in question, but of acquiescence.”​[370]​  Thus, whereas by far most countries, have on more than one occasion actively demonstrated their approval of the precautionary principle “in the form of positive statements or other action”, the doctrine formally includes also those states that, although they may not have expressed their support, have not consistently and openly protested against the principle either.​[371]​  In the current context, the precautionary principle, apart from being endorsed in numerous treaties, declarations and other international agreements, has been repeatedly and openly harnessed as a principle of customary international law, inter alia by Chile, New Zealand, Ireland, the United Kingdom and Australia in the affairs mentioned above when discussing consistency, as well as by the Indian Supreme Court in Vellore Citizens, by Hungary in the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros case and by the EU in the Beef Hormones case.  In this light, “the fact that it is [nearly] impossible to find examples of nations rejecting the precautionary principle or citing scientific uncertainty as a legitimate basis for action or inaction,”​[372]​ indicates the existence, in formal terms, of a not merely general, but virtually universal practice in favour of the precautionary principle.  In short, it appears more than reasonable to assume that state practice on the principle satisfies the three criteria of duration, uniformity and generality.

2.2(ii)  Opinio Juris Sive Necessitatis

As stated before, practice alone does not create customary law.  To do this, it must be complemented by a “conception that the practice is required by, or consistent with, prevailing international law.”​[373]​  This psychological or subjective element, commonly denominated in Latin as opinio juris sive necessitatis, distinguishes custom from mere usage, which may be prompted by “reasons of mere courtesy, convenience or tradition, rather than by legal obligation.”​[374]​  Underscoring the reality of the difference between custom and usage, Brownlie submits:  “The sense of legal obligation, as opposed to motives of courtesy, fairness, or morality, is real enough, and the practice of states recognises a distinction between obligation and usage.”​[375]​  The role, in other words, of opinio juris in interstate behaviour is “simply to identify which acts out of many have legal consequence.”​[376]​  Obviously, the theory of opinio juris sive necessitatis is not without its complications.  One of these relates to the early days of a norm growing into custom and echoes, to an extent, the dilemma of chicken and egg, for the doctrine assumes that the first states to engage in a particular new practice do so already in the conviction that a rule of law requires them to do so.​[377]​  This is what Sir Hersch Lauterpacht must have had in mind when referring to “the mysterious phenomenon of customary international law which is deemed to be a source of law only on condition that it is in accordance with law.”​[378]​  Consequently, if too rigid a view would be taken of the concept, the development of international law would become stunted and the law itself, in due course, deficient.​[379]​  As indicated by its characterisation as the psychological or subjective element of custom, another difficulty of opinio juris lies in the fact that it is difficult to grasp:  it is not tangible or visible.  Instead, in any quest of opinio juris indirect evidence and deduction are the tools to be handled, making the task of proving its existence—whether for academic or essentially political purposes—more often than not a problematical one.​[380]​  As Wallace observes:

The problem with opinio juris is one of proof.  It is frequently difficult to determine when the transformation into law has taken place.  How can a state’s conviction be proved to exist?  Essentially, what must be proved is the state’s acceptance, recognition or acquiescence in the binding character of the rule in question.​[381]​

In the Lotus case, the inability of France to produce the necessary evidence of opinio juris proved fatal to its arguments, which were founded largely on the allegation that customary law conferred exclusive criminal jurisdiction on the flag state.  A similarly high standard of proof of opinio juris as adopted by the Permanent Court of International Justice in this case, was applied by the ICJ in the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases to the practice involving the equidistance principle.  Relying on the very Lotus Judgement,​[382]​the Court stated:

Applying this dictum to the present case, the position is simply that in certain cases—not a great number—the States concerned agreed to draw or did draw the boundaries concerned according to the principle of equidistance.  There is no evidence that they so acted because they felt legally compelled to draw them in this way by reason of a rule of customary law obliging them to do so—especially considering that they might have been motivated by other obvious factors.​[383]​

Although, as Brownlie notes, it would not be appropriate to regard the Court’s exact findings in the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases “as in all respects incompatible with the view that the existence of a general practice raises a presumption of opinio juris,”​[384]​ the common feel of the Judgment is one demanding more positive proof in this respect.​[385]​  The decision was expressly referred to by the Court in its Nicaragua Judgment, in which a by and large comparable approach was adopted.

Although this method, requiring the display of positive evidence of opinio juris by the claimant of a customary rule, is frequently brought up during discussions on the determination of this customary element, the three cases in which it has been employed by the Permanent and the International Court in fact create a (significant) minority in their jurisprudence.​[386]​  In many other cases the ICJ was less demanding and willing to presuppose the existence of a relevant opinio juris, on the bases, inter alia, of proof of a general practice, consensus among writers, or previous findings of the Court or other international tribunals.​[387]​  The second approach and in particular the position that a general practice gives rise to a presumption of opinio juris, was the one defended by Judge Tanaka and Ad Hoc Judge Sorensen in their respective Dissenting Opinions on the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases.  In the words of the latter:

I do not find it necessary to go into the question of opinio juris.  This is a problem of legal doctrine which may cause great difficulties in international adjudication.  In view of the manner in which international relations are conducted, there may be numerous cases in which it is practically impossible for one government to produce conclusive evidence of the motives which have prompted the action and policy of other governments.  Without going into all aspects of the doctrinal debate on this issue, I wish only to cite the following passage by one of the most qualified commentators on the jurisprudence of the Court.  Examining the conditions of the opinio necessitatis juris Sir Hersch Lauterpacht writes: ‘Unless judicial activity is to result in reducing the legal significance of the most potent source of rules of international law, namely, the conduct of States, it would appear that the accurate principle on the subject consists in regarding all uniform conduct of Governments (or, in appropriate cases, abstention therefrom) as evidencing the opinio necessitatis juris except when it is shown that the conduct in question was not accompanied by such intention.’​[388]​  Applying these considerations to the circumstances of the present cases, I think that the practice of States [..] may be taken as sufficient evidence of the existence of any necessary opinio juris.​[389]​  

This method, which actually overturns the burden of proof in relation to opinio juris where state practice is extensive, holds with rather broad support in literature.  It also coincides with the position taken in the ILA Statement of Principles Applicable to the Formation of General Customary International Law, namely that “it is not always, and probably not even usually, necessary to prove the existence of any sort of subjective element” in addition to state practice, where it is present, this may suffice to establish the existence of a customary rule.  Proof of its absence may signify that such a rule has not formed.​[390]​  Indeed, it seems that there is a lot to be said for Judge Tanaka’s conclusion that “[t]here is no other way than to ascertain the existence of opinio juris from the fact of the external existence of a certain custom and its necessity felt in the international community, rather than to seek evidence as to the subjective motives for each example of State practice, which is something which is impossible of achievement.”​[391]​

When applying the first approach, however, it must be asked how the positive proof it requires is to be delivered.  Logically, the prime tangible material in which to search for indications of the intangible opinio juris sive necessitatis is made up of the very same sources that constitute state practice.​[392]​  That in the environmental field, so called “soft law” documents have an important role to play in this respect is made clear by the following assessment by two environmental jurists of the contributions of such instruments in the functioning of the international legal order:

Such guidelines and norms manifest general consent to certain basic principles that are acceptable and practicable for both developed and developing countries.  To this extent, if followed by state practice, they can also provide evidence of the opinio juris from which new customary laws and principles develop.​[393]​

The drawing of an analogy with Principle 21 of the Stockholm Declaration is also helpful.  This general principle of international environmental law lays down one of the most basic rules of the discipline by affirming the sovereign right of states to exploit their resources pursuant to their own policies, and the corresponding responsibility to avoid transboundary environmental damage.​[394]​  It is widely believed to represent customary international law.  An enumeration of some of the sources that justify this belief, illustrates the considerable overlap that often exists between material sources of state conduct and those from which opinio juris is inferred:

Evidence of state practice can be found in the presence of statements made by governments since 1972 that support Principle 21; in the inclusion of the principle in other treaties or formal declarations; and in the decisions of arbitral panels and judicial bodies that cite or rely on the principle.  Opinio juris is evidenced by the writing of jurists who claim to have found an acceptance of Principle 21 in major legal systems around the world, as well as by a number of bilateral and regional agreements that have referred specifically to the Stockholm Declaration in their texts.  Each of these documents establishes that states are following Principle 21 in practice and believe themselves to be obligated.​[395]​

In general, of course, the more coherent and persistent a particular practice, the stronger also the presumption that it is experienced by states as binding law.

After many observations, it is time for their application to the factual situation of the precautionary principle in international law.  When applying the approach of Lauterpacht, Tanaka, Sorensen and the ILA Statement of Principles, the uniformity and generality of the precautionary state practice described earlier on would trigger the assumption that the necessary opinio juris on the application of the precautionary principle is also accounted for.  Nonetheless, an evaluation of precautionary practice in accordance with the more exacting method utilised by the World Court in the Lotus, North Sea Continental Shelf and Nicaragua cases seems to be called for as well.  For this purpose, the same material sources that were used for the determination of state practice on the principle ought to be looked at.  In spite of the overlap portrayed by the concrete sources of evidence of practice and opinio juris, there are viable arguments for drawing a distinction whereby state practice foremostly comprises the various instances of (the intention to take) action in the face of uncertainty, and opinio juris the codifications of this need to act even in uncertain conditions and, even more so, the accompanying references to a pre-existing precautionary “principle” or “approach” requiring such action.  When considering the various categories of material sources in some more detail, beginning with legally binding agreements, the utility of such a distinction is self-evident.  As Bosselmann observed in 1995, “the increased number of references to the precautionary principle in recent international environmental conventions is a powerful evidence that there is indeed such a principle to which reference is made to those conventions;” evidence, he notes, which serves to indicate the existence of opinio juris in the matter.​[396]​  Similarly, James Cameron asserted one year earlier:  “Recent treaty developments provide prima facie evidence of an emerging sense of legal obligation to adhere to the precautionary principle.”​[397]​  It is unquestionable that extra significance in this context should also be accorded to those instances where the precautionary principle was not incorporated in a new agreement, but instead expressly added to the framework of an existing one.  It will be recalled that in the cases of the Cartagena Convention, CITES, and initially also of the 1974 Baltic Sea Convention, the 1974 Convention for the Prevention of Marine Pollution from Land-Based Sources, the Barcelona Convention and the London Dumping Convention, that this was done by way of resolutions or other decisions.  Even more convincing evidence of opinio juris can be inferred from amendments of treaties to include the principle, more in specifically those of the two ozone agreements.  The EC Treaty, the Barcelona Convention, the Athens Land-Based Sources Protocol and the GFCM Agreement, or from those instances where a new, precautionary instrument was negotiated to take the place of an outdated one, the result of which are the 1992 Baltic Sea Convention, the OSPAR Convention, the 1995 Protocol Concerning Specially Protected Areas and Biological Diversity in the Mediterranean and the 1996 LDC Protocol.  Also relevant is that on those occasions where states opposed the formal introduction of the precautionary principle into treaty regimes, this was often done on grounds of redundancy.​[398]​  “The terms of opposition to the principle, in other words, can demonstrate the prevailing sense of obligation towards it.”​[399]​  The practice of the European Union, for instance, is “useful as an indicator of the EU Member State Practice and opinio juris.”​[400]​  Hence, in this example, it would be important to keep in mind that, according to the European Commission itself, many EU measures in the environmental field “have been inspired by the precautionary principle,” that the principle was openly confessed as a general rule of customary international law by the Community in the Beef Hormones case, and is considered by the Commission not only as a “full-fledged and general principle of international law,” but also as an “essential plank” of EC environmental policy.  Moreover in the context of the Codex Committee on General Principles (CCGP), it repeated its conviction that “the principle that responsible governments should act on the basis of precaution when there is established scientific uncertainty in order to achieve the chosen level of protection is so widely and universally accepted that it has already become a rule of customary international law in the areas of health and environmental protection.”​[401]​  However, that the possibility of the principle representing binding law was not lightly discarded by France in the 1995 Nuclear Tests case is clear from its attempts to argue that, although it considered the principle’s legal position still uncertain, it had complied with it in any event.  As will be recalled, in the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros proceedings, Slovakia did not go at lengths to deny the precautionary principle customary status either.  The same applies to Japan’s argumentation in the Southern Bluefin Tuna Cases, which did not come down to an outright negation of the possibility of the precautionary principle having attained such status.

  2.2(iii) The Precautionary Principle: The relevance of Judicial Decisions and Legal Doctrines in Customary International Law

There appears to be only one legitimate answer to the question whether or not nowadays the precautionary principle is to be considered as part of customary international law.  It is appropriate before drawing any final conclusions in this respect, to have regard to the fourth section of Article 38(1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice.  That the relevance of judicial decisions, whether issued by international or national tribunals, is not derived purely or even mainly from their capacity as state practice indicators has become clear already from previous discussions, and is reinforced by their qualification in the provision just referred to as “subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law.”​[402]​  In spite of the hesitance of most international judicial bodies to go into the question of the legal status of the precautionary principle, it is useful in the current context to bring to mind once more the affirmative answers flowing in this arena.  These come, whether directly or indirectly, from decisions by courts in Pakistan, India, Australia and New Zealand.

Of great indicative value are also some of the individual opinions that accompany, especially, the 1995 Nuclear Tests case and the 1999 ITLOS Southern Bluefin Tuna Cases.  Strictly speaking not constituting part of the judicial decisions they comment on, such opinions could in many cases well be viewed as “teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations”, which are attributed equal ranking by the ICJ Statute​[403]​.  Before the ICJ the principle appears to have first been raised in New Zealand’s 1995 request concerning French nuclear testing.  New Zealand relied extensively on the principle, which described as ‘a very widely accepted and operative principle of international law’ and which transfered the burden onto France to prove that the proposed tests would not amount to environmental damage.​[404]​  Five ‘intervening’ states (Australia, the Marshall Islands, Samoa and the Solomon Islands) also evoked the principle.  France gave its remarks that the status of the principle in international law was ‘tout a fait incertain’, but that in any circumstance it had been obeyed, and that evidentiary burdens were not much different in the environmental area than any other area of international law.  The ICJ’s order did not mention these arguments, although Judge Weeramantry’s dissent recorded that the principle had ‘evolved to meet [the] evidentiary complexity caused by the fact [that] information needed to prove a proposal’ may be ‘with the party causing or threatening the damage’, and that it was ‘gaining growing support as part of the international environment law for the Court to work upon it’. It must be kept in mind that the ICJ Ad Hoc Judge Geoffrey Palmer in his Dissenting Opinion on the case submitted that “the norm involved in the precautionary principle has moved forward quickly and may now be a principle of international customary law concerning the environment.”  In the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros case, Hungary and Slovakia also relied on the precautionary principle.  The ICJ did not feel that it is necessary to address the principle, restricting itself to a reference to Hungary’s claim that the principle gave good reason for the termination of the 1977 Treaty and its acknowledgement of the parties’ contract to take environmental concerns seriously and to take the necessary precautionary measures.   In his Separate Opinion annexed to the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Judgment, Judge Weeramantry stated in more precise terms that by that time he considered the precautionary principle part of international custom.  The views expressed by ITLOS Judges Treves, Laing and Ad Hoc Judge Shearer in their Separate Opinions on the Southern Bluefin Tuna Cases reveal that they do not lightly dismiss the possibility of the principle having attained customary status either.

To stay with “the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists”, in practice the views of writers have been invoked frequently by the International Court of Justice and its predecessor and, more so, by parties to disputes serving before it, arbitrators and other international adjudicators, and domestic courts​[405]​.  In the Lotus case, for instance, France supported its claims in part by reference to the “teachings of publicists”, whereupon the Permanent Court in its Judgment gave evidence of a thorough literature study on its behalf as part of the foundation of its ruling”.  In doing so, it accorded significance both to whether the principle in contention was taught in the available commentaries at all, as well as to the wider legal meaning attached to it by the various writers.

In fact, when conducting the present study only a negligible number of writers were encountered withholding their support for the message put forward by the principle​[406]​.  Most others would probably agree with Catherine Tinker when she stated that “[o]nly compliance with standards based on the precautionary principle and international cooperation will provide the necessary protection for the planet.”​[407]​  In 1990, Lothar Gundling recommended the adoption by the international community of the precautionary principle as a legal duty, but nevertheless concluded that the predominance of non-binding agreements, meant that further “law creating acts” were necessary in order for the principle to attain customary status​[408]​.  That same year UN Secretary-General Javier Perez de Cuellar spoke of “the considerable significance” of the precautionary principle in the context of marine environmental law.  As Handl commented: “State practice, resolutions of international organisations, and other pertinent ideas point to the emergence of community expectations that, at least as a matter of basic international policy, activities potentially affecting the environment be subject to constraint.”​[409]​  However, he continued, “at present the precautionary principle is not a term of art.  The principle’s exact political, and a legal implications remain ‘elusive’, although some of the basic ingredients of the principle “appear to be well on their way to becoming part of the international customary law of the environment.”​[410]​  The thoughts entrusted to paper by Andre Nollkaemper in 1991 are similarly sceptical as to the principle’s normative status​[411]​.  Simultaneously, Cameron and Abouchar deemed the precautionary principle and emerging customary principle​[412]​.  The conclusion reached by David Freestone in a publication dating 1991, is that the principle had, at a minimum to some degree, attained the status of a normative principle​[413]​.  His argumentation is as follows:  

“The speed with which the precautionary principle has been brought on to the international agenda, and the range and variety of international forums which have explicitly accepted it within the recent past, are quite staggering.  The significance of the repeated public acceptance and endorsement by government representatives should not be underrated, particularly if, as is increasing the case, this is supported by binding measures explicitly implementing the principle.  Would it be reasonable today (in the current state of the law) to presume that a state which has participated in the endorsement of the precautionary principle in a particular sector would be held liable in the future for causing harm (whether to neighbours or commons) for activities in that sector which today are strongly suspected (but not proven) to cause substantial harm?  The evidence suggests that the answer may well be affirmative.  The international recognition and endorsement of the precautionary principle may well have reached the point at which it has begun to change the existing purely preventive requirements of due diligence and foreseeability.  At present this is probably only arguable on a sector by sector basis, but if present trends continue this may be a general requirement of environmental law in the not too distant future.”​[414]​

Following such scholarly expressions attributing normative value to the precautionary principle, Daniel Bodansky commented upon the same international developments in different terms:

“Indeed, so frequent is its invocation that some commentators are even beginning to suggest that the principle is ripening into a norm of customary international law.  [..] The precautionary principle provides a general orientation to environmental issues.  In my view, however, it is far too vague to serve as a regulatory standard [..]  It is therefore perhaps appropriate to take a cautious attitude towards the precautionary principle.  We may wish to adopt it as a general goal.  But it would be a mistake to believe it will resolve the difficult problems of international environmental regulation or prevent new hazards from emerging in the future.”​[415]​



The opinion voiced by Birnie and Boyle (& Redgwell) is of much the same tenor:

“Despite its attractions, the great variety of interpretations given to the precautionary principle, and the novel and far-reaching effects of some of its applications suggest that it is not yet a principle of international law.  Difficult questions concerning the point at which it becomes applicable to any given activity remain unanswered and seriously undermine its normative character and practical utility, although support for it does indicate a policy of greater prudence on the part of those states willing to accept it.”​[416]​

When discussing the international law of marine pollution, they repeat the view that, although “growing support for a precautionary approach to protection of the marine environment is apparent [..] the evidence supports the view expressed that it is premature to treat the precautionary principle as a requirement of international law.”​[417]​

In these early commentaries, authors see precautionary policies, or even rules, developing, but cannot quite bring themselves to establish that together these constitute, at that time, general and binding principle​[418]​.  It may be good to bear in mind that all of these writings pre-date the Rio Earth Summit​[419]​.  Nevertheless, whereas McIntyre and Mosedale have pointed out in this respect that “those authors who have loyally resisted attributing normative status to the principle have mostly done so prior to 1992 and the UNCED process​[420]​”, this does not entail that sceptical commentators have dried up completely during the aftermath of the Conference.  Quite the contrary, for instance, Edith Brown Weiss claimed in March 1993 that “there is no agreement on the content of this principle, or even as to whether an actual principle has emerged or only an approach to address a problem.”​[421]​  Likewise, in a publication dating 1994, Gundling demonstrated that he had maintained his criticism of the assertion that the precautionary principle represents customary international law​[422]​.  Similarly, roughly three years after the Earth Summit, Catherine Tinker commented:

“The precautionary principle has appeared as soft law in numerous conference declarations and other statements of what governments think international law should be.  In the absence of strong evidence of state practice and opinio juris, such as an explicit statement from a high-level government minister that precautionary measures were adopted because they are mandated under international law, it is difficult to conclude that the precautionary principle is currently customary international law.  [..] At present, a state’s failure to follow the precautionary principle is not an internationally wrongful act that can trigger state responsibility.”​[423]​

She reiterated this position in a 1996 publication.  About the same time Jurgielewicz, basing herself on the opinions of Birnie, Boyle and Brown Weiss quoted above, submitted that the precautionary principle “is not yet an accepted principle of international law.”​[424]​  This was motivated by reference to the principle being “largely limited to non-binding declarations”, the lack of a definitive interpretation and, remarkably, “the fact that it is also at odds with a ‘no-regrets’ policy, which advocates taking action only when action is also justified on other grounds.”​[425]​

In most recent publications, however, authors have come to more expressly optimistic assessments of the precautionary principle’s status in international law.  Ellen Hey in 1992, advocated the position that the principle had occurred so frequently in international practice that it had crystallised into a basic normative principle​[426]​.  Cameron concurred with this conclusion in 1993​[427]​, whereas Sanwal also considered that inclusion of the precautionary principle in the majority of UNCED instruments had made it part of general international law​[428]​.  Still in 1993, Christie argued that “because, on the international plane, nations have accepted the precautionary principle as a basic for ocean dumping and sustainable development policies, the precautionary principle is now emerging as customary international law.”​[429]​  Under the title “The Status of the Precautionary Principle in International Law”, James Cameron once more gave an exposition of the subject in 1994, in which he submitted that “the precautionary principle is not only capable of having legal effect (rather than policy guidance) but does have legal effect”, and not only in respect of international agreements in force​[430]​.  He furthermore considered that “the evidence for the precautionary principle constituting a customary norm of international law is increasingly conclusive”, and that from his point of view “UNCED was the crystallising moment in the development of the principle that was emerging as to one that is legally binding.”​[431]​  As he concluded:

“The precautionary principle is a general principle which binds state parties to the international conventions which give expression to it.  It is a principle of international environmental law.  There remains debate about whether it is yet a principle of customary international law binding on all states.  In that debate I feel comfortable in arguing that it is, whether I am persuasive, others must judge.”​[432]​

Also in 1997, Sharon Mascher observed that “the precautionary approach is finding increasing expression both within international treaties and domestic law.  Its status at international law and its meaning, however, are not yet uniformly understood.  The New Zealand High Court’s Interpretation in the Greenpeace decision is a step in the evolution of the precautionary approach’s legal status as one of customary law.”​[433]​  In the same journal as Mascher, Warwick Gullet notes the “almost universal acceptance of the principle” and states:  “As the principle has been expressly adopted in a plethora of international instruments (as well as being endorsed implicitly in many more), it seems any doubt as to its legal validity goes to determining its specific requirements rather than to its existence as a principle of law.”​[434]​  Rosemary Lyster’s opinion appears to coincide with this:

“The precautionary principle has been incorporated into 18 international environmental instruments, including the Rio Declaration on the Environment and Development (the Rio Declaration).  Although the principles contained in the Rio Declaration and Agenda 21 do not create binding international legal obligations, it has been asserted that the principle is emerging as a customary international law.”​[435]​

It would not do justice to the various points of view, however, to leave it at such numerical considerations.  As far as the merits of the several positions are concerned, much of the more recently expressed scepticism as to the principle’s status denies the principle customary force on the same grounds as the early writings of Birnie, Boyle and Bodansky, that is, the lack of an authoritative definition or interpretation.  It suffices here, therefore, to underline the conclusions drawn in that context by noting that the host of writers coming to more optimistic estimations of the principle’s status are by no means unaware of the absence of a uniform interpretation, rather treating such dearth in the sphere of implementation.

The second most mentioned argument by critics of the assumption that the precautionary principle represents a customary norm is an insufficiency of state practice in the area.  In a number of instances this may be put down to relatively early writing dates, or to a perception of the requirements of state practice other than the criteria of duration, uniformity and generality, and in isolated cases perhaps to an ordinary lack of baseline information.  One way or the other, the many opinions pointing at the probability of the principle being part of customary international law appear considerably more convincing.  In short, after assessing all preceding considerations on state practice, opinio juris and expert opinion, the final conclusion may be drawn with the assumption that at present the precautionary principle is a principle of customary international law.  It may be more difficult to justify if we are to conclude the contrary.  In an attempt to reconstruct the principle’s legal development, it can be held that a period of ambiguity, similar to the one described by the ICJ in the 1974 Fisheries Jurisdiction case existed during the roughly five years preceding the 1992 UNCED.  Nevertheless, although in hindsight many writers rightly, it is submitted here, propose the Rio Conference as a major landmark in the legal evolution of the principle, on the basis of currently available information it is difficult and perhaps impossible to pinpoint with certainty the exact moment at which the metamorphosis of the precautionary principle from a non-binding principle into a mandatory one occurred.  As Tinker observes: “It is never easy to say precisely when a rule crystallises into customary international law.”​[436]​  This does not detract from the fact, however, that at some point within a period of roughly fifteen years, starting with its explicit emergence in international discourse in the mid 1980s, the precautionary principle has developed into a binding norm of customary international law.

It has been demonstrated above that, by virtue of its widespread endorsement and the workings of the doctrine of acquiescence, as a custom the precautionary principle is a prima facie universal and not a regional one.  Consequently, in principle it imposes duties on all states​[437]​.  “In principle”, because so far no serious attention has been paid to the phenomena of persistent and subsequent objection in relation to the precautionary principle.  In respect of the former, states opposing the application of a given norm throughout its formative stages may be exempted from its reach once it attains customary status.  Considering their outright negation of the binding character of the principle in the Beef Hormones (1998), and in the Biotech (2006) disputes, Canada and the United States may be among the most likely candidates for qualification as persistent objectors in the present context.  As far as Canadian practice is concerned, it has already been pointed out that its position in the Beef Hormones case stands in shrill contrast with the otherwise unequivocal support it has lent the precautionary principle ever since its emergence on the international scene.  Besides, the contention that international law does not yet recognise a precautionary principle, as opposed to a concept or approach, would appear to be in contradiction with the various international instruments adhered to by Canada that do explicitly articulate precaution as a “principle”​[438]​.  The denial by the United States before the WTO Beef Hormones panels of the existence of the precautionary principle as a customary norm having general application was of a less incidental nature.  During the negotiations for the Climate Change Convention, for instance, US delegates clearly guarded against any attribution of customary status to the precautionary principle, whereas the obstructive attempts by the US in other for a during the roughly four years culminating in the Earth Summit will also be remembered.  Although evidence of dissent in all these cases is fairly clear, the consistency of United States opposition to the precautionary principle, although more substantial than that portrayed by its northern neighbour, must be seriously doubted, when taking as well of the more than considerable amount of occasions on which the US, whether verbally or otherwise, has expressed its acceptance of the principle in the international setting.  In the Biotech (2006) dispute, the European Communities (EC) affirms that certain GMOs come with possible threats to human health and the environment.  The EC submits that a potential threat validates the examination of risk on a case-by-case basis and special protective measures derived from the precautionary principle.  More recently, in the particular field of GMOs, the Biosafety Protocol has approved of the key function of the precautionary principle in the decision to limit or ban imports of GMOs due to scientific uncertainty.  Whereas the United States ​[439]​argues that the EC has not identified how a “precautionary principle” would be of significance to interpreting any particular provision of the WTO Agreement.  Furthermore, the United States records that in the EC-Hormones dispute, the Appellate Body analysed in-depth almost all identical arguments presented by the EC regarding the relationship between an alleged “precautionary principle” and the SPS Agreement (The WTO Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures).  The EC has no reasonable grounds to argue that any different results should apply here.  The United States, nevertheless, records that it very much does not agree that “precaution” has become a rule of international law.  According to the United States, the “precautionary principle” cannot be regarded as a general principle or norm of international law because it does not possess a uniformly agreed formulation.  The United States comments in this regard that, in contrast, the precautionary concept has many variations across a number of different factors.  Thus, the United States believes precaution to be an “approach”, not a “principle” of international law.    The United States does not consider the precautionary principle to satisfy any of the requirements to become a rule of customary international law for the following reasons: “(i) it cannot be considered a “rule” because it has no clear content and therefore cannot be said to provide any authoritative guide for a State’s conduct; (ii) it cannot be said to reflect the practice of States, as it cannot even be uniformly defined by those who espouse it; and (iii) given that precaution cannot be defined and, therefore, could not possibly be a legal norm, one could not argue that States follow it from a sense of legal obligation.”​[440]​  

Regarding subsequent objection, international law appears to allow for the exemption of states from a principle’s application not only during, but also after its maturing as a customary norm​[441]​.  This doctrine is less firmly established, however, and is not always clearly distinguished from persistent objection​[442]​.  Logically, the criteria to be met in order for a state to qualify as a subsequent objector would be more stringent than the conditions of persistent objection.  Although as Brownlie observes, the International Court has never been too overt about the role of acquiescence in validating the subsequent contracting out of rules.  The bottom line seems to be that, apart from the requirements of consistency and proof of opposition, it is the response of fellow states to subsequent opposition that turns the scale​[443]​.  In other words, as stated before, such dissent with a particular norm may only entail its non-application if and in so far as the attitudes of other members of the international community are apparently indifferent in the matter.  

Thus, substantiating the point of view that the United States, Argentina, South Korea, Japan or whichever other nation is exonerated from the legal consequence of the precautionary principle on grounds of subsequent objection, may well prove to be a difficult task.  In particular, in view of the facts that the motivations for adoption of the precautionary principle as a binding norm of international law related precisely to the need for a more effective protection of the worldwide environment.  As any action incompatible with the principle necessarily undermines the achievement of that objective, it can hardly be assumed that any such action would carry the approval of the international community.  Testimony of this are the alleged non-compliance, of their duties under the principle, the clearest examples of these being the Chile-Japan, New Zealand-France, Ireland-UK, UK-Denmark and Australia and New Zealand-Japan controversies.  Consequently-although, naturally, the merits of any claim of subsequent objection would have to be assessed in the light of as complete information as possible-in the absence of solid proof to the contrary, states cannot lightly be supposed to have contracted out of the obligations inherent in the precautionary principle after its transformation into a customary principle.  Put another way, any state acting in apparent in conformity with the requirements of the precautionary principle is to be presumed a delinquent and not a subsequent objector.
The second and final issue relating to the reach of the precautionary principle involves another dimension of its applicability; one that was already referred to when discussing its relationship with the preventive principle and Principle 21.  The development of the principle in international law as presented earlier, points out that it applies to the environments as a whole-while increasingly covering human health issues as well.  As Judge Laing sketches this development:  “The notion of environmental precaution largely stems from diplomatic practice and treaty-making in the spheres, originally, of international marine pollution and, now, of biodiversity, climate change, pollution generally and, broadly, the environment.”​[444]​  

The Southern Bluefin Tuna cases provide a classic situation for the sensible application of precaution in an international context.​[445]​  Indeed, it might be the most pertinent such situation since the World Trade Organisation’s Appellate Body chose not to apply precaution in the 1998 EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Beef Hormones) case​[446]​.  Both sides in the Southern Bluefin Tuna dispute are keen to carry on fishing the southern bluefin tuna.  It is an extremely lucrative operation, which offers considerable returns to the fishermen of all concerning states.  However, the availability of stock is largely unknown.  The applicants, New Zealand and Australia based their claim, inter alia, on the precautionary principle.  In their view, when agreement or scientific consensus concerning the conservation of seriously depleted stocks is not present, all interested parties should act in a precautionary manner.  The applicants alleged that the stocks of bluefin tuna were gravely depleted, and were at their lowest levels of all time, without reliable indications of stock recovery.​[447]​  As Judge Laing indicated in his separate opinion, completely opposite views are uttered by scientists on several important issues, such as the forecast of future levels of parental biomass, the changes in size composition, the rate of recruitment of juveniles, the mortality rates of juveniles, the projection of recovery levels as well as the appropriate approach to necessary scientific investigation.  

Despite not knowing for definite, both sides in the case agreed that the stock is constantly low (Order, para.71).  One side (Japan) believed that the scientific evidence showed that the stock was about to recuperate, while the other (Australia and New Zealand) thought that it was about to deplete totally.  Because of this contended setting, ITLOS was asked by Australia and New Zealand to endorse provisional measures to stop Japan from continuing its unilateral experimental fishing programme, because Japan had considerably increased its catches from those negotiated within the framework of the tri-lateral 1993 Convention on the Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna (SBT Convention).  Australia and New Zealand shared the view that Japan must be ordered to act in accordance with the precautionary principle.

Although the Tribunal’s Order did not deal directly with the nature of the precautionary principle, it, however, made certain interesting general and practical observations.  First, the ITLOS Order used the term ‘caution’ rather than the precautionary principle.  The most important is paragraph 77 of the Order, which states as follows: 

“Considering that, in the view of the Tribunal, the parties should in the circumstances act with prudence and caution to ensure that effective conservation measures are taken to prevent serious harm to the stock of southern bluefin tuna…[paragraph 77]”​[448]​

Paragraphs 79 and 80 of the Order are also relevant:

“Considering that there is a scientific uncertainty regarding their efforts to cooperate with other participants in the fishery for southern bluefin tuna with a view to ensuring conservation and promoting the objective the optimum utilisation of the stock…[paragraph 79]”;

And finally;

“Considering, that although the Tribunal cannot conclusively assess the scientific evidence presented by the parties, it finds that measures should be taken as a matter of urgency to preserve the rights of the parties and to avert further deterioration of southern bluefin tuna stock…[paragraph 80].”

It must be commented that the ITLOS expressed the approach as that of ‘prudence and caution’, thus avoiding using the term ‘precautionary principle’.  As was observed; the Order is of importance since it:

“addresses fundamental aspects of putting the precautionary principle into practice, such as risk assessment, the definition of environmental damage, and the implications of a shift of the burden of proof.  However, ITLOS’s decision also evidences the difficulties of making effective use of a precautionary approach, given the need to balance the number of, at times, contradictory interests (that is, the prevention of environmental damage and the economic and social costs of taking precautionary measures) as well as the complexity of operating in the face of uncertainty.”​[449]​

Fabra also observes the fundamental aspect of the precautionary principle, i.e. that it is a relative concept and therefore has to be considered on a case-by-case basis.​[450]​
It is worth mentioning that, in reaching its decision to grant provisional measures in the case, ITLOS did not perform a qualitative assessment of the scientific evidence in the case.  It did not favour one side’s science against the other.  Rather, what it did was to understand that each side had its own view.  That scientific uncertainty existed as to the impact of the experimental fishing programme, just as there was scientific uncertainty about the wellbeing of the stock and the necessary measures that might be required to achieve conservation and best possible utilisation.​[451]​  It then issued a ruling urging the parties to act with prudence and caution to make sure that operative conservation measures are undertaken to prevent serious harm to the stock of southern bluefin tuna. These measures, as a consequence, ended the unilateral experimental fishing programme.  However, it can be argued that the ITLOS prescribed caution rather than the precautionary principle; in fact it adhered to the premise on which the precautionary principle is established of taking action without scientific certainty: ‘[e]ven if ITLOS only urged “caution” on the parties, it did oblige them to suspend possibly damaging activities despite the presence of scientific uncertainty.  This is a classic application of precautionary methodology.’​[452]​

In 2001, in the MOX case (Ireland v United Kingdom), Ireland alleged that the United Kingdom had failed to adopt a precautionary approach to the protection of the Irish Sea in the practice of its decision-making agency related to the direct and indirect impacts of the operation of the MOX (Mixed Oxide fuel) plant and international movements of radioactive materials associated with the operation of the MOX plant.  Ireland referred to the precautionary principle at the provisional measures phase to back its claim that the United Kingdom had the burden to prove that no harm would result from discharges and other impacts of the operation of the MOX plant, and to notify the assessment by the Tribunal of the necessity of the measures it is required to take in respect of the operation of the MOX plant.​[453]​  The precautionary principle represented one of the bases of the claim submitted by Ireland.  However, the Statement of Claim did not shed more light on the very nature of this principle: precaution, the precautionary principle and precautionary approach were used interchangeably, which indeed proves the point that such distinctions bear very little practical importance.​[454]​  For its part, and whilst agreeing that in examining the degree of risk in any given case the concepts of prudence and caution may be of relevance, the United Kingdom argued that with no evidence demonstrating a real risk of harm precaution could not permit a restraint of the rights of the United Kingdom to operate the plant.​[455]​  According to Judge Wolfrum in his Separate Opinion concerning the case:  

“It is still a matter of discussion whether the precautionary principle or the precautionary approach in international environmental law has become part of customary international law.  This principle or approach applied in international environmental law reflects the necessity of making environment-related decisions in the face of scientific uncertainty about the potential future harm of a particular activity.  There is no general agreement as to the consequences which flow from the implementation of this principle other than the fact that the burden of proof concerning the possible impact of a given activity is reversed.  A State interested in undertaking or continuing a particular activity has to prove that such activities will not result in any harm, rather than the other side having to prove that it will result in harm.”​[456]​  

The Tribunal did not grant the suspension of the operation of the plant, as requested by Ireland, but as an alternative ordered the parties to co-operate and become involved in consultations to exchange further information on likely consequences for the Irish Sea resulting from the operation of the MOX plant and to develop, as appropriate, measures to prevent marine pollution which might result from the operation of the MOX plant.​[457]​  That Order, which contained a certain precautionary nature, was granted on considerations of ‘prudence and caution’.​[458]​    
A recent analysis carried out testing the relevant conduct and statements of States against the generally accepted standards on the formation of customary or general international law, and taking into account also of international jurisprudence and doctrine, encouraged the conclusion that the core content of the precautionary principle had by then indeed attained the status of customary international law.​[459]​  As one judge stated in a recent case before the ICJ, ‘the precautionary principle is not an abstraction or an academic component of desirable soft law, but a rule of law within general international law as it stands today.’​[460]​  To exemplify the practical significance of this conclusion, it is worth observing that States have continually invoked the principle as a norm of general international law in international judicial proceedings, including three times before the ITLOS in Hamburg (Australia and New Zealand,​[461]​ Ireland​[462]​ and Malaysia​[463]​) and four times before the ICJ in the Hague (New Zealand,​[464]​ Hungary,​[465]​ Argentina,​[466]​ and Ecuador​[467]​).  In the most recently instigated and currently pending case, Ecuador claims that by ‘aerially spraying toxic herbicides at, near, and over its border with Ecuador’, Colombia has failed to act in an adequately precautionary manner.​[468]​  Instances of application of the precautionary principle as a norm of customary international law at the national level include judgements by the Supreme Courts of India​[469]​ and Canada​[470]​ concerning environmental pollution from the leather industry and pesticides, in  that order.  

Thus, apart from being all-encompassing in terms of environmental segments, it is so in terms of legal territory as well, just like the preventive principle.  As a consequence, states are under the obligation to act in line with the precautionary principle in all their decisions relating to the environment, including the environment within the bounds of domestic jurisdiction, that is, at a minimum, their air space, land mass, internal waters and territorial sea, including the ecosystems these house and compose.  This can be inferred, besides, from the fact that the precautionary principle, as noted previously, is widely considered as ancillary to or inherent in the larger concept of sustainable development, to which the duty upon states to protect not only the global, but also their own environments is intrinsic—how else can the preservation of the world’s natural resources and acceptable environmental conditions for present and future generations be guaranteed?​[471]​











CHAPTER’S CONCLUSIONS

States and other members of the international community still have not established a harmonised understanding of the meaning of the precautionary principle.  This is without surprise since there are a wide range of separate formulations of the precautionary principle.  In international law, the scope of the precautionary principle is rather broad.  Aside from its capacity of general principle of international environmental law, as an element of numerous treaties and general customary international law, the precautionary principle has legal repercussions for many states.  Its scope is all-embracing in that it applies to the environment as a whole.  Currently, the legal status of the precautionary principle is developing.  There is surely adequate evidence of state practice to back the conclusion that the principle, as stipulated in Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration as well as in many international conventions, has now gained widespread support to allow a strong argument that it reflects a principle of customary law.  Within the framework of the European Union, the principle has now achieved customary status.  Nonetheless, it must be appreciated that international adjudicatory bodies have been unwilling to accept openly that the principle has a customary international law status, despite having broad support in favour of that view, and fading resistence to it.  The unwillingness of the international courts may be comprehensible, considering its naturally reasonable approach, even if the practical outcomes of its application are determined on a case-by-case basis.​[472]​










CHAPTER 3  

THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE IN THE LAW OF THE SEA AND THE PROTECTION OF THE MARINE ENVIRONMENT

Introduction

The period after the Second World War had seen the continual increase in the volume and effects of pollution from land and seaborne sources, and this prompted rigorous international action.  Regulation of marine pollution, to some extent, was developed at a slower pace, indicating the more limited interest of states in this problem, and the drawbacks of scientific understanding of oceanic processes.  By the late 1960s, however, consciousness of the effect of pollution on coastal environments, on fisheries, and on human populations had become prevalent.  The Torrey Canyon disaster in the United Kingdom in 1967 created the blemish of large areas of coastline by oil.  The disaster demonstrated the risk associated with the daily transport of toxic and hazardous substances at sea.  The incident of mercury emissions from a factory at Minimata in Japan had poisoned fish and caused danger to the lives of coastal communities.  We, then, learned that the problem was no longer restricted to the operation of ships.  As a consequence, full control of all potential pollution sources, including those on land is needed.  “Scientific studies conducted in the 1970s and 1980s by GESAMP, and at regional level, showed significant pollution of the sea by oil, persistent organic compounds, chemicals nuclear waste, and the effluent of urban, industrial society.”​[473]​  By 1990s, real problems of over-fishing, loss of marine biological diversity, and degradation of marine ecosystems had been more evident.​[474]​  In addition to their impacts on the environment, these problems have seriously challenged the role of science in policy-making, in particular with respect to the ability of science to foresee and therefore prevent potentially disastrous environmental change.  When recognised as a theoretical possibility in advance, e.g. global warming, lake acidification, eutrophication of coastal waters, science has not been able to predict either the starting point or the rate of change.  Furthermore, when ‘degradation’ has become obvious, scientists have been unable to concur on causes and effects.  Therefore, the problems raised by the rising threat of adverse environmental change have set off a major review of pollution control policy and its basis in science.  The connected shift in policy from pollution control to pollution prevention has been expressed as a ‘paradigm shift’ in environmental management.​[475]​  That means, it represents a fundamental reappraisal not only of policy itself, but also of the assumptions which underlie both environmental management, and the relationship of society to its environment.  The problems which have overwhelmed marine scientists in trying to determine limiting environmental capacities are inherent, rather than circumstantial problems.  They have occurred not because some particular scientist has not been able to carry out his or her tasks adequately, but rather because of intrinsic complexity of ecological systems, and the underlying uncertainty that must be attached to any scientific analysis.  Uncertainty is an inherent property of the relationship between science and the environmental and human systems which science proposes to describe.  Furthermore, with regard to this uncertainty, it is extremely unsafe to demand proof of actual environmental effects and the establishment of causal links prior to taking measures to minimise the potentially adverse and irreversible environmental impacts.  Thus, to this end, the precautionary principle is addressed.  The precautionary principle has surged over the shores of marine environmental protection.​[476]​  Nearly every international environmental agreement and declaration in the past two decades has proclaimed the idea that when an activity, such as proposed pollution or a coastal development, holds the potential for serious environmental harm, decision-makers should err on the side of caution.​[477]​  Scientific certainty should not be waited for.  From climate change to biodiversity protection, precautionary measures are being advocated.​[478]​  However, the law and literature relating to the precautionary principle has been portrayed as in “disarray”, with a great deal of confusion over meaning and detachments from relevant social science and legal literature.​[479]​  The precautionary principle/approach​[480]​ is also seen as not dependable due to the wide range of available management measures.  Direct and severe measures to promote precaution include total bans on certain human activities, such as nuclear technology​[481]​ or new aquaculture development; designation of “no-take” areas; and “reverse listing” for pollutants or wastes where only pollutants/wastes registered on a “safe list” would be permitted to be used or released.​[482]​  An example of a direct/extreme approach at the international level is in ocean dumping, where the 1996 Protocol​[483]​ to the London Convention 1972​[484]​ requires a precautionary reverse listing approach where only wastes registered on a “safe list” may be disposed of at sea​[485]​ and only after national authorities are satisfied with a waste assessment.​[486]​  Practical repercussions of the precautionary approach to fisheries management have also been subject to discussion with various management measures possible.​[487]​  Due to the adoption of the 1972 Convention for the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping from Ships and Aircraft (Oslo Convention) and the 1972 London (Dumping) Convention, universal action was thus prompted.  This soon after leads to the adoption of the 1992 OSPAR Convention​[488]​ and the 1996 Protocol to the 1972 London Convention.  In spite of an extensive international law regime, the precautionary principle remains a vital risk management tool that is called upon in the context of dumping and incineration at sea.​[489]​  


Legal Development in the Law of the Sea and Marine Pollution Prevention with Reference to the Precautionary Principle

As discussed above, protection of the marine environment and sustainable use of marine resources have become major issues in the modernisation of the law of the sea.
Therefore, the process of developing new law, initially based on ad hoc attempts to regulate specific problems such as pollution from ships or from dumping, was given substantial force by the 1972 Stockholm Conference on the Human Environment and the 1992 Rio Conference on Environment and Development.  Recommendations of the Stockholm Conference led directly to the adoption of the 1972 London and Oslo Dumping Conventions, and the 1973 (MARPOL) Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships.  General principles for the assessment and control of marine pollution from all sources, including land-based and airborne, were also endorsed, and these formed the basis for articles later incorporated in UNEP’s Regional Seas Agreements and in Part XII of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).​[490]​




The 1982 UNCLOS was proposed to be an inclusive restatement of almost all aspects of the Law of the Sea, and it has aimed to establish;

“a legal order for the seas and oceans which will facilitate international communication, and will promote the peaceful uses of the seas and oceans, the equitable and efficient utilisation of their resources, the conservation of their living resources, and the study, protection and preservation of the marine environment.”​[491]​

The Convention, consequently, endeavours for the first time to provide a global framework for the reasonable exploitation and conservation of the sea’s resources and the protection of the environment.  In many ways, it has been seen as a model for the evolution of international environmental law.​[492]​  

The articles of the 1982 UNCLOS on the marine environment signify the outcome of a process of international law-making which has affected a number of fundamental changes in the international law of the sea.​[493]​  The most important here is that, firstly, the idea that pollution can no longer be regarded as an implicit freedom of the seas is introduced, and diligent control from all sources is now a matter of comprehensive legal responsibility affecting the marine environment as a whole.  Secondly, there is a change to the balance of power between flag states and coastal states.  Many states do fall into both categories and thus faced with difficulties in negotiating the 1982 UNCLOS.  Thirdly, the emphasis is now principally placed on international regulation and co-operation in the protection of the marine environment.  In the make-up of this legal regime, flag states, coastal states, port states, and international organisations and commissions each possesses important roles, powers and responsibilities.  In certain respects, these responsibilities merge to produce one of the more successful examples of international environmental co-operation.

It is comprehensible therefore that the 1982 UNCLOS is mentioned in Agenda 21 of the 1992 Rio Conference Report as providing ‘the international basis upon which to pursue the protection and sustainable development of the marine and coastal environment and its resources.’  Nevertheless, Chapter 17 of Agenda 21 introduces several new elements, which cannot be found in UNCLOS, including an emphasis on integrated and precautionary approaches to protection of the marine and coastal environment.​[494]​  The focal point is no longer primarily on the control of sources of marine pollution, but more largely on the prevention of environmental ‘degradation’ as well as the protection of ecosystems.  It is the first time that protection of the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) is linked with sustainable development of coastal areas and sustainable use of marine living resources.  Although Agenda 21 cannot amend the 1982 UNCLOS, and has no binding effects on states, it can be taken into account when interpreting or implementing the Convention and it has had the effect of legitimising and encouraging legal developments based on these new standpoints.  The impact of Agenda 21 thus shows how ‘a more conceptually sophisticated’ focus on protection of the marine environment has grown out of Part XII of UNCLOS.​[495]​  As Yankov notes: ‘It is hard to conceive of the development of modern law of the sea and the emerging international environmental law in ocean-related matters outside the close association and interplay between UNCLOS and Agenda 21.’​[496]​

As we are aware, the concept of the precautionary principle had not yet been developed when UNCLOS (1982) was adopted.  There are, however, good grounds for arguing that at least the wording of some of the UNCLOS’ provisions reflect a precautionary spirit.  For example, one can state that Article 1(1)(4) UNCLOS was drafted in a precautionary language, as “pollution” is not defined as something which “results” in hazards to human health or harm to living resources, but “is likely to result”.  It entails a mandate of protective measures before any harm can actually happen.  Further, it has been argued that the wording of Article 192 UNCLOS reflects the precautionary principle.​[497]​  The same is true for Article 194 UNCLOS, which distinguishes the need for “preventive action” in order to avoid negative impact.​[498]​  However, Article 206 UNCLOS appears closest to applying the precautionary principle when it requires an environmental impact assessment to be conducted in situations where states have reasonable grounds for believing that planned activities may cause substantial pollution or significant and harmful changes to the marine environment.  Its drafting history discloses that the states have responsibilities to conduct an EIA in situations where a planned activity could bring about potentially adverse effects to the marine environment.​[499]​   It is however largely believed that the precautionary principle was not yet conceptualised at the time of the Conference.  As a result, Article 206 UNCLOS can be regarded as a flexible norm, which could potentially be interpreted according to the precautionary principle as a rule of custom.  Similar to UNCLOS, the provisions of the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL) reflect the language of the 1970s, a time in which the concept of the precautionary principle was not yet established in international arena.​[500]​  It goes after the language of the preventive principle, for example in its definition of “harmful substances”.​[501]​  Annex II to the Protocol of 17 February 1978 relating to MARPOL provides for regulations on the prevention of substances which are known to be harmful, thus also pointing towards the preventive principle.

“Under the law of treaties, the United Nation Convention on the Law of the Sea’s provisions will have binding effects only upon entry into force and only for those States and entities​[502]​ which have expressed their consensus to be bound by it.”​[503]​  One of the distinct legal characteristics of UNCLOS, however, is the fact that, in addition to a number of provisions symbolising the codification of existing customary law, many other provisions are considered to have become part of customary law even prior to its entry into force.   Therefore, these provisions will bind all States as such.​[504]​  It would then be understandable, therefore, if the Convention’s entry into force does not bring about a new impact on States in such areas as the breadth of the territorial sea,​[505]​ the basic regime of the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ),​[506]​ the regime of archipelagic States,​[507]​ and straits used for international navigation.​[508]​  Its direct impact on States would thus be more obvious in other fields, especially to those which comparatively less attention has been paid.  This applies first and foremost to States Parties to UNCLOS.  But other States may also find it more and more difficult not to abide by such an impact since consensus is rising in the current negotiations to enable the Convention to be universally acceptable.  

How these developments have further changed the law can be seen in the rewriting of regional seas agreements on the Mediterranean, the Baltic, and the North-East Atlantic, revision of the London Convention, extension of treaty schemes on liability for pollution damage, and the adoption at Washington in 1995 of a Declaration and Global Programme of Action on Protection of the Marine Environment from Land-Based Activities.  A precautionary approach to the protection of marine ecosystems and biological diversity has been adopted in many of these treaties and in several other ways.  In particular, through the Conventions on Biological Diversity and Climate Change, the 1995 Agreement on Straddling and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, and the creation of specially protected areas by International Maritime Organisation (IMO) and under regional seas agreements.​[509]​

In order to consider the obligation of the IMO to precautionary principle, it is vital to review a few of the existing international conventions, which were negotiated within the IMO and sponsored by it.  Therefore, firstly, this chapter is proposed to review the global conventions, (the Convention for Prevention of Pollution from Ships-the MARPOL 73/78, and the 1972 London Convention), which were signed under the auspices of the IMO, and secondly, to analyse the conventions, which are more recent.  This approach will allow us to determine whether the IMO applies the precautionary principle in conventions, which were negotiated and signed before the emergence of the precautionary principle, and, further, how the precautionary principle is accounted for in the new conventions.  Other IMO Conventions will also be mentioned here to the extent that they apply the precautionary approach.  These IMO Conventions include the Convention of Intervention of the High Seas in case of Oil Casualties; the Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness, Response and Co-operation (OPRC); the International Convention of the Control of Harmful Anti-Fouling Systems; and International Convention for the Control Management of Ships’ Ballast Water and Sediments.  Many of these agreements are very broadly ratified and adopted by maritime states, and most can be readily amended and updated by IMO.  To that extent they establish a kind of international regulation of the environmental risks of transporting oil and other substances by sea, with IMO acting as the main regulatory and supervisory institution.  There are two agreements which deal specially with operational pollution and the reduction of accidents, they are the 1954 London Convention for the Prevention of Pollution of the Sea by Oil, and the 1973 International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL).




(a)  The 1954 London Convention​[510]​

This Convention celebrated the first successful attempt at international regulation of oil pollution from tankers.  It was consecutively amended until its replacement in 1973 by the new MARPOL Convention, but some forty states continue to be bound only by the older treaty.  Few if any of these are major tanker operators, however.

The 1954 Convention utilised several techniques for reducing operational discharges of oil.  There are provisions to control their locations (by defining prohibited areas and excluding coastal zones); to control the quantity of pollution (by limiting the rate of discharge); to control the need for discharges (by setting construction and equipment standards intended to reduce the volume of waste oil, or to separate oil from ballast water, and by calling on governments to provide port discharge facilities).  As the Convention began to affect the construction of tankers, so it was possible to introduce more and more stricter standards, including under a 1969 amendment, the so-called ‘load on top system’ which permitted tankers to discharge oily residues to land-based reception facilities.  

There was nothing intrinsically flawed in this approach to the regulation of operational pollution, and the Convention was clearly capable of keeping up with technical progress.  It was not particularly successful, however, for two reasons.  First, the enforcement record of flag states​[511]​ was rather weak; many lacked interest in pursuing enforcement energetically in areas beyond their territorial jurisdiction and they were in any case faced with practical problems of collecting evidence and bringing proceedings against ships which hardly ever entered their ports.  Secondly, not all flag states were parties to the Convention, nor did the 1958 High Seas Convention, with its requirement only to ‘take account’ of existing treaty provisions, force states to apply the London Convention.  Some flags of convenience could thus avoid more burdensome regulations, at the same time that coastal states could do little to enforce.  The Stockholm Conference in 1972 acknowledged both failings in its recommendations on marine pollution, which called on states to accept and implement available instruments and to ensure compliance by their flag vessels.​[512]​

(b) The 1973/78 MARPOL Convention​[513]​

This Convention, adopted for the first time in 1973, was considerably amended in 1978 to assist entry into force.  The Convention articles very much deal with jurisdiction, powers of enforcement, and inspection; the more in-depth anti-pollution regulations are contained in annexes which can be adopted and amended by the Marine Environment Protection Committee (MEPC) of IMO, subject to acceptance by at least two-thirds of parties constituting not less than 50 per cent gross tonnage of the world merchant fleet.  Annexes I and II, which regulate oil and chemical pollution correspondingly have been amended often to keep up with increasing technological advance and rising environmental awareness, partly in order to take account of the precautionary approach.  However, as more ships flag out to developing country open registers, the 50 per cent tonnage requirement is becoming harder to achieve, and Annex VI on air pollution, adopted in 1997, has taken a very long time to enter into force (It eventually did so in May 2005).

All parties are bound by Annexes I and II.  Other annexes are not obligatory and participation differs usually.  “The parties to MARPOL in 2000 comprised over 94 per cent of merchant tonnage, which puts at least Annexes I and II in the category of ‘generally accepted international rules and standards’ prescribed by Article 211 of the 1982 UNCLOS as the minimum content of the flag state’s duty to exercise diligent control of its vessels in the prevention of marine pollution.”​[514]​  As we have seen, there are also reasons for treating MARPOL regulations as a customary standard enforceable against vessels of all states, irrespective of the fact that they have ratified the MARPOL Convention.​[515]​  At the same time, it must be noted that, under Article 16 of this Convention, states parties are not bound by amendments they have not accepted, so there may be different regulations in force simultaneously for different flag states.  This certainly makes difficult the question whether any particular regulation is ‘generally accepted’ when deciding what rules a flag state must apply under Article 211.  From this, we may deduce that States that did not ratify MARPOL are bound by this convention on the basis of customary international law, nonetheless.

The MARPOL Convention’s approach to the regulation of oil pollution is generally similar to the 1954 Convention in depending mainly on technical measures to restrict oil discharges.  It also introduces new construction standards, however, which are more strict for new vessels, and which were amended in 1992 to demand double hulls after the Exxon Valdez disaster.  “The discharge of small quantities of oil is still allowed, but only if it is done en route, more than fifty miles from land and not in special areas where almost all discharges are prohibited.”​[516]​  The special areas stipulated in the Convention as regards oil pollution include the Mediterranean, the Black Sea, the Baltic, the Red Sea, and the Persian Gulf, all enclosed or semi-enclosed seas, where more strict standards are needed.  The Gulf of Aden, the North Sea and North West European waters, and the Antarctic, have later been inserted into this list.  In general terms, these provisions are intended to take advantage of modern technology and operating methods to get rid of all but smallest levels of oil discharge, to make sure that these have the least impact on coastal states, and to stress port discharge for residues which cannot otherwise be disposed of.

In other respects, however, the MARPOL Convention varies greatly from the earlier scheme.  First, it is no longer restricted to oil pollution, but also regulates other types of ship-based pollution, including the bulk carriage of noxious liquids, harmful substances, and garbage from ships.​[517]​  It thus offers some proof of internationally agreed standards of environmentally sound management for the transport of chemicals and hazardous wastes, and may be applicable in determining the obligations of states under the 1989 Basel Convention.

Secondly, a much more efficient scheme of enforcement was set up in response to pressure from coastal states disgruntled with the performance of the 1954 Treaty.  This scheme comprises the co-operation of coastal states, port states, and flag states in a system of certification, inspection, and reporting whose aims are to make the operation of faulty vessels difficult and to assist the performance by flag states of their primary jurisdiction to prosecute and enforce applicable laws.  It is this scheme which has made the MARPOL Convention a big progress on the 1954 Treaty and which provides proof of the impact independent inspection can have in ensuring compliance with environmental protection treaties.  

The author will now move on to analyse the IMO practice in relation to the precautionary principle.  The analysis will begin by looking at the 73/78 MARPOL Convention.​[518]​  The Convention is established to prevent and lessen pollution from ships, both accidental and operational forms.  The Convention contains the framework and six technical Annexes:

Annex I—Regulations for the Prevention of Pollution by Oil;​[519]​
Annex II—Regulations for the Control by Noxious Liquid Substances in Bulk;​[520]​
Annex III—Prevention of Pollution by Harmful Substances Carried by Sea in Packaged Form;​[521]​
Annex IV—Prevention of Pollution by Sewage from Ships;​[522]​
Annex V—Prevention of Pollution by Garbage from Ships;
Annex VI—Prevention of Air Pollution.​[523]​


The MARPOL 73/78 Convention is an important international agreement concerning prevention of pollution of the marine environment from ships.  It is an amalgamation of treaties adopted in 1973 and 1978 and modernised by the way of amendments.​[524]​  Annex I and II are compulsory for parties to the Convention and all other remaining Annexes are not obligatory.  “As of 31 January 2005, the parties to the MARPOL include of 97.07 per cent of merchant tonnage and the number of Contracting Parties is 136.”​[525]​  Therefore, it makes their provisions, together with the ‘framework or umbrella’ Convention a worldwide instrument, comprising of “generally accepted international rules and standards” (in the wording of Article 211 of the 1982 UNCLOS), which establish a minimum standard prescribed by flag states for their merchant ships and, which, also have become binding on third States through the operation of customary international law.​[526]​  Other Annexes are not so widely accepted.​[527]​  Amendments to the Convention are accepted on the basis of which any State party to the Convention may “opt out” from accepting a new amendment within a set period of time and as a result is not bound by it (Article 16).  This procedure do not make the application of the Convention consistent and as some authors observed “[t]his undoubtedly complicates the question whether any particular regulation is ‘generally accepted’ when determining what rules a flag state must apply under Article 211.”​[528]​

Under MARPOL 73/78 the parties to the Convention agree to give effect to the provisions of the MARPOL 73/78 and those Annexes thereto which have binding effects on them, in order to prevent the pollution of the marine environment by discharge of harmful substances or effluents containing such substances in contravention of the Convention (Article 1 para.1).  Article 4 of the MARPOL 73/78 stipulates double system of national prohibitions and sanctions.  Firstly, violations are to be forbidden and sanctions to be established under the law of the Administration​[529]​ of the ship concerned, wherever the violation takes place (Article 4 para.1); and, secondly, violations are to be forbidden and sanctions to be imposed, under the law of the party within whose jurisdiction they occur (Article 4 para.2).  Following the 73/78 MARPOL, the flag State has to make sure that its ship complies with all the required technical standards.  In order to achieve this, the State has to undergo inspections and issue an “international oil pollution prevention certificate”.  Article 5 of the Convention introduced an extensive jurisdiction of the port State.

It provides that the inspection must be conducted in order to assess the conditions of the ships and to confirm that the ship is in possession of a valid certificate, especially when there are some clear grounds to believe that its conditions do not match largely with the certificate.  When there is a stated non-compliance with the MARPOL certificate, Article 7 imposes a duty on a port state not to permit such a ship to leave the port, unless it can do so without showing an unreasonable threat of harm to the environment.  However, the port state has a responsibility not to delay ships inappropriately.  In case of such a violation Article 4 para.2 (in the jurisdiction of a party), the party is either to cause proceedings to be taken in accordance with its law or to supply such information and evidence as may be in possession that a violation has taken place (Article 4 para.2(a-b)) to the Administration of the ship concerned.  Article 4 para.(1) further provides that, “if the Administration of a ship involved in violation is informed of it and is satisfied that sufficient evidence is available to enable proceedings to be brought, that Administration will cause such proceedings to be taken as soon as possible, in accordance with its law.”  It may also be observed that “any violation” in Article 4 para.2 means that it applies to operational and discharge standards, as well as design and equipment standards of the Convention.​[530]​  MARPOL 73/78 establishes that the parties to the Convention “shall co-operate in the detection of violations and the enforcement of the provisions of the present Convention, using all appropriate and practicable measures of detection and environmental monitoring adequate procedures for reporting and accumulation of evidence.” (Article 6, para.1).  It states further that, “any Party shall furnish to the Administration evidence, if any, that the ship has discharged harmful substances of effluents containing such substances in violation of the provisions of the Regulations.  If it is practicable to do so, the competent authority of the former party shall notify the master of the ship of the alleged violation” (Article 6, para.3).  Parties have an obligation to supply to the Administration information on discharge of harmful substances effluents.  When the evidence is received, the Administration so informed as to examine the matter and may demand the other party to supply further or better evidence of the alleged violation.  If the Administration is content that sufficient evidence is available to allow proceedings to be taken in accordance with its law as soon as possible, the Administration will quickly inform the party which has reported the alleged violation, as well as the IMO, of the action taken (Article 6, para.4).  When it concerns the ships of non-parties to MARPOL 73/78, the Parties are to apply requirements as may be necessary to make sure that no more favourable treatment is granted to such ship (Article 5).  The measures under Article 5 are the cause of some doctrinal argument in so far as they claim to apply to ships flying the flag of non-parties.  As an exercise of the jurisdiction by the coastal state over foreign ships, this provision cannot, according to one of the authors, limit the rights enjoyed by non-parties under the general international law principle pacta tertiis nec nocent nec prosunt.  According to Willish, the provisions, which obligate parties to apply the requirements of a convention to ships flying the flag of non-parties is, under this principle, subject to the geographical limitations of a coastal state’s jurisdiction as determined by general international law.  “[t]he right to apply the treaty requirements to non-parties is also subject to the customary right of innocent passage, which, at present, only insofar requires compliance with pollution regulations of coastal states as those regulations do not exceed the customary or treaty obligations in force between both states concerned.”​[531]​



The Precautionary Principle and the 73/78 MARPOL Convention

The MARPOL 73/78 Convention is a very broad and ground-breaking international agreement, especially in its enforcement of environmental regulations.  However, it does not contain any explicit provisions on precautionary principle.
As a matter of fact, the Marine Environment Protection Committee (MEPC), of the IMO, adopted a Resolution on 15 September 1995, on Guidelines on Incorporation of the Precautionary Approach in the Context of Specific IMO Activities.​[532]​  The Resolution links to the Agenda 21 as well as Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration.  The precautionary principle was put into practice on the basis of this Resolution as a provisional measure, “until further experience with application was gained.”  The Resolution also demanded all relevant IMO bodies to review the guidelines and put forward comments to the MEPC with a view to their eventual submission to the Assembly for the adoption of guidelines for all relevant IMO activities.  The Annex to this Resolution lays down specific guidelines on the implementation of this approach.  Guidelines depend on Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration as the basic definition of the precautionary approach and on Agenda 21 chapter 17 on the manner of its application.​[533]​

The Guidelines portrayed the whole list of elements to be considered in order to regularly incorporate the precautionary approach into the decision-making process of the IMO:

“1. anticipation and prevention of environmental problems arising from any regulatory activities of IMO and striving for continual improvement in all facets of those activities;
2. that solution to problems and consideration of new and existing policies, programmes, guidelines and regulations are developed in accordance with the precautionary approach;
3. that where action is necessary and options may involve uncertainty, all options are evaluated consistent with the precautionary approach;
4. adoption of cost-effective practices and practical solutions to problems and promotion of their continued development;
5. where appropriate, that decision-making is preceded by environmental assessment and risk analysis to identify the environmental impacts of the proposed or alternative courses of action, whether these impacts can be prevented or minimised and how this might be done;
6. improvement in decision-making and management by obtaining and providing baseline and other data, identifying and explaining environmental changes;
7. promotion of national and international research, analysis and information programmes to identify, understand and disseminate information about threats to the environment from maritime operations, to contribute to defining the problems, including analysis of the degree of risk involved, by which uncertainties are reduced, and developing and testing solutions to problems;
8. consideration and adoption of economic incentives to encourage environmental responsibility as to conserve the marine environment and avoid further degradation;
9. support for development of new and existing policies, programmes, guidelines or regulations.  Where appropriate, which contribute to the protection and enhancement of the marine and coastal environment consistent with IMO mandate;
10. that, as necessary and appropriate, IMO should, through programme such as its Integrated Technical Co-operation Programme, assist countries to improve their capabilities in order to comply with the IMO standards in the shortest possible time;
11. where existing practices fail to provide adequate environmental protection, encouragement of the development and use of cost-effective interim protective measure with feasible time frames, which include best environmental practice and best available technology;
12. promotion of clean technologies and waste minimisation techniques form maritime activities, including the best environmental practice and best available technology to ensure improving environmental performance.”

The Resolution also emphasises that the precautionary approach should not be considered in separation of other IMO practices, procedures and resolutions, including resolutions A.500​[534]​ and A.777​[535]​ and principles such as a “polluter-pays” principle as reflected in Rio Declaration, principle 16.  The document “Framework for Incorporation of the Precautionary Principle into the Programmes and Activities of IMO”, illustrates the management and the decision-making framework to be respected in order to promote incorporation of preventive, precautionary and anticipatory approaches.​[536]​

In short, it may be said that the main features of the precautionary approach of the IMO are as follows;
(i)	The IMO backs precautionary approach not principle, which is along the lines of the formulation adopted by Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration.​[537]​
(ii)	The precautionary approach has to be applied in case of uncertainty; however,
(iii)	It has to be cost-effective;
(iv)	Environmental impact assessment is an essential part of the implementation of precautionary approach;
(v)	Access to and distribution of information should be encouraged;
(vi)	National and international research (such as the risk analysis) must be carried out;
(vii)	The conservation of the marine environment may be achieved through the implementation of economic incentives;
(viii)	IMO through various programmes will provide assistance to countries, where necessary,  to enhance the capabilities to achieve the IMO standards;
(ix)	New practices based on the best environmental practice and the best available technology will be introduced.

The above elements of the implementation of the precautionary principle go along with the general concept of what makes up the precautionary approach (principle).  The inherent ambiguity of “scientific uncertainty” and the risk is offset by the existence of the environmental impact assessment, the duty to inform and the use of the best available technology (BAT) and the best environmental practice (BEP), which are the most concrete constituents of the approach.

Therefore, the next move will involve the investigation and the legal analysis of the relevant provisions, found in the IMO selected instruments and the analysis to what extent the obligations contain therein embrace this principle.

The Fourth Meeting of the Open-Ended Consultative Process on Oceans and the Law resulted in several interesting suggestions.  Firstly, it must be mentioned that the approach to precautionary approach in relation to all activities that concern the marine environment (therefore these deriving from the MARPOL) is directed by the idea of its general, universal application based on the link between the safety of navigation and the protection of vulnerable marine ecosystems.​[538]​  Therefore, the favoured approach is a holistic in nature, i.e. the overall application of a precautionary approach in an integrated manner.  The intervention of Norway was fascinating as it witnessed that the UNCLOS does not allow for environmental precautionary measures against ships that comply with international standards.  Generally, the application of precautionary approach is a very controversial issue.  For example, New Zealand voiced its concern over the diversion of single hull tankers to other waters as a consequence of the measures adopted the EU after the Prestige disaster.  New Zealand stressed that such a measure is likely to increase the inspection costs.  Some states (such as the Russian Federation) are very solidly against any regional and unilateral measures, which hinder the commercial navigation.  Therefore, it may be assumed that some precautionary measures, albeit regional, which have an effect on the world navigation, do not receive a full approval.  China highlighted the importance of freedom of navigation and environmental protection and wanted the solution in appropriate balancing of both, within the structure of international law.  As it will be shown, precautionary approaches to protection of the marine environment and the prevention are difficult to tell apart.  Therefore, in relation to, for example, oil spills prevention (or preventative approach) will be compared with the 1995 IMO Guidelines on Precautionary Principle.

The Prevention of Vessel Oil Spill ​[539]​

The industry and the IMO dedicate considerable time and effort in order to introduce prevention of oil spill.  International Oil Spill Conferences take place annually and many workshops are arranged following these events, for example in 2004, there was the Prevention Workshop organised at the IMO in London on: “Prevention, what are the next Challenges?”​[540]​

As explained earlier, vessel source input could be classified as follows: tankers; barges; non-tankers, recreational vessels; fishing vessels; and passenger vessels.  There are two key categories of inputs, for example, accidental spills, which derive e.g. from collision, and operational discharges, such as e.g. oil contained in ballast water and oil discharged in bilge water.  Lentz and Felleman noted, “[r]ecent evidence indicates widespread by-passing of oil/water separators, in direct contravention of MARPOL operational discharges limitations.”​[541]​  Lentz and Felleman also noted that the volume of operational spills had been underrated on the presumption that the reduction in spills was the outcome of the compliance with international regulations.  However, such a statement has been disputed as “misplaced”, at least in so far as it concerns the Northern American waters and spills were only confined to the cruise industry.​[542]​  There were cases of false waste oil disposal statements in the record book of the ship, to the effect that waste oil was being burned in the incinerator of the ship, whilst in actual fact this was being discharged in the Pacific Ocean via a secret bypass hose.  Some other research specifies that some shippers may be deliberately modifying oil/water separators in order to discharge illegal quantities of oil into the sea.  Approximately between 60,000 and 100,000 birds are killed every year on the South Coast of Newfoundland in Canada as a result of illegal oil pollution.  Such tragic incidents also take place in Europe.  In the “special areas” chosen under the MARPOL, such as the Baltic Sea  more than 800 of illegal spills were discovered in 1998 and more than 1100 in 1997, which suggests that  “non-compliance is rife in this heavily monitored area, and calls in question OIS assumptions.”​[543]​  Another thing, which adds to this disappointing state of affairs, is an unavailability of the proper reception facilities, even in States, which are parties to the MARPOL (Annex I requires them).  Accidental discharges from non-tank vessels are very much linked to non-compliance with discharge regulations of MARPOL, area, which is not adequately researched, as well as the provision of harsher monitoring and enforcement policies.​[544]​  There are various measures, apart from spill response capability, which “allege to address prevention.”​[545]​  These measures include: double-hull requirements; vessel management requirements (e.g. International Safety Management (ISM Code)); vessel crew licensing certification and training requirements (e.g. development of Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping (STCW)); and Port State control inspections.  It is indisputable that double hulls work effectively in spills control.  Prevention of oil spills has a close relation with the ship design; however, there are various issues concerning the design, which was not yet integrated into spill convention.​[546]​  Referred to above, the International Safety Management Code has as well an important preventative function, as it applies to all passenger vessels, oil tankers; chemical tankers, gas carriers, bulk carriers and high speed craft of 500 gross tonnes or more on an international basis.​[547]​  However, the effectiveness of the ISM Code is still unsure.  The structure of the Code has the genuine possibility to be more than a paper exercise.  Its effectiveness depends very much on the commitment of ship managers to industriously perform its implementation.  Up to now there has been no methodical evaluation of the level of such commitment by which to determine its effectiveness.”​[548]​  The new 2002 International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for Seafarers is too new to assess its effectiveness, strength of standards of which applied by the IMO in awarding the “white list” status were anyhow questioned by some industry.​[549]​  The port state control and the flag state answerability are also not very effective means in oil spill prevention, due to, first of all, the failure of some States to comply with internationally agreed standards, and, secondly, a lack of any serious penalties in cases of such a failure.​[550]​  Not very hopeful, according to the same authors, is salvage as a prevention measure.  Despite the being of international instruments to this effect such as the 1989 International Salvage Convention and other schemes, e.g. SCOPIC (Special Compensation P & I Clause), “the economic feasibility of the salvage industry has been tested over the past few decades as better ship safety have reduced the overall number of major casualties.  As a result, the salvage industry also encountered a decline in the numbers of trained and experienced personnel available to perform complex salvage operations.”​[551]​  However, when there is a catastrophe, “[e]nvironmental consequences can be shocking.”​[552]​  Polluter-Pays Principle “creates none other than a ‘paper tiger’, providing smallest salvage capability and readiness.”​[553]​  Salvage as a tool, in prevention of oil spills: creation of “safe heavens” or “port of refuge”; prevention of operational discharges and; voluntary industry programmes to reduce the number of spills, although quite effective in many ways, are not practised by companies, which could benefit the most from them, as “the owners and operators of sub-standard ships are not likely to put in voluntary efforts to develop performance beyond that which is required by regulation.  For these organisations, regulatory mandates are essential.”​[554]​  Finally, there are two more important things for the prevention of oil spills: the human element and responsibility of the charter.  First of the two, involves extra economic costs, implementation of which (e.g. training) may crash with short-term interests of shareholders; as to the second one, “there is not much incentive to encourage the high standard of shipping in the current structure of the marine petroleum transport, the major problem is the lack of the responsibility of the charterer, which could be resolved by shared liability between shipper and charterer in order to achieve the highest standard of shipping.”​[555]​

In general, the act of prevention has as its purpose to ensure the non-spill.  Before prevention is the Preparedness Stage (which includes: national plans, the 1990 Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness, Response and Cooperation, protocols, place of refuge, planning, design standards, construction standards, training standards, international/intergovernmental regulation, enforcement, exclusion zones, special areas zone).  This is a structural dimension.  Next arrives the Prevention Stage (which includes contingency plans, exercising, ship routing, inspection regimes, maintenance regimes, operating standards, operational procedures).  This is an operational dimension.  “This stage may be followed by threat and/or spill, which is covered by a “grey” (blurred) Intervention Zone.  This stage is followed by the Response Zone (that includes: salvage, towage, place of refuge, response actions).  Both preparedness and prevention are proactive and response is reactive.”​[556]​

In the event of a threat of a spill or the actual spill, actions, which will be taken, are aimed either at the prevention of the incident of a spill or at minimising the follow-on pollution.  The minimising actions, together with cleaning following the spill, signify Response.  However, the borderline between Prevention and Response is often not blurred.  The response may start immediately, after the threat has been established and the action has been undertaken to prevent the threat to develop into a spill (such as the movement of a casualty vessel from an exposed location into a place of refuge).  Moreover, there is a certain interval between the detection of a threat of a spill and the actual spill, which sets off intervention.  “This Intervention zone may be either a period during which the Operator or the Vessel Owner may undertake an action; or a period in which the Government may move in to intervene in order to take control over the situation that may pose a threat of damage to the State waters or a coastline.”​[557]​  For these reasons “[i]t is important to be sensitive to the fact that various organisations and governments may use differing definitions to distinguish between these proactive and reactive stages associated with an event and these may have a particular legal significance in some circumstances.”​[558]​  It may be said that “intervention may be sometimes required to prevent the occurrence of pollution.”​[559]​

There is also a bunch of other factors, which are frequently mentioned by many authors as essential in oil spills prevention.  For example, the lessons learned from the incidents in the past are a very important part of the whole prevention process, as they lead to the invention of the new, more efficient procedures and the improvement of the existing ones.  Of the utmost importance is the effective statutory reporting, which is crucial for the success of the transparency, without which the avoidance of the oil spills is not possible.  Such reports are best put together and analysed by Governments, with the collaboration of industry.​[560]​  In spite of many improvements, there are many incidents, caused by many various factors: human factors; mechanical failure; management systems/procedural weakness; regulatory weakness; and security.​[561]​  The ways to better the current situation relies on the distribution of rules and responsibilities between industry and governments.  First of all, in order to achieve prevention, shared responsibility should be encouraged.  The primary responsibility for enforcement belongs to governments.  Prevention cannot be done without funding and resourcing.  The improvement of communication with the public and media must also be stressed.  Very importantly, international regulations must be respected.​[562]​  These should be developed beyond the current ones in the MARPOL 73/78 and the OPRC Convention and to this effect development of Global Environmental Standards is suggested.​[563]​ Risk management is a complex issue as it involves with costs.  The normal practice is the assessment of risk management and expenses involved.  Often, it is thought that no further expenditure should be involved if it incurs disproportionate costs, and no noticeable risk improvement.  “[i]n many real business circumstances, the expenditures can only be justified on a cost effectiveness basis.”​[564]​  The other factors also pointed out are the security (the IMO has introduced the International Ship and Port Facility Security Code) and the management of natural disasters and education, which should be a combined effort by, inter alia, the IMO, oil industry and coast guards.​[565]​

The oil pollution prevention is presently one of the major projects founded by the European Union titled: “Pollution Prevention and Control-Safe Transportation of Hazardous Goods by Tankers.”​[566]​  This project’s objective is “to provide a framework and suitable tools for a methodological assessment of risk to be undertaken to provide a sensible basis for making decisions pertaining [to] the design, operation and regulation of oil tankers…The project brings together top protagonists from the area of maritime safety in Europe.”​[567]​  As the authors of the project note, oil spills still happen and often they are the direct grounds for the new regulations and amendments by the IMO concerning the MARPOL 73/78.  For example, following the Exxon Valdez accident, it was revised to the effect that it was compulsory for the new and existing tankers of 5000 DWT and more after 6 July 1993 to be equipped with double hulls, or another design approved by the IMO.  The Erika accident brought out a new, more stringent timetable to phase out schedule for single hull tankers and the principal phasing-out date was the year 2015.  The 2002 Prestige incident triggered the EU Regulation 1726/2002 to introduce a new, more stringent set of timelines for phasing out of single hull tankers.  IMO followed by adoption by the MEPC on 4 December 2003 of a revised Regulation 13 G​[568]​ and in addition the new Regulation 13 H of Annex I of the MARPOL 73/78 setting the final date of phasing out date for categories 2 and 3 tankers are scheduled to be phased out in 2010 (brought forward from 2015).  There are some rules concerning the extension of phasing out period tankers categories 2 and 3 beyond 2010, depending on the satisfactory Condition Assessment Scheme (“the CAS”).​[569]​

Significantly, a party to the MARPOL 73/78 can reject the entry to single hull tankers, which have been permitted to continue operation under these exemptions, into ports or offshore terminals under its jurisdiction.  The project on question will be concentrated on the following issues:
(i) to develop a risk-based methodology to determine the oil spill potential of specific tankers (for existing and tankers of proposed new design), taking into consideration the likelihood of collision, groundings, fire and explosions and structural failure;
(ii) to develop a risk-based passive pollution prevention methodology (design and operational lines of defence);
(iii) to develop a risk-based active post-accident pollution mitigation and control framework.

The authors will first determine the pollution risk and the next step will be the risk reduction through preventative measures and post accident mitigation and control measures will as well be developed.  “A risk-based assessment methodology adopted a holistic approach that integrates the design process and as well as the operation.  The balancing test will be employed in order to analyse cost-effectiveness of safety enhancing features.”​[570]​

In conclusion, it may be said that all of the above expert views are based on the preventative approach not precautionary principles, to the oil pollution.  Prevention of oil spills from tankers is the mission of the utmost importance in this area of environmental protection.  As described above, the application of preventative measures is met with difficulties and indeed in need of improvement.  Although, the IMO adopted the Resolution on the application of the precautionary principle in 1995, it seems in light of the current practice of this organisation and industry that it is not yet put into operation.  A lot more need to be done to fully adopt preventative and precautionary principles.  The application of the precautionary principle is a job in implementation of which a huge number of actors involved: the IMO, tanks owners, operators and oil industry.  Therefore, the IMO’s best efforts to follow the precautionary principle rely on an intensive and harmonised action of all involved and interested actors, a really intimidating task.  Oil pollution is considered very much a reactive approach, as shown by the double-hull regulations.  It requires occurrence of many serious accidents to introduce new, stricter regulations, since the economic factors and cost-effectiveness certainly play the key role.  The adoption of any measures is the outcome of the balancing of interests test and as it stands right now, the nexus of existing (often contradictory) interests and multitude of actors make it very difficult to apply the precautionary principle at this stage of co-operation, especially with the view that implementation of preventative measures cause problems.  It may be argued that the prevention of oil pollution is one of the best recognised areas of the protection of the marine environment.  Therefore, if the adoption of precautionary principle is encountered some difficulties there, it may be even more implausible in other less regulated areas of marine protection.

The national communications concerning certain aspects of the implementation of these regulations did not result in a consistent application.​[571]​  For example, the USA sent the reply indicating that these new regulations will not apply in the US, since the express approval of the US Government will be necessary before the Regulation 13 G as amended and the new Regulation 13 H could enter into force for the US.  The US will apply the OPA 90 phase-out scheme.  The communication was, inter alia, as follows: “[s]ince the US is not a party to the aforementioned regulations, the US Coastal Guard cannot enforce its provisions or compel US vessels owners to comply.  Further, because of our official reservation status, our national law does not recognise the amended MARPOL regulations, and the US is not obliged to record MARPOL phase-out dates on the Form B Supplement of International Oil Pollution Prevention (IOPP) Certificates.”​[572]​  Moreover, US law does not require tanks vessels to meet the requirements of the Condition Assessment Scheme (CAS).​[573]​  Majority of States agreed to the extensions guaranteed by these Regulations, however, mostly they concern only tankers below 5000 DWT.  For example, Japan, gave “favourable consideration” to Japanese flag oil tankers to continue operation beyond the vessel’s phase-out date, as set by the Regulation 13G(4) for ships delivered in 1984 or later, providing that vessels has double bottom or double sides (Regulation 13G(5)) and according to the Regulation 13G(7) complies with CAS requirement, but no later than 25 years from the date of delivery or 2015 whichever is shorter.  The same “favourable consideration” affects Japanese flag oil tankers carrying on board heavy grade of oil to continue operation beyond 5 April 2005 providing that the vessel is in compliance with conditions described in the Regulation 13G(5) and 13H, but no later than 2015.  Japanese oil tankers below 5000 DWT may be allowed under the Regulation 13(H)(6)(b) to continue until their 25th anniversary only if they have a double bottom or double sides.  Japanese oil tankers are not allowed to continue transportation of heavy grade crude oil according to the Regulation 13(H)(6)(a) as of 5 April 2005.  As it concerns foreign flag tankers to call Japanese ports if they comply with provisions set by the Regulations 13(G)(5) and 13(H)(5).  Single hull tankers carrying heavy grade crude oil (Regulation 13(H)(6)(a)) are not allowed in Japanese ports since 5 April 2005.  There is an exception concerning single hull tankers of less than 5000 DWT (Regulation 13(H)(6)(b)) will be allowed to Japanese ports until their anniversary date 2008, unless they have double bottoms or double sides, in which case they will be allowed to call until 25th anniversary.

More stringent conditions apply in every European Union Member States and the States of the European Economic Area.  As far as the Regulation 13G is concerned, the EU Member States will go along with the schemes set out under the Regulation 13G, with the following exceptions:  After 2015, single hull tankers will not be allowed to call at EU ports or offshore terminals under their jurisdiction, including category 2 and 3 tankers complying with the Regulation 13(G)(5), i.e. with double bottoms or double-sided tankers; after 2010, any single hull tankers, which may be given a phase-out date under its Flag State (Regulation 13(G)(7)) will not be allowed the entry into EU ports or offshore terminals under their jurisdiction; from 5 April 2005, the EU will not allow entry to its ports or offshore terminals under their jurisdiction, all single hull tankers carrying heavy grade oils, including tankers that are permitted for such trade by the Flag State according to the Regulation 13(H)(5).

The law in China is also very strict.​[574]​  As it concerns the oil tankers flying the Chinese flag, it will permit double-sided and double-bottom tankers to carrying on trading until their 25th anniversary but no later than 2015 (Regulation 13(G)(5)).  Chinese single-bottom and single-sided tankers will be banned from trading beyond their phase-out date (Regulation 13(G)(7)).  Single-sided and single- bottom tankers will not be allowed to carry heavy grade oil or crude oil with densities over 900 Kg/m3 beyond their phase-out date, according to the Regulation 13(H)(6) and (7).  As it concerns foreign flag single-hull tankers, they will not be allowed in Chinese ports after the initial phase-out date, in accordance with the Regulation 13(G)(4), despite any extension granted by the flag state.  As of 5 April 2005, foreign flag single-hull tankers carrying heavy grade oils are not allowed in Chinese ports, with the exception of single-sided or double-bottom tankers, which are under 20 years old.
The above examples of national practice specify that both Regulations 13H and 13G, which are preventative measures concerning oil pollution from tankers, are not implemented consistently by States (the USA not implemented at all).  These verify the observations made above, which clearly indicate that since a coordinated preventive policy (as regards oil pollution) does not exist, it is very hard to expect States to apply precautionary principle, considering how vague and imprecise the principle is.
Dumping at Sea & The 1972 London Convention and the 1996 Protocol

This part will largely study the provisions and practice of the 1972 Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter (the London Convention) from the point of view of its implementation of the precautionary principle.​[575]​  The London Convention is a global convention.​[576]​  It is characterised by dumping deliberate disposal at sea of wastes or other matter from vessels, aircraft, platforms or other man-made structures, as well as deliberate disposal of these vessels or platforms themselves.  The Convention, on the whole, regulates the international control and prevention of marine pollution.  It makes the dumping of certain hazardous materials unlawful, which is based on prior and general special permits.  Special permit relates to dumping of certain or other specified group of hazardous materials and the general permit is required for other wastes or matter.  The Convention also promotes international co-operation in the field of monitoring and scientific research.  The Convention has Annexes attached to it, which register prohibited wastes and other waste, for which a special permit is necessary.  

The most significant amendment of the Convention was the adoption in 1996 of the Protocol, which is meant to replace the London Convention once it entered into force.​[577]​  The 1996 Protocol is much more restricted than the 1972 London Convention and implemented very ground-breaking regulatory techniques in relation to the dumping at sea.  The 1972 Convention permits dumping to be carried out, if certain conditions are met, whereas the 1996 Protocol in principle prohibits all dumping.  Article 4 states that Contracting Parties “shall prohibit the dumping of any wastes or other matter with the exception of those listed in Annex 1.”​[578]​

The Precautionary Principle in the 1972 London Convention and the 1996 Protocol

The London Convention was signed in 1973 when the idea of the precautionary principle has not yet come into the realm of international environmental law.  However, in response to the growing interest in the protection of the environment, the parties to the London Convention, adopted the Resolution 44/14 in 1991, on the precautionary principle.​[579]​  One of the most fundamental changes introduced by this Protocol, was the integration in the text of the Protocol (Article 3) of precautionary approach.​[580]​  It must be mentioned here that the Preambular provisions of the Protocol, stated as follows: “[n]oting in this regard the achievements within the framework Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter, 1972 and especially the evolution towards approaches based on precaution and prevention…”  The analysis of the provisions of the Resolution introducing precautionary approach to the London Convention, firstly, it adopted precautionary approach, not principle, along the lines on the MARPOL 73/78.  Secondly, the formulation of the approach is rather traditional i.e., it emphasises that “lack of conclusive evidence” and not fully proved “causal link”.  Furthermore, the Resolution promotes the implementation of clean production technology and the development of scientific research.  It is notable that Resolution both recommends adopting of precautionary approach as well as taking preventative measures.  Therefore there is no strict division between both.

The Scientific Group at its 22nd meeting in 1999, recognised the importance of applying the precautionary approach when implementing the London Convention.  In this circumstance, risk assessment procedures were kept under review.  However, as the Scientific Committee noticed at its 27th meeting that there were no documents submitted under this item.  Delegations were, thus, invited to submit their experiences to the 28th meeting of the Scientific Group.​[581]​ 

The next move is to examine practice in relation to the precautionary principle in certain areas of dumping at sea.​[582]​  One of the best examples is the ban of dumping of nuclear waste.  The parties to the London Convention at their first meeting had banned dumping at sea of the high level radioactive waste, which was followed in 1983 by the voluntary moratorium on the ban of dumping of intermediate level nuclear waste adopted at the seventh meeting.  In 1993, the ban on dumping of all nuclear material was made compulsory.​[583]​  Russia, however, opted out of the Resolution.  The Russian policy concerning nuclear waste was a cause for concern, since it was reported in the “Yablokov Report” that the former USSR dumped over 2.5 million curies of radioactive waste in the Arctic Ocean and other marine environments, including 18 nuclear reactors, and there were more than 10 million curies kept aboard vessels in Murmansk Harbour.​[584]​  Russian Federation also reported lacking facilities to store and process the low-level radioactive wastes generated by its Northern and Pacific nuclear submarines and icebreakers fleets.  However, Russian facilities were improved and developed with help from Japan, Finland, Norway and the USA.  Recently, Russian Federation gave precedence to the implementation of its National Management Plan addressing radioactive wastes from all sources, before officially accepting ban on dumping at sea.  On the 17th May 2005, Russia has finally accepted the 1993 ban on dumping of radioactive wastes under the 1972 London Convention.  The Russian Government informed the Secretary General of the IMO that it has accepted the ban as contained in the amendments to the Convention under the Resolution LC.51(16).  Therefore, it has taken 12 years after the adoption of this ban for the prohibition of the disposal of radioactive wastes at sea is finally in force for all 81 Contracting Parties to the Convention.​[585]​

It can be argued that, this example clearly demonstrates that the precautionary principle is at least partly implemented under the London Convention.  Margaret Thatcher is reported to have said that: “[n]o generation has a freehold on this earth.  All we have is a life tenancy—with full repairing lease.”​[586]​  As it was observed in connection with this statement, “[t]hatcher’s sentiment, and the moratorium on dumping from London Convention, are derived from precautionary principle: for actions that may have negative consequences in the long term, it is best to be conservative.”  There is perhaps no area where it applies more than with nuclear waste.  “In some cases, like sunken nuclear submarines, the time for precaution is gone and the question is of balancing the cost and risk of bringing them to the surface as compared to leaving them where they lie, possibly slowly leaking radionucleides in the environment.  For the spent nuclear fuel accumulated, and still accumulating worldwide, the question is one of weighing the current risks of possibly inadequate temporary disposal on land against the risks of a more permanent solution under the seafloor.”​[587]​

Conclusions on the MARPOL 73/78 and the 1972 London Convention and the Precautionary Principle

The MARPOL 73/78 contained the application of the precautionary principle to all its activities in its general structure.  However, as it was presented above, it is not easy to consider its actual working due to the unavailability of reliable database.  As it was observed, it is sometimes difficult to explain even the current practice of States, based on the present conditions of the marine environment due to inaccurate or insufficient submissions from States.  Therefore, it may not be wrong to say that, it is even more difficult to reach any conclusions as to the implementation of the precautionary principle in the practice of the IMO.  Moreover, considering that certain binding Resolutions of the IMO based on full scientific knowledge are still not always implemented by the various users of the oceans, it is difficult to imagine how the precautionary principle may already be totally applicable within the structure of the IMO.  

It seems that the London Convention incorporated the precautionary principle to a greater extent than the MARPOL 73/78, as it was mentioned above in relation to nuclear waste.  The long-term effects of the disposal of such a waste (including low level nuclear waste) are not fully known.  However, under the London Convention a total ban on such activities exists.  This prohibition is forward-thinking and was implemented without the help of full scientific knowledge.  The significant aspect of this ban is that as of May 2005, all the Parties to the Convention are bound by it.
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More than twenty years have passed since the first introduction of the precautionary principle in an international agreement.  During this time international environmental law has gone through a major change.  It has become more energetic and flexible in adopting protocols to further reinforce the provisions of existing conventions.
This chapter has demonstrated how far an international legal regime for the control of marine pollution from ships has progressed since 1972, and the extent to which it has proved effective.  Although significant problems in enforcing international pollution regulations at sea, and in controlling the risks of serious accidents still persist, there is evidence that relevant international and regional conventions, most notably the MARPOL 73/78 Convention, have led to better protection of the marine environment.  The regulatory system based on MARPOL has worked reasonably well under the supervision of IMO, which has shown the flexibility and openness necessary to keep up with new developments, and has successfully provided a forum in which competing interests can be balanced.  The relative success of the London Dumping Convention in thriving to meet new priorities and needs, and the slow movement of regional institutions dealing with marine pollution, point towards both the strengths and weaknesses of international regulation.  The evidence of state practice and international conventions considered in this chapter do sustain the suggestions that states are compelled by international (environmental) law to protect the marine environment by taking measures to prevent, reduce, and control pollution of common areas, and there is increasing support for a precautionary approach to safeguard the environment.​[588]​  Finally, the evidence supports the view that, at this stage, it may not be too early to treat the precautionary principle as a rule of international customary (environmental) law, but to draw firm conclusions regarding its precise content is another matter.  However, it may be stated that the principle’s fundamental features are well-established in international law, such as its application in face of scientific uncertainty and cost-effectiveness (i.e. the soft formulation of the precautionary principle).  The reversal of the burden of proof and the lack of the requirement of causality (i.e. the hard formulation of the precautionary principle) are still subject to controversy.
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CHAPTER 4

THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE IN THAILAND ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY


I.  INTRODUCTION

This chapter endeavours to illustrate and analyse the adoption and implementation of the precautionary and preventive principles in Thai environmental law and policy. The study will attempt to prove the hypothesis that Thailand applies and implements precautionary and preventive principles, or a precautionary approach into its environmental practices through examinations of (Thai) national legislations, declarations, and action plans etc. 

In less than 30 years, Thailand has been transformed from a traditional agricultural rural society into an industrialised urban nation.  In the rush to improve the standard of living, environmental concerns have often taken a back seat to industrial development.  Increasingly, however, people are beginning to realise that the pleasures of a developed society include a pollution free environment.  Presently, the precautionary principle is being worked on by legal officials in several states, as well as being incorporated in international regimes and the secondary legislation (of the EU).​[589]​  Simultaneously, international courts have been passing judgement on cases where the principle has been further explained upon.  This development has resulted in diverse standard setting and several definitions of the principle.​[590]​  Until now, the legal argument of the precautionary principle has been (very) limited in Thailand.  The reason for this may be the fact that there has not been a single court case before the Thai Supreme Court to which the precautionary principle has been referred.​[591]​  In this case, the precautionary principle can be considered as very close to the principle of prevention, largely addressing legislators, but also public administration when putting the relevant acts into operation.  In my view, the precautionary principle is not a very clear, well-defined principle or concept in Thai law or policy.  Thus, the author agrees with Hans Christian Bugge in thinking that the principle can be linked primarily to events of uncertainty; but perhaps it can be seen as a part of a more general principle of prevention, a principle for affirming a safety margin in environmental policy.​[592]​ 

In international books and debates, there are variations between the ‘precautionary principle’ (Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the North-East Atlantic (OSPAR) Article 2(a) and European Community (EC) Treaty Article 174), the ‘precautionary approach’ (Rio Declaration, Principle 15) and ‘precautionary measure’ (Framework Convention on Climate Change (FCCC) Article 3.3).  On this occasion, the writer, again, agrees with Hans Christian Bugge that it is a matter of discussion whether the wording precautionary approach inferred a less strong and less exact obligation than the precautionary principle, and whether or not a basis for such a distinction existed.​[593]​   In Thai translations (and debates), obvious distinctions between these many wordings is not found.  At this time, we would like to consider them all under the word ‘the precautionary principle.’​[594]​

In the Thai discussion, it is, however, often stressed that the principle also involves procedural requirements:  an assessment of environmental qualities and potential effects of an activity or a product, such as an assessment of the intrinsic risks, uncertainties and knowledge gaps.​[595]​  Therefore, the rules relating to environmental impact assessment (EIA) in Thai law may be seen as one feature applying the precautionary principle.​[596]​  However, the precautionary principle is not referred to in these rules and no exact legal requirements stipulated as to how meticulous an assessment has to be in events of scientific uncertainties.  


II.	THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE AS A GENERAL PRINCIPLE OF THAILAND’S ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY

It is reasonable to maintain that Thai environmental policy has been based on a precautionary approach, in a broad sense of that concept, for more than two decades.​[597]​  Significant environmental legislation was implemented during the 1980s and early 1990s in view of a principle of prevention.  New Acts on hazardous products, pollution control and wildlife management are introduced.  They later established systems of general prohibition and management of activities that may be dangerous to the environment.

Each five years Thailand adopts a new National Plan for Economic and Social Development, which identifies government priorities and concerns.  The Seventh National Plan (for the years 1992 to 1996), cites environmental protection as a national priority.  Water and air pollution, solid wastes, toxic chemicals, and global warming are identified as serious problems.  Specific objectives for improvement in each of these areas are set forth, and the means of achieving these goals are formulated.  The inclusion of environmental objectives in the Seventh National Plan commits the Royal Thai Government to action.​[598]​  

The Seventh National Plan (for Economic and Social Development) cites the environment as one of the most pressing national concerns and sets specific targets to meet over the next few years.  As the first step in addressing the problems, a new Enhancement and Conservation of National Environmental Quality Act (NEQA) (1992) ​[599]​has been implemented and other outdated legislation has been overhauled to address weaknesses in the legislative regime.  The Royal Thai Government is also beginning to show some determination to enforce the legislation, recently closing factories and imposing fines.  

In all there are over 50 pieces of legislation which deal with environmental matters in Thailand.  These include such diverse legislation as the Mining Act,​[600]​ the Motor Car Act,​[601]​ the Thai Penal Code,​[602]​ the Navigation in Thai Territorial Waters Act,​[603]​ and the Civil and Commercial Code (CCC).​[604]​  The major pieces of environmental legislation, however, are the National Environmental Quality Act (NEQA) and the Hazardous Substances Act,​[605]​ which were passed in 1992, and the Public Health 
Act ​[606]​ and Factories Act,​[607]​ which were amended in the same year.  The NEQA is the primary piece of legislation designed to take precedence over other Acts in regards to environmental issues.  The precautionary principle, however, is not stated in this Act since (Thai) legal officials, at its creation in 1992, paid more attention to the principle of pollution reduction than the precautionary principle.  We may get the feeling that the principle is considered to be a principle of environmental policy only, thus, it is appreciated in a narrow sense.​[608]​  “For example, the precautionary principle has not been given much strength to deal with policy in such areas which also contributed to environmental harms, i.e. transport, agriculture, tourism, general land-use policy etc, nor was the principle heavily mentioned when it comes to general economic policy”​[609]​  At the start, it is (quite) clear that the precautionary principle has some importance in Thai law. This is reinforced by the many international agreements and treaties that observe the principle, to which Thailand is a party.​[610]​  But when we are asked about its legal importance and role more precisely, we may struggle to give clear answers.​[611]​  Hans Christian Bugge argued credibly that “the principle may be employed as an argument for an interpretation of the law that allows the authority to take measures of risk assessment and risk management in accordance with the principle.  But it is not applicable as an argument in all fields of law and regardless of the type of case in question.”​[612]​ 

The precautionary principle may have another role pertaining to the application of the law within the basis of understanding inbuilt in the various legal rules. “The principle may possess a legal significance by either allowing precautionary measures when there is uncertainty (what could be called ‘the precautionary principle in a weak sense’); or requiring precautionary measures when it comes to uncertainty (what could be called ‘the precautionary principle in a strong sense’).”​[613]​  To this end, the author favours Hans Christian Bugge’s understanding in the sense that “on the one hand, the principle may affect the interpretation and application in such a way that it infers a right for the public authority to apply precaution when uncertainty is present; in other words, the authority may employ precaution, but it is not compelled by law to do so.  On the other hand, the principle may signify a duty for the authority; the law shall be applied in consistent with the precautionary principle.”​[614]​





Thai Courts  

When discussing the rights and obligations of the authorities related to the precautionary principle, the possible role of the courts cannot be overlooked.  The question arises here is may or will the courts review decisions made by the legislator and the executive with regard to their application or non-application of the principle?  Concerning environmental issues, De Sadeleer observed that “the courts may play a role positively and negatively.  The courts may employ the precautionary principle to warrant an ‘environmentally friendly’ solution to a case.  They may also amend the use of the principle by the authorities.”​[615]​  From an academic point of view, some will argue that the very meaning of a principle being a principle of law implies that it eventually may, or will, be sustained by the courts.  However, this point of view is not to be discussed here.  In my view, the principle has a legal character to the extent that the legislator, or the executive authorities who apply the law, find it necessary to take the principle into account when making decisions.  “It is not possible to argue and come to conclusions about the ending outcome of a court case where a party states that the authority has either fallen short to apply the precautionary principle and thereby breached the law or, to the opposite, has applied the principle illegally by prohibiting an activity without having a sufficient legal basis.”​[616]​  This will primarily depend upon the text of the relevant rule and its normal interpretation.  But it also depends upon the general rules in (Thai) law concerning judicial review.  All Thai courts are ordinary courts that apply statutory rules, customary law and general legal principles, as well as judicial practice, in their logical analysis.​[617]​  The Thai judges analyse the wordings of statutory rules and the legislator’s statements in order to specify the precise meanings of the legislator in making necessary obligations by the scope of the rules.​[618]​  Unlike most common law systems, the judgments of the Thai courts are rather brief and usually without the exceptionally in-detail analysis.​[619]​  Furthermore, the analyses are shorter than seen in judgments made by other Asian courts (e.g. Malaysian or Singaporean courts) because Thai judges prefer not to make judgments of a cumbersome nature.​[620]​ 

Thai Legislation​[621]​

Thai environmental legislation is, generally, of a preventive nature, to a large extent duplicating recent international environmental issues.​[622]​  The legislation is not very well-coordinated, and is found in several acts that are not all supervised by the (Thai) Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment (MONRE).​[623]​  This fact makes possibilities of integrating environmental objectives difficult.  Another problem is the fact that most of the recent environmental principles, such as the precautionary principle, have not explicitly been indicated in the legislation.​[624]​

As mentioned above, Thai legislation is unclear when it comes to an application of the precautionary approach (principle).  In Thai, the term ‘precaution’ means ‘ป้องกันล่วงหน้า’, and is translated in English as ‘prevention in advance’; but in practice the word “prevention” has often been given a much more emphasis and importance than the  word “advance”.  The author had an opportunity to interview Thai government officials in MONRE and gathered an impression that Thai government officials did not rigidly discern between the words ‘preventive’ and ‘precautionary’.  Indeed, they did not place very much emphasis on the word ‘prevention in advance’ (as a literal translation of the word ‘precaution’ in Thai language), instead they tended to treat the word precautionary in the same manner as the word preventive or prevention.  The essence of the precautionary principle, in that it is the principle generally applied in the case involved scientific uncertainty, still had not been well-registered with Thai officials.  Nevertheless, Thai officials were aware of the existence of the precautionary principle in international law, and the fact that the precautionary principle became widely known in international arena after the preventive principle.   Since the prevention principle has been longer known and existed, therefore, they did not see any difficulties in using these two words interchangeably.  This has created a legal implication, in my view, that the word ‘precaution(ary)’ was hardly seen in legislation up until now since environmental law and policy in Thailand has largely been based on the preventive principle for many decades and officials did not see any urgent necessities to alter or adapt existing environmental legislations to explicitly incorporate or implement the precautionary principle.  Thai officials, however, agreed to some extent that the precautionary principle had some roles (albeit limited ones) to play in Thailand environmental law and policy, and precautionary approach has also been adopted into Thai environmental legislation concerning pollution control, for example.​[625]​    Not surprisingly, these two words sometimes cause confusion, and prevention could be covered by the definition of precaution, and vice versa.  Whether or not, the attitudes of Thai officials will change and more willingness to embrace the concept of the precautionary principle will materialise in Thailand in the foreseeable future remain to be seen.    



For clarification, the key environmental legislation having the objective to conserve, manage, and control natural resources and their utilisation will now be listed and briefly described.  General comments will be made as to whether or not the legislation explicitly or implicitly reveals the precautionary principle.​[626]​

Given the fact that most Thai environmental legislation possesses an administrative character, and that the legal obligations are put into operation by administrative authorities, thus attention should be paid (briefly) on the administrative bodies, their employees and members of the (appeal) bodies, as well as their practice.  The highest administrative level comprises of members of government, including ministers.  In Thailand, there are numerous government agencies which have authority to regulate with respect to the environment, including the Police Department, the Department of Industrial Works, the Ministry of Industry,​[627]​ the Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment (MONRE),​[628]​ the Harbour Master, and so on.  Often the authority of several government bodies overlaps.  For example, the Minister of Commerce has the authority to issue Notifications regarding the quality of benzene and diesel fuel that can be sold in Thailand, whereas the Minister of Natural Resources and Environment can impose standards of acceptable levels of hydrocarbon emissions by motor vehicles, as may the Director-General of the Police Department.  One of the most serious problems identified by the Seventh National Plan with respect to environmental protection was that responsibility for environmental protection fell under the auspices of numerous government bodies and ministries, with no co-ordinating mechanism.​[629]​  There was no single body which was assigned overall responsibility for the general environmental health of the country.​[630]​ In order to counter this, the National Environment Board (NEB), initially established under earlier NEQA legislation in 1975, was promoted and revitalised to give it greater authority by Section 12 of the amended NEQA in 1992.  The NEB serves primarily as a watchdog, but with sufficient bite to ensure that it is taken seriously.​[631]​  The NEB has been given primary responsibility for setting environmental standards.  The standards set by the NEB are the minimum acceptable standards. Nevertheless, other Ministries are free to impose standards higher than those imposed by the NEB.  The NEB is responsible for establishing ambient air, noise, and water quality standards.  The MONRE is responsible for implementation and enforcement.  The NEB also has authority, where it is deemed fit, to issue higher environmental quality standards for Environmental Conservation Zones, Environmental Protection Areas, Pollution Control Zones, comprehensive town or country planning areas, specific planning areas, building control zones or industrial estates etc.  Therefore, it can be assumed, from this, that the prevention principle has been largely applied in Thailand for many decades.  Due to this reason, Thai law has already been capable to open legal pathways for placing caution or precaution as a duty of the operator.​[632]​  According to the Factories Act (1992), a general duty of care and prevention is imposed​[633]​  A study of environmental impacts on water and water quality needs to be conducted in all water and environmental permit matters.​[634]​  “Often the operator has been obliged to conduct research before a permit could be granted or an emission permitted.  It appears, however, that for the most part the risks supposed to be settled were imminent or, to some extent, probable.”​[635]​  The MONRE is authorised to issue standards for controlling pollution from drainage of waste water or effluent discharge into the environment in order to meet the environmental quality standards prescribed by the NEB.  Places of origin which must utilise a waste water treatment system will be identified by the MONRE.  A Regulation issued under the authority of the earlier National Environment Quality Act of 1975 directs owners of certain types of structures to ensure that waste water discharged from the structure meets the standards established under it.  This Regulation is still in effect under the New Act until it is replaced or repealed.​[636]​  The Pollution Control Officials (PCO) may inspect the facilities and stipulate what type of pollution control systems must be installed.  If pollution control devices are already installed they may be inspected by the PCO to ensure that they are sufficient, and if not, replaced or improved.  The PCO may also require the owner or occupier to hire a supervisor to oversee the operation of any pollution control system.​[637]​  The government may also license private undertakings to operate waste water treatment services under permit.  If there is no common waste water treatment centre, but there is a permit holder permitted to provide waste water treatment services, then the owner or occupier of a place of origin must send the waste water to the permit holder for treatment in accordance with the rules stipulated by the local officer. 

All large fixed operations with the likelihood to pollute the environment must operate under licensing procedure and official control.  Furthermore, they are advised to observe best available technology (BAT) requirements and an EIA procedure in accordance with principle of Environmental Impact Assessment.​[638]​  The law is based on a general ban to pollute environments, unless it is legally allowed (permitted).  The permission again can only be granted if pollution is properly curbed.  In Thai language, the same term is employed for real (that is, foreseeable) and potential (that is, eventual) impacts whenever the impacts may amount to ‘pollution’.​[639]​  “This has, at a rather early stage, allowed the authorities to call for examination of risk factors in the chain of pollution and to impose care or caution in cases of uncertainty.”​[640]​  The same case has respectively been for air pollution when the Minister of the MONRE has issued Notifications prescribing standards for the discharge of air borne pollutants to meet the general ambient atmospheric standards prescribed by the NEB, and to identify structures, operations and conveyances deemed to be a source of air pollution.  Several Notifications of the MONRE have already been issued under this authority concerning exhaust emissions and noise levels of vehicles.​[641]​  The health legislation (currently the Public Health Act of 1992) is inclined to respond to dangers and risks that involve uncertainty.  “It is, however, not clear on what degree of probability of risk would be required to prompt a permit authority to impose extra obligations on the operator.”​[642]​  Sadly, any separate provisions do not explicitly assert any recent environmental principle, including the precautionary principle.  It would, however, be mistaken to think that the precautionary approach is not there in this sector of the environmental legislation.  

Frequently, precautionary measures indistinctly covered by the concept of prevention, may be found in the following legal contexts of Thai environmental law.  In the general legislation on pollution control (prevention) of the Enhancement and Conservation of National Environmental Quality Act (NEQA of 1992), it is reasonable to think that the precautionary principle obviously influences policy.  In my view, it also has (some) legal relevance.  For a more political background to the principle, one may refer to the constitutional provision on environmental basic rights in section 56 of the Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand.  Following this provision, everyone has responsibility for nature and its biodiversity, the environment and national heritage.  The words do not explain how the basis for the responsibility has to be defined.  Thus, it can be said that Thai law does not acknowledge any explicit or general rule of precaution.  As an alternative, in specific circumstances the precautionary principle has been addressed either directly or more as a political concept.  As mentioned earlier, there is no definition exists to tell prevention and precaution apart.  

Before the arrival of the NEQA, one of the most important pieces of environmental legislation in Thailand was the Public Health Act.​[643]​  This Act, which is still in effect, imposes a duty upon companies and individuals to refrain from creating nuisances.​[644]​  In the event a nuisance occurs or is likely to occur in either a public or private place, the local official authorised under the Act may issue a written order to the person who is the cause or is involved in creating the nuisance to abate or prevent the nuisance within a reasonable period of time.  In the event it appears to the local official that the order is not being complied with, and the nuisance may cause serious harm to health, the local official may take the proper care and caution or take measures necessary to prevent the recurrence of the nuisance at the expense of the person who caused it.

This formulation mentions nothing about the level of required scientific knowledge or how the authorities should decide in cases of ignorance or in situations with no proof.  In my opinion, the principle does not stretch to the level of precaution as it appears, for example, in Article 174 of the European Community (EC) treaty.​[645]​  As far as the NEQA is concerned, there is no precise precautionary practice or a duty to take precautionary measures ever exists.


Environmental Impact Assessment

Environmental impact assessment (EIA) is ‘a procedure for evaluating the likely impact of a proposed activity on the environment.’​[646]​  An EIA is aimed to offer decision-makers with information about possible environmental effects when deciding whether or not to allow the activity to proceed.  It is an essential concept to any regulatory system which aims to prevent or lessen environmental harm, or to promote sustainable development.  Since it was adopted in the US National Environmental Policy Act of 1969,​[647]​ EIA has been a procedural instrument, i.e. it is more than just a study on the potential environment impacts of a project.  An EIA is a formal, legal procedure, following a stipulated sequence of steps to be carried out within a prescribed periods of time.​[648]​ EIA is in general understood to be an instrument of preventive environmental management.  Therefore, the rationale underlying the EIA process is the principle of prevention.​[649]​  With the aim of preventing environmental damage, it is necessary to understand the environmental consequences of a proposed project as early as possible in the project cycle.  Once these environmental consequences are identified, mitigatory measures could be taken to reduce the impact on the environment.  On the other hand, the decision-maker may decide that the impact on the environment is irreversible or that it far outweighs the benefits from the proposed project or that there is no justification for the project to go forward.    In essence, EIA is a methodical process that examines the environmental consequences of development actions in advance.  The emphasis, compared with many other mechanisms for environmental protection, is on prevention.  Of course, planners have traditionally assessed the impacts of developments on the environment, but invariably not in the systematic, holistic and multidisciplinary way required by EIA.​[650]​

At an international level it warns governments and international organisations when transboundary harm is likely.  Without the benefit of an EIA the responsibility to inform and check with other states in cases of transboundary risk will very much be worthless.  EIA also plays a role in the implementation of national policies on sustainable development and precautionary action.  Although US experience demonstrates that the process can be burdensome, costly, and time-consuming, when conducted properly EIA should aid governments to foresee and evade international environmental tragedy or damaging consequences for which they might otherwise be held legally responsible.  Therefore, EIA is widely applied to predict the effects of proposed activities on the environment.​[651]​  A close relationship between the precautionary principle and EIA process can be established.  Demanding the proponent to show that his project or development activity does not cause significant damage to the environment is not a reversal of the burden of proof, but rather its normal application.​[652]​  By conducting an EIA, the proponent will be able to demonstrate the impact of his project on the environment and the measures he intends to mitigate such impact.  The EIA process, however, is limited by existing scientific knowledge.  If scientific knowledge is lacking on a particular case, the precautionary principle will come into play.​[653]​  Whether this means a total ban unless scientific certainty is proven, depends on the circumstances in each case.  As such EIA can be seen, to some extent, as an important part in a precautionary approach.  EIA can assist implementation of the precautionary principle in many ways, not least by providing information about environmental effects and their likely significance.​[654]​  It compels proponents of new developments and activities to provide proof that their proposals will be environmentally suitable and provides a basis for discussion of possible harm and uncertainty.  If properly applied, EIA offers opportunities to redesign proposals to avoid possible harm to sensitive environment and promote options that reduce risks.  Therefore, while EIA is an important tool for implementing the precautionary approach, the appropriate application of the precautionary principle within the EIA process is also important,​[655]​ in situations where: first, there is uncertainty about outcomes associated with proposed activities; and second, there is a reasonable risk that significant adverse impact might occur.  In practice, all proposals subject to EIA are characterised by uncertainty to some extent.​[656]​

As discussed above, an important and widely accepted component of the precautionary principle is that the proponent of an activity should bear the burden of proof with regard to resolving uncertainty over possible impacts.  Thus, proponents of potentially environmentally damaging practices must demonstrate that their proposed activities are likely to be acceptable before they can proceed; it is not sitting on others to prove that the activities are harmful in order to have them stopped.  The legal or policy requirement for a project proponent to conduct EIA and to provide decision-makers with the information they need in order to decide whether environmental impacts are acceptable therefore provides an important mechanism for implementing the precautionary principle.  EIA is now compulsory in much of the world and is also required by international lending establishments such as the World Bank, as part of their approval processes for major infrastructure and industrial development projects (for example dams, railways, major trunk roads, airports, mining, oil extraction and pipelines etc.).  Such projects often come with considerable environmental impacts, such as direct habitat loss, or indirect effects of disturbance, pollution and habitat fragmentation etc.  EIA is also intended as a preventative mechanism to avoid or pre-empt adverse environmental effects that might arise from a proposed development or new activity.  However, if adverse environmental effects cannot be avoided, the EIA process generally triggers measures to reduce or control adverse effects on the environment (‘mitigation’) or to provide compensation (also known as ‘offsets’) for unavoidable impacts.​[657]​
Nevertheless, there is often limited capacity, particularly in developing countries, to carry out all-inclusive environmental evaluations, or to undertake reliable assessments of potential impacts.  Rules for EIAs in European Union (EU) Member States are prescribed in the EC EIA Directive.​[658]​  While directives are the controlling documents, Member States have ample discretion in implementing regulations, and these will vary.  The directive does not include any explicit reference to the precautionary principle, nor does it imply in any way that the principle should be followed.​[659]​  However, the directive does indicate (Article 1) that the ‘Directive shall apply to the assessment of the environmental effects of those public and private projects which are likely to have significant effects on the environment’ (emphasis added).​[660]​  The use of the word ‘likely’ here could be interpreted as a partial application of the precautionary principle in that the requirement for an EIA is not restricted to projects that are certain to have a significant effect.  However, before an EIA is conducted, the knowledge and certainty of possible impacts is generally narrow.  Judgements of ‘likely significance’ therefore have to be made based on the type of activity proposed and its location in relation to important or sensitive environmental features and resources.​[661]​  The main text of the directive does not refer to issues concerning scientific uncertainty, but Annex IV of the amended directive (97/11/EC of 3 March 1997) does require ‘An indication of any difficulties (technical deficiencies or lack of know-how) encountered by the developer in gathering the required information.’  This suggests that the proponent should keep a record of any sources of uncertainty in their assessment of baseline conditions and predicted impacts, providing an opportunity for the precautionary principle to be applied in the decision-making process if appropriate.​[662]​



In summary, EIA is an important device for putting, to a certain extent, the precautionary principle into practice.  EIA provides an opportunity to assess the existing and, to a certain extent, potential impacts of human activities on the environment, and can help identify opportunities and alternatives that avoid potential environmental damage at source, identify requirements for additional information and understanding, and specify requirements for mitigation or compensation.  EIA is regularly restrained by scientific uncertainty.  Often inadequate information is available, and proponents are frequently not willing to invest time and money in the studies and data gathering necessary to reduce uncertainty to acceptable levels.  Practitioners therefore have to cope with scientific uncertainty throughout the EIA process, particularly for new project types in new locations.  Despite this there appears to be very little guidance in EIA regulations and guidelines on dealing with such uncertainty and the appropriate use of the precautionary principle in such circumstances.​[663]​  There is also usually significant uncertainty in predicting the overall impacts of a proposed development.  This is mainly because knowledge of environment functioning is barely sufficient to make reliable predictions about outcomes for environment or to suggest reliable mitigation measures.  This is worsened by the compounding of uncertainty at previous stages and by the general failure to monitor or follow up on actual environmental outcomes to reduce uncertainty for future proposals.  As a result, EIA in practice tends to depend strongly on subjective judgement.​[664]​









Application of EIA in Thailand

As a result of rising environmental problems, EIA process has been put into operation in Thailand as a means for environmental planning and management in relation to economic development projects since 1981.  The EIA has been employed to specify impacts of the projects as well as set up the proper mitigation measures with the intention that the natural resources will be not-wastefully used for the economic development of the country.​[665]​  At present, EIA legislation is covered by Section 46-51 of the Enhancement and Conservation of National Environmental Quality Act (NEQA, 1992).  The Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment (MONRE), with the approval of National Environment Board (NEB), has been given authorities to identify notification for the type and size of projects and activities calling for EIA. 

Environmental Impact Assessments (EIA) are required in Thailand of certain large scale projects which may cause significant environmental impacts.  The aim of requiring an EIA is to give the government an opportunity to study the environmental impact of a project in order to fully recognise the environmental consequences, and to enforce restrictions with precautionary element, where necessary, to reduce possible environmental threats.  The project proponent (this could be government agency, state enterprise, or private sector) must engage the use of consultant firms registered by Office of the Natural Resources and Environmental Policy and Planning (ONEP) and permitting agencies.  Not all projects are required to submit a full EIA.  The NEB may identify projects for which it is sufficient to submit only a preliminary environmental examination.  A preliminary environmental examination is an EIA that has been made for another project very much the same as the proposed project.  Provided the proposed project complies precisely with the environmental safety measures contained in the EIA for the original project, the proposed project will be let off from a full review.​[666]​

Furthermore, legislation regarding the protection of natural resources and public lands can be found under several Acts in Thailand.​[667]​ These Acts have, inter alia, the aim to promote sustainable and reasonable land use, preservation of nature and the conservation of the cultural heritage, all there to evade environmental damage and over-exploitation of natural resources.  The realistic instruments to be employed in order to reach the objectives are, primarily, different types of planning; the requirement to get developing permission for all projects having huge impact on the environment; the responsibility to conduct an EIA for specific projects and operations; and, finally, the obligation to get a building permit prior to erecting buildings.  Nevertheless, no explicit precautionary wording is present in those Acts in Thailand.  On this occasion, it can be argued, however, that the precautionary principle (or precautionary element) may be applied implicitly through the Thai EIA procedures.

The Thai environmental impact assessment legislation stipulates lists of operations and installations for which an assessment is called.  According to Section 46-47, under NEQA (1992), the Minister of MONRE with the endorsement of the NEB will have the authority “to publish the notification laying down categories and scales of 22 projects or activities of government agency, state enterprise and private organisation, which are demanded to submit an EIA report to the Office of the Natural Resources and Environmental Policy and Planning (ONEP)​[668]​ and the committee of Experts for review and make an approval before carrying on (See Table 2).  Projects that require licenses or government approval before construction must submit a copy of the EIA to the relevant authority for granting the necessary approval and to the ONEP.  The agency responsible for granting the license is not allowed to give its permission until it has been notified by the ONEP that the EIA has been endorsed.  The EIA must be prepared by qualified/licensed consultants.  The person filing the EIA must be acknowledged within 15 days of the ONEP receiving the EIA, if the EIA is complete or if it needs to be corrected or added.  The ONEP may then take 30 days to review and make initial comments on the report before submitting it to a committee of experts summoned to study it.”​[669]​ Other than that, there is a case-by-case deliberation within the capability of the Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment (MONRE)​[670]​ to lay down the assessment of environmental impacts.  “Here, in separate cases of consideration, the role of precaution may come into play because standards for prescribing environmental impact assessment on a case-by-case basis have a link with the area of impacts and the disturbed population, to the quantity and form of impacts as well as to the possibility of impacts.  It stresses that the discretion is based on and restricted by law, which stops added political perspectives from being taken into consideration.”​[671]​  When the EIA has been approved, the government authority responsible for granting permission to start the project will specify any extenuating measures to lessen the environmental impact of the project imposed by the committee of experts as conditions for granting the necessary permits or following renewals.

TABLE 2:   Types and Sizes of Projects or Activities Requiring EIA Report​[672]​

Items     	  Type of Projects or Activities 	               Size
   1	Dam or Reservoir  	storage volume greater than 100,000,000 cubic metres or storage surface greater than 15 square kilometres.
   2	Irrigation	Irrigated area greater than 80,000 rais (12,800 hectares).
   3	Commercial Airport 	All sizes.
   4	Building in areas adjacent to river, coastal area, lake or beach or in the vicinity of National Parks or Historical Park which may affect the area environmental quality.	Height of 23 metres or more.  With total floor area or individual floor area in the building is 10,000 square metres or more.
	Residential Building as defined by the Building Control Act.	80 rooms or more.
	Land allocation of residential or commercial purpose	500 land plots or more.  With total developed area exceed 100 rais (16 hectares).
	Hotel or Resort facility	80 rooms or more.
	Hospital which located:	
	(a) in area adjacent to river, coastal area, lake or beach.	30 in-patient beds or more.
	(b) in area other than (a)	60 in-patient beds or more.
   5	Mass Transit System under the Mass Transit System and Expressway Act or project with the same characteristic or Mass Transit which use rail.	All sizes.
   6	Highway or road as defined by the Highway Act, passing through following areas:	
	(a) Wildlife sanctuaries and wildlife non-hunting areas as defined by the Wildlife Conservation and Projection Act	  All projects with equivalents to or above the minimum standard of rural highway, including road expansion on existing route.                                                             
	(b) National Park as defined by the National Park Act.	
	(c) Watershed area classified as class 2 by the Cabinet Resolution.	
	(d) Mangrove Forests Designated as the National Forest Reserve	
	(e)Coastal Area within 50 metres of high tide level	
   7	Coastal Reclamation 	All sizes.
   8	All types of projects located in the areas approved by the Cabinet as class 1 B watershed area	All sizes.
   9	Mining as defined by the Mineral Act No.1 B.E.2510 (1967), No.2 B.E.2516 (1973), and No.3 B.E.2522 (1979)	All sizes.
   10	Industrial Estate as defined by the Industrial Estate Authority of Thailand Act B.E.2522 (1979), or projects with similar feature.	All sizes.
   11	Commercial Port and Harbour 	With capacity for vessels of greater than 500 ton-gross.
   12	Thermal Power Plant	Capacity greater than 10 MW
   13	Petroleum Development	
	(a) Geophysical drilling, exploration and/or production	All sizes
	(b) Oil and Gas pipeline system	All sizes.
 14	Industries	
	(1) Petrochemical Industry	Using raw materials which are produced from oil refining and/or natural gas separation, with production capacity of 100 tons/day or more.
	(2) Oil Refinery	All sizes.
	(3) Natural Gas Separation or Processing	All sizes.
	(4) Chlor-Alkaline Industry requiring NaC1 as raw material for production of Na2Co3, NaOH, HC1, C12, NaOCL and Bleaching Powder	Production capacity of each or combined product greater than 100 tons/day.
	(5) Iron and/or Steel Industry	Production capacity of 100 tons/day or more (production capacity shall be calculated by using ton/hour furnaces capacity multiply by 24 hours).
	(6) Cement Industry	All sizes.
	(7)  Smelting Industry other than Iron and Steel	Production capacity greater than 50 tons/day.
	(8)  Pulp Industry	Production capacity greater than 50 tons/day.
	(9)  Sugar Industry	
	Producing raw sugar, white sugar, refined sugar	All sizes.
	Producing glucose, dextrose, fructose or the like	Production capacity of 20 tons/day or more.
	(10)  Pesticide Industry producing active Ingredient by chemical process	All sizes.
	(11)  Chemical Fertilises Industry using Chemical Process	All sizes.
	(12)  Central Waste Treatment plant as defined by the Industry Act.	All sizes.

Precaution is essential for hazardous activities. From an environmental point of view, there are three areas that essentially require full risk assessment and precaution in case of scientific uncertainty because the control of emissions cannot be fully confined.  These sectors are particularly represented in the Hazardous Substances Act (1992) and the Public Health Act (1992, section 25, with respect to waste).  In the Thai system, most activities covered by these acts also are regulated under the NEQA and the EIA acts.  By and large, these sectoral laws apply the principles of duty of care and prevention.​[673]​  Therefore, the Act’s inherent provisions do not clearly talk about any modern environmental principle, including the precautionary principle.  Under section 18 of the former Poisonous Substances Act (1967, amended in 1973), substances are divided into common and violent poisonous substances.  No one is permitted to import, export, transport, manufacture, or sell common or violent substances without registering such substances with the Competent Official and receiving a certificate of registration.​[674]​  Those holding a certificate (of registration) to import or manufacture poisonous substances must report the particulars of the chemical substance, packing methods, and place of storage or manufacture.  No one may import, produce or sell spurious, substandard, deteriorated or unlicensed poisonous substances or poisonous substances for which the licence has been cancelled.  There are also stipulations regarding packaging and labelling (Section 20(1)).​[675]​  

Under the authority of Section 5, paragraph 2, and Section 20 the Poisonous Substances Act, the Ministers of Industry, Public Health, and Agriculture & Co-operatives, may issue Regulations in the government gazette identifying substances deemed to be hazardous materials in industrial processes, agriculture, and other activities, and may prescribe rules, measures, and procedures for controlling the collection, storage, safety, transport, removal, treatment, disposal, importation into and export from Thailand of hazardous waste.​[676]​  

In 1992, the Royal Thai Government overhauled the old Poisonous Substances Act, creating the Hazardous Substances Act.  The Hazardous Substances Act provides for substantially higher penalties for breaches, strict liability for accidents concerning hazardous substances, and alters the scheme of regulating the possession, production, import and export of hazardous substances.​[677]​  Those in possession of, or who import, export, or manufacture Type 1 substances must comply with specific criteria and procedures.  Type 2 substances are subject to the same requirements, but those importing, exporting, possessing or manufacturing these types of substances have an additional duty to inform the appropriate authority first.  Type 3 substances may only be imported, exported, manufactured or possessed under permit.  Permits issued for Type 3 substances are only valid for three years.  Permits may be revoked if the substance is re-classified, the law is changed, if there are serious violations of the Act, or there are substantial grounds for concern for public safety.  Type 4 substances are the most strictly controlled.  The import, export, production or possession of Type 4 substances is prohibited absolutely.  Other government authorities also have responsibility to regulate the use and control of toxic materials.  The Public Health Act allows local officials to manage toxic waste which is creating a nuisance.  The Ministry of Industry under authority of the Factories Act (1992) has issued Notifications regarding the handling of hazardous materials in the workplace.  The Ministry of Interior and the Department of Labour Protection and Welfare have also issued Notifications with respect to health and safety precautions to protect employees working with hazardous chemicals.

The Waste Act endeavours to support sustainable development, and prevent as well as combat harm to health and the environment.​[678]​  In Thailand, authority to regulate with respect to waste is delegated to the MONRE under the NEQA and the Minister of Public Health, under the Public Health Act (1992).  The MONRE has authority to issue Notifications prescribing the categories of places of origin from which the release of waste into public water sources or into the environment outside the site of the pollution must be controlled.  It is the duty of the owner or occupier of a place of origin to build, install, or procure a system for waste treatment or waste disposal as stipulated by the Pollution Control Official (PCO), to utilise a government common waste disposal service or a disposal service provided by a permit holder licensed by the government to conduct such business, or to comply with any temporary measures implemented by the government.  Under the Public Health Act, the local authorities have the power to issue provisions regarding solid waste, and to deal with nuisances caused by inadequate waste control.  Regulations issued under the authority of the Factories Act and the Building Code with respect to waste collection may also be applicable.  Therefore, it can be argued in this case that precaution per se is not officially a guiding principle of the act; instead, preventive measures are set in accordance with economical and technical conditions.  

Liability/Penalties and Precaution

In order to alleviate the government of some of the financial burden of pollution control and environmental protection, and to provide a financial disincentive for engaging in polluting activities the “polluter-pays principle” has been introduced into Thai environmental law.  The polluter-pays principle imposes the costs of polluting on those that create the problem.​[679]​  Although this is not referred to explicitly in the legislation, it has been made a fundamental theme and is implicit throughout the NEQA.​[680]​  For example, owners or operators of potentially polluting facilities will be responsible for installing pollution control equipment or developing plans to eliminate or dispose of polluting elements at their own cost (loans or financial aids from the Environment Fund may be available to assist with capital costs​[681]​).  Furthermore, fees will be charged for the use of centralised waste treatment facilities constructed and operated by the government or licensed private ventures.  Finally, individuals or companies that cause pollution will bear the cost of cleaning it up.  

Environmental liability may be defined in three contexts—namely, civil law, public law and criminal law liability​[682]​.  One of the problems cited with previous Thai environmental legislation was that there was little disincentive to polluters.  Fines of 50 bahts (less than £1) were not uncommon.  In part this was due to the fact that the legislation was very outdated.  “Precaution has a role to play in laying down criteria for strict liability as it happens in civil environmental law.  Administrative and public law usually operate when damage has already happened or is likely to happen.  Plain neglect of precaution therefore seems to be immaterial for categories of liability.”​[683]​  

Strict liability, as seen in civil environmental law, may have a link to the criteria of precautionary measures.​[684]​  Such a provision of strict liability exists in the Thai Act (Section 96 of the NEQA (1992)).​[685]​  Under Section 97 of the NEQA, polluters can also be held liable for loss or damage to State’s natural resources as a result of any unlawful act or omission.  This section does not impose strict liability.  However, proof of any failure to comply with the requirements of this Act or any other pollution control legislation would be sufficient to bring the polluter within the ambit of this section.  If found liable, the polluter is responsible for the total value of the natural resources lost, destroyed, or damaged.  Section 66 of the Hazardous Substances Act also imposes strict liability on producers, importers, exporters, and persons possessing hazardous materials for injury caused by the hazardous substance; vicarious liability for actions of employees in handling these substances; and joint liability on every person involved in handling the substance from the line of production until the time it is disposed of or treated in an environmentally sound way.  Under section 69 of the Hazardous Substances Act, if the hazardous substance causes injury to persons, animals, plants, or the environment generally, and the government incurs expenses in rescuing, moving, treating, or mitigating the damage, or if there is injury to State’s natural resources or property, the government may institute a claim for damages as a special case.​[686]​  In nearly all systems, a permit agency assesses and stipulates in an administrative order the requirement and content of precautionary measures, which are supposed to suit the needs of victims, as well.  But in the Thai system, strict civil liability is not restricted to unlawful activities or to professional activities.  Therefore, it is possible that civil precautionary claims, whenever justified, are greater than the degree of protection set in permit conditions, should be taken up by the court.​[687]​  Until now, there is no court practice on this matter.

Directors and managers of companies should also take note that under Section 65 of the Hazardous Substances Act 1992, they could be held personally liable for acts or omissions of the company, unless they can prove that they were unaware of the activities or that the actions were taken over their objections.  There are provisions under several statutes which extend criminal liability to directors and managers of juristic persons (companies or partnerships) making them personally liable for criminal actions.  In each of the Hazardous Substances Act, the NEQA, the Factories Act, and the Building Code, there are provisions which impose penalties on directors and managers concurrently with the company for breach of the pollution control laws.​[688]​  It should also be noted that employers can be held vicariously accountable for actions of their employees under the Hazardous Substances Act and the Civil and Commercial Code (CCC).  There are a number of Sections in the CCC which may be relied upon by private individuals to bring claims for damages caused by polluting activities.​[689]​  As recourse is now available under more specific Acts, reliance on these Sections may no longer be necessary.  First, anyone who, wilfully or negligently, unlawfully injures the life, body, health, liberty, property or any right of another person is liable to make compensation for damages.  As with Section 97 of the NEQA, any activity which is illegal under any legislation will constitute an illegal act within the contemplation of this provision.  Further, section 420 of the CCC also imposes joint liability on employers for wrongful acts committed by their employees in the course of their employment.​[690]​  The courts in Thailand often interpret the term “in the course of employment” quite broadly to include any actions that cause environmental damage performed by the employee which benefit the employer, whether or not they are during office hours or within the employee’s job descriptions.​[691]​  Finally, Section 437 of the CCC imposes strict liability on companies or individuals for any damage to the environment caused by things in their possession which are inherently dangerous.  The mere fact of possession of the item is sufficient to draw a conclusion of liability.  Whether something is dangerous by nature is a question of fact.  The only defences available are force majeure or fault of the injured party.  Like Section 96 of the NEQA and Sections 63 and 66 of the Hazardous Substances Act discussed above, this is a strict liability provision. 

The amount of damages awarded to the injured party under any of these provisions will depend upon many factors.  Under Thai law, damage awards cover only direct consequences or consequences which arise from special circumstances.  Injury to individuals can result in damages being awarded for lost employment, medical care, and burial expenses.​[692]​  Damages awarded for destruction or damage to property can include the lost value of the property, although under Section 96, the last paragraph, of the NEQA the full costs of the clean up, and of the resources​[693]​ destroyed or damaged is also recoverable.  


CONCLUSIONS

This chapter offers a refreshing opportunity to continue researching the precautionary principle under Thai law.  In this study, the author does not find any explicit references to the precautionary principle in the Thai environmental legislation, nor did (Thai) courts imply that the principle had been given any specific attention.  Cases when a judgment has clearly been build upon the principle are still not found.  This, then, leaves us with substantial uncertainty regarding several aspects of the principle.  The conclusions that can be drawn from this section are as follows.  Thailand environmental law and policy is largely of preventive nature, and has been based on the preventive principle for many decades.   Even though explicit references to the precautionary principle are not found in the legislation after examination, the precautionary principle and precautionary approach do have some parts to play in Thai legal system and executive practice in the field of environmental legislation.  We can conclude that the rules of EIA in Thailand embrace the preventive principle from the outset, but close examination into Thai EIA procedures will present us with some precautionary elements.  There are, however, particular issues in the legal system that lessen the possibility for applying the precautionary principle.  For instance, the Thai Constitution has not yet been modernised and largely lacks references to basic environmental goals and principles.  Furthermore, the legislator and Thai government officials are yet to attach the volume of all environmental principles, including the precautionary principle, into the respective legal texts.  

Finally, the results of this chapter’s analysis suggest that the precautionary principle has its life in the Thai legal system and has been to some extent applied in environmental decision-making.  The legislation, however, must be further expanded upon in order to make the principle work better within the legal system.



























CHAPTER 5:  

THE LAW OF THE SEA AND MARINE POLLUTION IN THAILAND AND SOUTH-EAST ASIA WITH REFERENCE TO THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE

Introduction

This chapter will look at the adoption and implementation of the precautionary principle in marine environment and marine pollution in Thailand and South-East Asia.  A particular focus will be presented on the case of THAILAND (one of the Member States of Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN)).  The study will attempt to prove the hypothesis that Thailand applies and implements precautionary principle, or precautionary approach, when conducting its maritime activities, by showing the extent that Thailand respects and follows certain provisions of global maritime conventions, which have evolved to customary law status and, arguably, possessed precautionary natures, such as UNCLOS 1982, MARPOL73/78, and London Convention, despite the fact that Thailand has not become a Party to, nor has it ratified such global conventions.  Major programmes, activities, and regional operations in the South-East Asian region over the past few decades will also be studied and analysed in this study.  


5.1  SETTING THE SCENE: THAILAND AND THE LAW OF THE SEA

Thailand’s Positions in the Light of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (1982)

Instead of presenting natural obstacles to would-be transgressors from beyond the sea, the Gulf of Thailand has afforded a place of refuge for many a vessel in distress.  Thailand has earned the reputation of an oldest and most experienced rice-growing community with expertise also in fish culture.  Freedom of the sea means to the Thais freedom of navigation, freedom of over-flight and freedom to fish.  Fish and rice constitute the staple diet of the Thais throughout history.  In this connection, food and agriculture have provided a crucial key to Thailand’s success in achieving and furthering its healthy growth and economic development.  Fishery constitutes a sector of primary importance in Thailand’s agricultural extension programme.  This includes fresh-water, brackish water as well as salt water fish, prawn, shell-fish and seafood of various species.  Thailand is not only self-sufficient in food, but is also a major food exporter in grains, cereals as well as in seafood, poultry, and other sources of protein.  In national planning, therefore, fishery ranks second only to defence and security.  The extended national jurisdiction over the 200 nautical miles of Exclusive Economic Zones implies a drastic limitation of Thailand’s traditional distant water fishing grounds.

The Gulf of Thailand is also endowed with virtually untapped resources in minerals and natural gas.  The country has only (just) begun to explore and exploit its off-shore non-living resources under the seabed.  Considerable problems and complications have emerged in connection with the new advanced technology of production management and distribution.  Highly perplexing problems appear to have arisen in the delimitation of maritime boundary.  Without a clearly delineated line agreed upon by interested parties, all plans for exploration and exploitation of natural resources could not effectively proceed.  


Since Thailand is the only country in South East Asia that has never been colonised by Western imperialists, there are no basic documents directly relevant to the Western notion of the Law of the Sea.  For example, with regard to the width of the territorial sea, Thailand had never, prior to 1966, issued any claim relevant to the limitation of the zone.  Although in practice, Thailand has always followed the Anglo-Saxon practice of three nautical miles.  In regard to legal regime building of the law of the sea, Thailand was the only country from the region to participate in the 1930 Hague Conference on the codification of the international law of the sea, the first of its kind in human history.  At the First United Nations Conference (UNCLOS I) in 1958, Thailand played a very important role, Prince Wan Waithayakorn, the head of the Thai delegation who was elected President of the Conference, already warmly embraced the notion of the sea being a common heritage of mankind.  At UNCLOS II in 1960, Prince Wan was again elected President of the Conference.​[694]​  

After UNCLOS II, the extension of the territorial sea to 12 nautical miles and the introduction of the new concept of the “Exclusive Economic Zone” (EEZ) represented a new movement, among the developing coastal states, towards the appropriation of maritime area.  This coincided with the rapid growth of the Thai long-distance fishing industry.  Such development made it necessary for the Thai fishing boats to go further afield into international waters which would later be under the national jurisdiction of the neighbouring countries.  Obviously, Thailand faced a very difficult situation at UNCLOS III in 1974.​[695]​  On one hand, it is a developing nation, but on the other hand, it emerges as one of the top ten fishing States of the world, just as the new concept of EEZ came into existence and created a zone-locked position to Thailand due to its geographical location.

Thailand’s standpoint is grounded on a variety of policy considerations.  Its attitude is seasoned by the passage of time.  Its formation is not altogether without trials and errors.  In more areas than one, Thailand is indeed experiencing untold tribulations.  To a considerable extent, Thailand’s national interests are closely affected by the changes envisioned in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 1982.​[696]​  This latest Convention takes the form of a codification package, of which the contents have been delicately balanced, the text intensely negotiated, the provisions carefully assembled and the instruments neatly put together with assured concordance for each of the official languages.  This comprehensive treaty is meant to prescribe a uniform standard of State conduct, its rights and obligations in related fields for generations to come.​[697]​  

It is often difficult to assess with reasonable precision the extent of a nation awareness of the issues and problems facing its government in the wake of far-reaching progressive developments of rules of international law regarding the status and permissible use of the resources of the sea.  The difficulty is multiplied in any attempt to evaluate the readiness, willingness and ability of a nation such as Thailand to cope with the new situation, entailing the unenviable task of comprehending the availability of potential wealth and resources and the intriguing mystery of the profound ocean floor.  The sea has not ceased to provide a challenge for mankind.  At the same time, it is a source of life and livelihood for sea-faring nations from time immemorial, Thailand included.  

As a coastal state, Thailand has had to learn to defend itself against the continual waves of colonial expansion from afar, warding off one by one the onslaught of gunboat diplomacy, at its peak, from distant lands, stemming the ugliest tide of aggression from overseas with swords and ploughs, and repelling alien invading forces by the combined use of its inner strength, popular resilience, national unity, cultural maturity and a touch of tactful diplomacy that is typically Thai.  In terms of national security, the sea has not exactly served as a barrier to obstruct prospective intruders.  Rather unkind to the host country, the ocean has opened several sea lanes to provide easy access to this hospitable land.  Thailand’s axe-like peninsular position jutted by the warm shallow waters of its enticing Gulf lined by the sand of its shores have increased rather than decreased its security risks.  The right of transit passage presents a dilemma which must be viewed with the greatest caution, but this will not be mentioned in this instance.  In this context, the adoption of a properly balanced compromise may better serve Thailand’s security interests.



Disputes are believed to be better avoided or prevented from arising than subsequently resolved or settled, in the same way as prevention seems more desirable than cure, as a matter of environmental policy.​[698]​  This may in turn serve to explain its attitude towards a number of important issues.

Last but not least, is the desirability of measures to be taken towards securing a pollution-free community.  Conservation has been a constant theme in the policies respecting marine environment.  Clean air and unpolluted sea are clearly targets to be achieved through international co-operation.  Abatement of activities generating pollution is only an initial step to ensure circulation of cleaner air and purer water in the ocean and the superjacent atmosphere. 

Leaving aside for the time being the feasibility of deep seabed mining and the international regime to be established for the management of the common heritage of mankind, this study is proposed to examine the impact of the new law in as far as it touches and affects the national interests of Thailand in a particular area of “Marine Pollution.”​[699]​  It will be shown how Thailand has come to grip with the situation and learned to formulate its positions, taking into account the available alternatives and policy options.  In this process, no nation can be said to be totally uninfluenced by considerations other than purely national interests.  A number of pertinent factors, vital or material interests and other irrelevant policy considerations have been scrutinised and carefully weighed before national position is formulated and finally taken on each point, not without prior consultations with nations or groups of nations sharing common positions, advantages and disadvantages.






Thailand’s Participation in the Codification and Progressive Development of the Law of the Sea

The new United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, opened for signature at Montego Bay, Jamaica, on December 10, 1982, constitutes a historic milestone, marking the culmination of over 14 years of work, involving participation of more than 150 countries, representing various regions of the world.  These countries have different legal and political systems, and are in different stages of socio-economic development.  “They are countries with various dispositions regarding the types of minerals found in the seabed, including coastal states, geographically disadvantaged states, archipelagic states, island states and land-locked states.  They all convened for the purpose of establishing a complete regime ‘dealing with all matters relating to the law of the sea, taking into consideration that the problems of ocean space are closely interrelated and need to be considered as a whole.’  The amplification of the Convention demonstrates an attempt to establish true universality in the effort to achieve a “just and equitable international economic order governing ocean space.”​[700]​

The Convention contains the constituent instruments of two major international organisations, namely, the Authority (Articles 156-191), including the Statute of the Enterprise (Annex IV), and the Statute of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (Annex VI: Statute).  In addition, it represents not only the codification of customary norms, but also the progressive development of international law.  The precise extent of the combination between codification of existing customary law and progressive development of new law depends on the moment of determination, as subsequent practice of States also operates to accelerate the ripening process of conventional law into established custom.

Without at this stage taking issues with any of the propositions relating to the comprehensiveness or finality of the Convention of 1982 or the proportion between the parts that are customary law and those involving substantial modifications by treaty provisions binding on parties, Thailand is well aware of the transitory character of any man-made norms.  As a Buddhist nation, Thailand understands the continuing character of international law, which moves and continues to grow with the movement or passage of time.  The Convention of 1982 represents an accelerated and timely growth of the corpus juris oceani, a ceaseless and continuing process in progress since time immemorial, especially precipitated by the Codification Conferences of 1958 and 1960.

Gradually, maritime jurisdiction of a coastal state has been extending by leaps and bounds, from straight baselines, including widening bays and enlarged jurisdiction around islands, to differences in the growing width of territorial waters from three nautical miles cannon-shot rule to four Scandinavian marine leagues in the Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case (1950)​[701]​, and thence to the exclusive fishery zone of 50 miles in the Fisheries Jurisdiction Case (Merits), UK v Iceland (1974)​[702]​ and ultimately the 200-mile EEZ.​[703]​

Thailand has not been insensitive to these changes.  One of its illustrious international jurists, Dr. Thanat Khoman, was an active member of the International Law Commission in the late 1950s when draft Articles on the Law of the Sea were discussed.  Prince Wan Waithayakorn, Krommun Naradhip Bongsaprabhand, President of the eleventh session of the General Assembly, was elected President of the First and Second Conferences on the Law of the Sea, Geneva 1958 and 1960.  Two hundred miles zone has become a real problem for Thai fishermen and fishing industry from the very start, ever since Professor Francois, the Dutch Special Rapporteur, suggested in one of his earlier reports to the International Law Commission that coastal states should be given the right to adopt fishery conservation measures within a 200-mile zone off their coasts.  These measures were to be binding on other States which could submit their disputes to the International Court of Justice, if found to be unjustified.  This suggestion was made in 1951,​[704]​ one year before the famous Santiago Declaration of “mar patrimonial” of 200 miles by Chile, Peru and Ecuador.​[705]​  For the protection of living resources of the sea, the Special Rapporteur came to the conclusion that the diversity of circumstances in which conservation measures could ideally be taken in the various parts of the world and with respect to different species was such that the coastal state in each situation is in the best position to take necessary measures, having regard to existing bilateral and multilateral treaties.

Subsequent events and, in particular, the 1958 and 1960 Conferences on the Law of the Sea were highlighted by further efforts on the part of coastal states and island states, especially archipelagic states, to enclose certain areas of the high seas as lying within their exclusive fishery jurisdiction.  Indonesia and the Philippines provide clear illustrations of archipelagic states.​[706]​  The 1960s were marked by the rapid development, by a limited number of countries, some of them developing countries such as Thailand and the Republic of Korea, of long-ranging fishing fleets operating throughout the oceans of the world.  In addition, the traditional capacity of developed countries such as Japan, USA and USSR, which have long engaged in distant water fishing industries in the handful of in the handful of the developing world put up considerable investments and efforts to this end, resulting in over-fishing in many areas of the Pacific, the Atlantic and the North Sea.  In most cases, regional fishery commissions lacked the power and the economic and political wills to prevent or slow down the decline and collapse of important fish stocks.​[707]​  Other developing countries, lacking the financial means and practical experience, and fearing depletion of existing stocks within their reach before they could begin to exploit them, naturally reacted to the prospect of over-fishing by extending their protective exclusive fishing zone to 200 miles, a trend that has since been difficult to resist, let alone to reverse.  Thailand did its utmost to resist the irresistible trend which ultimately swept it along with Japan and Korea from their fleet.  For all that, Thailand supports the Convention taking the view that the existence of an international regime provides greater protection for developing countries. 

In anticipation of Thailand’s ratification of the 1982 LOS Convention,​[708]​ a series of legislative Acts will be needed either in the form of general enabling Act or specialised fields of legislation, including detailed Ministerial Regulations, to implement the EEZ proclamation by Thailand.  The Fisheries Legislation of 1947 needs revision and restructuring.  In this particular connexion, the Asian African Legal Consultative Committee, of which Thailand has been an active member since 1961, should be closely consulted, in order to adopt timely and appropriate measures in harmonious coordination and cooperation with other coastal countries in the larger regions of Asia and Africa, without overlooking the legislative measures by other coastal States in the North and South as well as East Pacific regions.  The European Community also provides excellent models for legislation in regard to the EEZ, the Community as well as the individual member State of the Community.​[709]​

The present UNCLOS (1982) is ratified by 160 countries, including Cook Islands and the EU.​[710]​  According to Article 316 of the Convention, it would enter into force 12 months after receiving 60 ratifications or accessions.  Therefore, UNCLOS (1982) has entered into force since 16 November 1994.  It is enforceable only as conventional law for Party States.  As a matter of fact, Thailand has given a signature to UNCLOS (1982) since 10 December 1982, until now, Thailand still has not ratified or acceded the Convention.  After much analysis, it can be argued that UNCLOS (1982) has more advantages than disadvantages to Thailand, especially in this current situation disadvantage is very much vague, therefore, non-ratification of UNCLOS (1982) may not be in Thailand’s best interest. 

At present, Thailand has declared the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) with neighbouring countries, e.g. Vietnam, Burma, who are Parties to UNCLOS.​[711]​  Those countries have declared their EEZs of 200 nautical miles.  Thus, Thailand should declare its EEZ beyond theirs in order not to be in a disadvantageous position.  In practice, it seems that Thailand is ready to proceed and has implemented UNCLOS in various aspects.  But the fact that Thailand is still not a Party to UNCLOS, this incurs more difficulties for the country in world stage.  Thailand has also been under pressure from international community to urgently ratify UNCLOS.  In South East Asia, there are only 2 countries left, Thailand and Cambodia, to become Parties to UNCLOS.  If Thailand is to be the last to do so, this may give an impression of insincerity to other Party States.  Furthermore, ratifying UNCLOS will subsequently facilitate ratifications of other international environmental conventions in the future.  This is because UNCLOS is seen as a ‘Constitution for the Oceans’​[712]​ which has laid down and compiled broad principles and criterion on marine environment, sea navigation, fishery, marine pollution and safety at sea.  Nevertheless, before ratifying the Convention, amendments and redrafting of domestic legislation must be implemented.  This process could be very time-consuming and rather difficult because UNCLOS is a convention relating to various different government agencies, such as the Department of Fisheries (Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives), the Marine Department, Office of Natural Resources and Environmental Policy and Planning (MONRE), Royal Thai Navy, Marine Police Department etc., thus implementing legislations would have to be created separately.  Furthermore, many detailed considerations must be addressed in law-making process, for instance whether it would be better to amend each implementing piece of legislation to be in accordance with UNCLOS principles, or it would bring the whole of UNCLOS to be used as law per se?  The latter method has in fact been proposed by Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Council of State, but it was not successful.  The latest implementing work of Thailand on UNCLOS, at present, involves an appointment of the ‘Sub-committee on Implementation of UNCLOS’, who will ease and speed up the country’s process of becoming a Party to UNCLOS.  This will be possible because the Council of State, whose main duty is to draft and consider implementing legislation, will carry out this task themselves.  The Thai National Focal Point for UNCLOS is Department of Treaties and Legal Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, while other relevant government agencies include the Marine Department, Department of Mineral Resources (Ministry of Industry), Department of Fisheries, the Customs Department (Ministry of Finance), Department of Local Administration (Ministry of Interior), the Post and Telegraph Department, Pollution Control Department, Office of the Attorney-General, Office of the Maritime Promotion Commission, Office of Natural Resources and Environmental Policy and Planning, Port Authority of Thailand, Office of the Council of State, National Environment Board, Ministry of Justice etc.

5.2  MARINE POLLUTION IN THAILAND SOUTH-EAST ASIA CONTEXT

Introduction

This section of the chapter lays out how the precautionary principle has been implemented so far in international environmental law in relation to marine environment pollution in Thailand (and South-East Asia).  A particular focus will be on the case of THAILAND by looking at how and to what extent it has implemented certain international (marine) environmental agreements which possess precautionary elements, i.e. UNCLOS 1982, MARPOL73/78, and London Convention etc.  As a matter of fact, Thailand has not ratified any of these global conventions.  However, it will be shown in this part of the study that Thailand adopts the precautionary principle due to the fact that certain provisions of these global conventions constitute part of customary international law.  As said above, they are incorporated as international minimum standards in the Law of the Sea Convention.


5.2.1 THAILAND’S POSITIONS REGARDING MARINE POLLUTION

Thailand has recently recovered its appropriate place in the family of nations desiring to protect and preserve the environment, including marine environment.  Like other countries, Thailand has had its shares of suffering as a result of marine pollution, especially in the Gulf of Thailand.  Like its Asian neighbours, Thailand too will have to devise appropriate measures, legislations, procedures and practices to cope with the situation.  Its obligations to protect and preserve the marine environment are far reaching and all embracing.  In preparation for the treaty obligations, Thailand has to brace itself and be prepared to meet new challenge, to overcome past bitterness and prejudices.  A new legislative framework has to be structured, anchored in constitutional provisions (1974, the latest Constitution of 1997), and the National Environment Policy Act to provide a legal basis for the formulation of environmental policy and planning.  Two bodies have been established, i.e., the National Environment and Service Development Board (NESDB) and its secretariat, the National Environment Board (NEB), with a legal sub-committee to prepare appropriate draft legislations for submission to the Parliament.

Environmental protection in Thailand is under the Enhancement and Conservation of National Environmental Quality Act of 1975 (largely amended in 1992).  Thailand’s effort to control the existing sources of industrial wastes began in 1969 upon the implementation of the Factories Act 1969, and its later amendments in the year 1975, and the latest in 1992.​[713]​  The Factories Act is imposed to set industrial effluent standards, and to regulate the treatment of industrial wastes, as well as agricultural chemicals, such as fertilisers and toxic substances.  Order No.2 of the Ministry of Industry, issued in 1970 under the Factory Act of 1969, reads in part that no wastewater can be let out of the factory unless certain limits are observed.​[714]​  The Industrial Environment Division of the Ministry of Industry is supposed to enforce the regulations.  The penalty for violating section 20 of the Factories Act (which calls for the disposal and destruction of waste or surplus materials containing poisonous elements or flammable materials) is imprisonment for up to one month or a fine of up to 10,000 bahts (approximately US$ 285), or both.  The suspected law-breaker has to be served with a prior warning, and any injured party has to institute a tort case to collect compensation for alleged damages.​[715]​  Because of this complicated process, the law has remained largely ineffective.


For new waste sources, the most common measure is the permit system whereby the government agencies concerned are empowered to determine the environmental impact of industries before permits are issued.​[716]​  Section 6 of the amendment Act empowers the Prime Minister, on the advice of the National Environment Board, among others, to prescribe categories and the magnitude of projects or activities of government agencies, state enterprise or private organisations requiring environmental impact studies.​[717]​  With waste treatment systems and subsequent regulations established under the Act, the level of discharge reaching the inland waters has been reduced by as much as 65 per cent.  Two resort areas, Pattaya and Hua Hin, have been considered as sites for ocean outfalls.​[718]​

Another series of legislative Acts have been adopted to deal with marine pollution from land-based sources, including the Public Health Act 1941, its latest amendment was in 1992, to control the dumping of municipal waste.  Another series of legislation have been passed in respect of national control of marine pollution from sea-bed activities, in the form of the Petroleum Act 1971, establishing the Petroleum Authority of Thailand with an autonomous status, and with powers to regulate off-shore oil and gas drilling, including laying of gas pipelines in the Gulf of Thailand, and precautionary measures to prevent leakage.  The Mineral Act 1967 was designed to regulate mining of all mineral resources, including off-shore tin mining.  Slime and tailings emitted by the off-shore mining operations are subject to ministerial regulations and required to meet the standards set.

Oil still is as a very important energy resource for the present time. Human beings have been very much depending on oil for their necessary activities.  Oil is a limited, non-renewable resource and can be found only in certain places.  Throughout our history, oil consumption demand has been on the increase, and this certainly prompts transportation of oil across the world.  With its unique advantages of high carrying capacity and low costs of operation, marine transport is still a well-liked mode of transport across the world.  Notwithstanding improved protective measures, tanker accidents causing oil spill at sea still happen now and again.  Such disasters endanger marine resources and environment as well as negatively affecting tourism industry and fisheries.  It is an absolutely arduous task to restore affected areas to its original condition, not to mention the huge expenses involved.  Therefore, a Thai national oil spill response plan has been devised and put in place in order to reduce damage through appropriate and effective oil spill response.  With reliance on Clause 10 of the Office of Prime Minister’s Regulation on the Prevention and Combating of Oil Pollution (1995), the Committee on the Prevention and Combating of Oil Pollution had developed the Oil Spill Response Plan to put forward to agencies concerned.  The Plan is intended to describe responsibilities for the oil spill response operation and to set up response practices and devices.  The Plan deals with oil spills occurred in inland waters, port limits, coastal areas and at sea, both in the territorial sea and the exclusive economic zone (EEZ).  “The purpose of the Plan is to create collaboration among relevant agencies to best exploit existing resources to deal with the oil spill operation in Thai waters and to enable proper and prompt response. Furthermore, it also aims to achieve the general purpose of reducing damage to the environment and marine resources.  More importantly, this is pursuant to requirements of the International Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness, Response and Cooperation (OPRC, 1990).”​[719]​  However, Thailand has not yet become a Party to this Convention, in this case Thailand follows OPRC without ratification.

In addition, there has been a recent legislation in the form of Regulations on the Prevention and Abatement of Oil Pollution (RPAOP) to provide regulatory basis for evolving a national contingency plan for the abatement and monitoring control of oil spills resulting from the accidents and navigation, operational discharges of vessels, on a large scale and blast or blown-out from off-shore drilling activities.​[720]​

“As a consequence of the 911 tragedy, members of the International Maritime Organisation (IMO) have adopted the amendments of the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) which led to the implementation of the International Ship and Port Facility Security Code (ISPS Code).  In addition, other maritime security measures have also been adopted including the installation of the Automatic Identification System (AIS) on sea-going vessels of 300 GRT and up, which allows such vessels to send out radio signals containing vessel information to other AIS-equipped vessels and AIS Base Stations.  Thailand, as a member of IMO, and a Party to SOLAS, has founded the Maritime Security and Vessel Traffic Control Centre under the management of the Marine Department of Thailand in order to effectively comply with the requirements of ISPS Code and other maritime security measures adopted by IMO.”​[721]​

At present, AIS​[722]​ Station is only available at a station at Map Ta Put Port.  It is clear that this is not enough to effectively implement ISPS Code and other maritime security measures.  Since maritime security has been known to be a crucial issue at national, regional and international levels, Thailand should work more actively, and more AIS Base Station should be set up.  The newly established Maritime Security and Vessel Traffic Control Centre needs to be well-furnished with advance, up-to-date technology for effective operation.​[723]​

“In consideration of the above, the Marine Department of Thailand has appointed the Aeronautical Radio of Thailand Co., Ltd. (AeroThai), a state enterprise under the Ministry of Transport and Communication in charge of air traffic control and management, to devise and develop the vessel traffic control system and the vessel traffic management information system (VTMIS).  The two government organisations have put a signature on a Memorandum of Cooperation (MOC) between AeroThai and the Marine Department for the design, Research and Development of Vessel Traffic Management and Information System on 7 February 2005 with a view to improving the efficiency of work on vessel traffic control and maritime security in consistent with pertinent IMO rules and regulations.  Under the Memorandum of Cooperation, the Marine Department and AeroThai will work jointly in developing a vessel traffic control and maritime security system to connect and aid communications between sea-going vessels and earth stations.  This system will also assist services for sea-going vessels entering into Thai ports, provide security services, publish weather forecasts and meteorological news and other information together with facilitate search and rescue operation.  After the signing of MOC, the Marine Department and AeroThai sent a mission for a field survey of vessel traffic control systems and equipment in many developed countries, in particular those which are well-knowned for heavy vessel traffic management.  Currently, AeroThai is working on the preliminary design of the system.”​[724]​

There are some sporadic provisions in the Navigation in Thai Territorial Waters Act (NTWA) of 1913 (as amended by the Navigation in Thai Territorial Waters Act (No.14), 1992), concerning dumping.​[725]​  Legislation in maritime law was long overdue, although reference to a specific maritime code was mentioned in the Civil and Commercial Code of Thailand.  The National Research Council, Law Section, did make recommendations as early as 1961 in support of the necessity for Thailand to have her own national maritime code, or the carriage of goods and passengers by sea.  With the advent of Thai merchant marine and growing shipping activities now, such a code has come into existence.  In this connection, Thai vessels, whether for commercial transport or fishing have to abide by international regulations and standards set by various international organisations, such as IMCO, IMO and ILO.  Thus, Thai vessels must obey regulations regarding discharge of oil waste and cleaning of bunkers, or dumping of waste in the ocean.  


THAILAND AND MARPOL (73/78)​[726]​

Thailand has become a Party to IMO since 20 September 1973.  It has contributed funds to IMO annually.  It has attempted to become a Party to the MARPOL Convention by drawing a proposal to the Cabinet, of which it has been approved since 29 April 1997.  And it gained an approval of Thai Parliament on 5 February 2000.  At present, only implementing legislation (in relation to MARPOL) is still left to be fully executed.  The legal draft, however, has been created, pending considerations and recommendations.  And Thailand is preparing for a ratification of the Convention.​[727]​
Since Thailand is a Party to the IMO, therefore, it is under obligation to participate in drafting various IMO Conventions, and is under obligation to comply with those IMO Conventions.  Even though Thailand, up until now, is not a Party to MARPOL per se, it is also under obligation to comply with main provisions of MARPOL because they possess the nature of customary international law.  Thai government, under the supervision of Ministry of Transport and Communication, needs to issue implementing legislation or regulation of MARPOL.  The Marine Department (Ministry of Transport and Communication), therefore, must issue rules and regulations on ship inspection, ship examiners must be properly trained and adequately provided for inspecting ships and issuing relevant certificates.  The Department also needs to provide experienced personnel, necessary equipment and tools for maintaining the compliance of MARPOL provisions, and monitoring general marine environment conditions, as well as promoting more research and development for preventing and reducing environmental impacts from pollution from ships.  It also needs to establish facilities for marine accident reports and submit such reports to the IMO, the Flag State and Party States which may be affected by the accident.  In carrying out this task, ports are allowed to enjoy joint benefits (of this) by sharing such facility.  Both public and private ports, which possess following characteristics, must be equipped with adequate reception facilities to process waste material:
(i) Ports or crude oil stations which oil tankers visit for receiving oil for not more than 72 hours or with distance of journey not exceeding 1,200 nautical miles;
(ii) Ports or other oil stations, apart from crude oil stations, which distribute oil for more than 1,000 tons/day;
(iii) Ports or ship garages which possess tank cleaning facilities;
(iv) Ports which are capable for ships of more than 400 ton gross;
(v) Every ports which are incapable of discarding oil-water component or sludge residue into the sea, following Regulation 9 of Annex I;
(vi) Ports which are carrying out the transportation of toxic liquid substance;
(vii) Ship garages which repair chemical tankers.​[728]​


The following types of ships must comply with regulations of MARPOL, by installing such equipment:
(i) Oil tankers greater than 150 ton gross must install slop tank and oil discharge monitoring and control system;
(ii) All types of ships greater than 400 ton gross must install sludge tank, appropriate with their engine capacities and distance of journey;
(iii) Ships greater than 400 ton gross but not exceeding 10,000 ton gross must install oil-water separating equipment, where waste water released through this equipment must contain oil part of less than 100 in a million;
(iv) Ships greater than 10,000 ton gross must install either of the following equipment:
-oil-water separating equipment and oil discharge monitoring and control system or;
-oil filtering equipment where waste water released through this equipment must contain oil part of less than 15 in a million.
These rules and regulations, however, are not enforceable to warships, government ships or ships used by the government for non-trade related purpose for a certain period of time.  These rules and regulations will have no effects on fishing ships or trawlers smaller than 400 ton gross, either.​[729]​

If Thailand is to become a Party to MARPOL, the Marine Department will be responsible for codifying and reviewing ship inspection regulations in response to standards of MARPOL, as well as providing enough trained personnel and necessary equipment to comply Thai ships with provisions of MARPOL.  Shipowners will also have to incur more expenses in improving ships and installing additional equipment, plus more burdens of operation.  Owners of certain types of ports, e.g. ordinary port capable for ships of more than 400 ton gross, and oil-transporting port capable of oil tankers of more than 150 ton gross, or liquid chemical-transporting port, will incur more burden to deal with waste management from docking ships, by having to provide waste reception facilities.  

Thai government has realised an importance and reward of being a Party to international conventions of IMO.  By the Cabinet Resolution, there appoints “National Committee for Coordinating with IMO” on 19 July 2000.  The body is a national focal point in dealing with IMO and delegating relevant government and private agencies relating to marine activities to implement and follow policy, plan, and objective laid down by the Thai Ministry of Transport and Communication.  Furthermore, it will study, analyse and monitor resolutions, recommendations of IMO in order to notify and encourage relevant agencies to formulate objective, policy and plan, including marine transportation activities of Ministry of Transport and Communication.  It will also have to study, analyse and consider suggestions and recommendations of agencies dealing with marine transportation, and participation of IMO’s activities.  Thailand has actually amended and reviewed her legislation regarding prevention, control and correction of marine environmental problems, e.g. the Navigation in Thai Territorial Waters Act (1913) amended in 1992.​[730]​  There was an appointment of “Committee on the Prevention and Combating of Oil Pollution” (following the Office of Prime Minister’s Order, 1992).  The Marine Department has also issued its Regulations on the Prevention of Danger from Oil or Chemicals Transportation in Waters (1993).  There was “National Action Plan on the Prevention and Combating of Marine Pollution from Oil” in Thailand, which was declared in May 1993.  This Action Plan stipulated responsibility zones by delegating the Marine Department with the job of combating oil stains in rivers, deltas, lakes, and harbour zones and jointly operating in the sea with the Thai Royal Navy.  There was an order of the Harbour Department (as it was called in 1993) on the prevention of oil, chemicals or toxic substances transportation in waters.  It obligated operators to place a proper, ready-to-use, preventive buoy before commencing the transportation.  Moreover, operators must possess measures and necessary equipment for dealing with emergency crisis, and must arrange an operational drill to control and combat oil stains for their relevant personnel.​[731]​

Furthermore, the National Committee for Coordinating with IMO has realised the urgent importance for Thailand to be a Party to MARPOL (73/78).  Therefore, the country’s preparation for ratification of MARPOL has been carrying out consistently since the year 1993, when the first proposal came into existence.  In 1999, the Thai Cabinet and Parliament were in agreement with the Convention and with becoming a Party to MARPOL.  They drafted the Prevention of Pollution from Ships Act (1999), which was a domestic implementing legislation.  There were also Regulations of the Marine Department in relevant issues, e.g. on collection and treatment of waste from ships; delegated Bangkok Harbour, Sriracha Harbour, Songkhla Harbour, Phuket Harbour, and Map Ta Put Harbour to be areas which must be equipped with waste reception facilities, declared on 16 September 2002.

As stated, IMO does not compel its State Parties to become parties to all of its international conventions.  But for countries who are still not parties to main IMO conventions, i.e. MARPOL (73/78), they are facing quite severe indirect effects.  As a consequence merchant ships of those countries will not be largely accepted by their trading partners, or could be obstructed by competing countries.  Thailand is one of those countries suffers from this, as an expansion of Thai fleet cannot be operated as specified in the plan.  Consequently, it reduces Thailand’s negotiating power in maritime trade and taints country’s positive images to a certain extent.​[732]​   

The preparation to be a Party to MARPOL is quite difficult and complicated because this involves many drafting of relevant domestic legislation or amendments of existing legislation to implement MARPOL.  Due to the limitation and less well-known nature of international maritime law, it is, therefore, very necessary for the country to extensively study, consider and compare many aspects and details very carefully before committing itself.  The process could be very time-consuming to allow relevant bodies, both public and private sectors, to follow rules and regulations without incurring any unsatisfactory impacts.  It is very important, at this instance, to pay particular attentions to the Convention, if not, in future Thailand’s marine activities are very likely to be in a very disadvantageous position in the world market.  In summary, Thailand has actually followed many provisions of MARPOL, although it is not a Party.  The question arises, however, whether this is due to customary law characters of MARPOL or due to a preparation of Thailand to become a Party to MARPOL.  If the latter is the case, Thailand is putting in place relevant legislation in anticipation of MARPOL, and, therefore, Thailand applies the precautionary principle under MARPOL.  However, in my view, due to customary character(s) of the MARPOL and the fact that Thailand is a Party to the IMO, therefore, it obliges to follow the provisions of the Convention negotiated and signed under the auspice of the IMO.    

Table 3:  Pros and Cons of Becoming a Party to MARPOL (Summary)​[733]​

PROS	CONS
Advantages of ratifying MARPOL, apart from conserving marine environment, in terms of economy, Thai ships will be more accepted in international waters.  At present, Thai ships are not widely accepted, even though the ships have been issued with certificates in waste management.  Due to the fact that Thailand is not a Party to MARPOL, this makes Thai certificates less weighty and credible.  Therefore, Thai ships are examined more stringent than other countries’ ships.  Moreover, if an industrial operator would like to rent a cargo ship, he is more likely to rent the ship from a Party of MARPOL, e.g. Malaysia, rather than from a country like Thailand.  If Thailand ratifies MARPOL, this sort of problem could be eliminated.  	Ratifying MARPOL will create more burdens to Thailand for both parts of shipowners and the government.  Shipowners must install additional equipment of waste reception facilities.  Harbour and/or coastal operators must also provide such a service.The government must introduce monitoring system to comply ships with regulations.  Generally, Thai ships outside Thai territorial waters are largely equipped with waste reception facilities, whereas Thai ships within Thai waters still very much lack this.  The additional job of government hereby is to prepare its capacity to look after Thai ships and ensure that they are operating in consistent with MARPOL regulations.


THAILAND AND THE LONDON CONVENTION (1972)​[734]​

The London Convention is different from MARPOL in that MARPOL will control only operations from ships, whereas London (Dumping) Convention is a control of a dumping of wastes and other matters at sea by categorising types of wastes and matters to be dumped.  The Protocol of London Convention was introduced in 1996, when various details have been changed.  Previously, the London Convention has stipulated types of waste into: waste which dumping is absolutely banned, waste which dumping is permitted in an exceptional case, and waste which dumping is allowed by permit.  In the Protocol (1996), there was a new category which altered the status of prohibited waste into a waste which can be dumped through specifying permitting measures, as well as conditions and considerations. This gave considerations and discretion to Coastal States as they see fit.  The Protocol still specified that the dumping could still be disallowed if the surrounding was not suitable.

At present, Thailand has not even signed this convention.  Unlike in relation to MARPOL 73/78, Thailand shows no intention to become a Party to the London Convention.  This is due to the fact that Thailand considers its domestic legislations to sufficiently cover a topic of waste dumping at sea under the Basel Convention to which Thailand is a Party, which it erroneously considers to cover the same subject matters as the London (Dumping) Convention (see below).  However, this only covers areas of Thai territorial seas, not including the exclusive economic zone.​[735]​  

Thailand, at present, is a Party to the Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Waste and their Disposal (1990).  It has ratified the Basel Convention on 24 November 1997, and the Convention has entered into force since 22 February 1998.​[736]​  As a result, the transboundary movements of waste, chemicals are controlled by domestic responsible agencies​[737]​ together with existing domestic legislations on control of waste dumping at sea (e.g. Hazardous Substance Act 1992, Factories Act 1992, NEQA 1992, the Navigation in Thai Territorial Waters Act 1992, and various Ministerial Regulations of Ministry of Industry).  Thai authorities are of the views that the Basel Convention covered matters regulated by the London Convention.​[738]​  Therefore Thailand is not in any hurry to ratify London Convention at this stage.  However, more considerations will have to be given in the future because, over the past many years, Thailand lacked readiness in terms of knowledge of chemical analysis for this Convention.  Now the London Protocol in 1996 is in existence plus the ban of certain type of dumping​[739]​, these could (arguably) reduce Thailand’s obstacles to ratify this Convention.​[740]​  In my view, this is not a right approach of the Thai authorities because Basel Convention covers different matters from London Convention.​[741]​











PROBLEMS OF STATE JURISDICTION IN THE MATTER OF MARINE POLLUTION IN THAI TERRITORIAL WATERS

Introduction

States have commitments and responsibilities according to international law in terms of general principle of the law of the sea to prevent and eliminate pollution as stipulated in United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS, 1982), in forms of Coastal State, Port State and Flag State.​[742]​  In practice, however, identifying the maritime zone according to UNCLOS (1982) has caused considerable practical problems for Thailand, both in terms of legal issues and legal facts, by requiring that states must be responsible for marine pollution.  As general legal principle has stipulated the commitment of state not to caused damage or transboundary pollution to other state, the Coastal State also has legal commitments, as specified in UNCLOS (1982) to prevent and eliminate marine pollution.​[743]​  The Coastal State must abstain from any activities which may cause marine pollution.  Furthermore, it must also adopt appropriate measures to prevent marine pollution, this can be pollution which occurs due to activities of that the Coastal State, are conducted by citizens of that Coastal State, or from activities of other nations.

Until now, Thailand has not, yet, fully become a Party to UNCLOS (1982).  It is also a fact that Thai domestic law still does not facilitate the work of Thai government bodies, and enable them to prevent and suppress any actions which (may) cause marine pollution within the framework of UNCLOS (1982).  Therefore, it can be expected that Thai government officials must face difficulties in preventing, eliminating, and suppressing marine pollution in various aspects, both in international law and domestic law levels.

Problems at the International and Domestic Law Levels Concerning Marine Pollution

(i)  At the International Law Level

Thailand had become a Party to many maritime international conventions.  There are 3 international conventions regarding maritime safety which Thailand had ratified.​[744]​  Worldwide benchmarks on the security of shipping have been adopted for load lines, the prevention of collisions at sea, the safety of life at sea.  These deal with issues relating to safety at sea, rather than operational and accidental discharge, and they have been considerably supported by States.  Since they contain legally binding rules, they stipulated thorough obligations on the design and construction of ships, plus equipping, manning, operations and matters concerning the training of the crew.  Though in existence, as a rule of customary international law, many years before the precautionary principle in international arena, these international conventions can be argued as to possess the precautionary elements.​[745]​  Therefore, it may not be wrong in this instance to argue that Thailand has adopted the precautionary principle in conducting its maritime affairs.

Nevertheless, there are problems relating to the ratification of many other international conventions which Thailand is still unable to ratify,​[746]​ mainly due to technical reasons.  This means that Thailand is still in the process of considering whether or not to join, and the making of domestic legislations following the ratification of those conventions is not fulfilled due to some factors regarding main principles of those Conventions on marine pollution.  Thailand is still unable to accept such commitments because they are very much considered as not to be in the best interest of the country, or as impractical to follow, for example, the MARPOL Convention (73/78) has stipulated a provision that merchant ships must install appropriate equipment, including an oil discharge monitoring and control system, oil-water separating equipment and a filtering system, slop tanks, sludge tanks, piping and pumping arrangement etc., because international law prohibits such discharge or dumping at sea.​[747]​

Considering recent Thailand’s capabilities, the role of the country in maritime transportation is still not very extensive because there are only a few small ocean liners.  However, Thailand has set a clear policy to augment its roles in maritime transportation.  When this happens, all general principles of international law Thailand will have to follow.  Furthermore, the service of containers and recipients for oil contaminant for foreign vessels at many ports in Thailand still lacks potentials to facilitate commitments under MARPOL.​[748]​  Moreover, according to international law on marine pollution,​[749]​ it often stipulates that the Flag State is the main responsible party to control and maintain ships, which register within its own country or draw a flag in its own country, not to cause any activities in violation of general principle of international law on marine pollution.  However, frequently, most Flag States have not enough capabilities or political will to control their Flag ships.  This undoubtedly makes countries such as Thailand face grave difficulties in preventing and eliminating marine pollution,​[750]​ due to reasons of finance and personnel, as well as the problems of its own domestic law.

Therefore, the problem for Thailand will be when Thailand will claim its rights under conventions in which it has not ratified, it thus may be protested against those rights since it is not a Party.  However, if it refuses to obey those soft laws,​[751]​ superpower countries will adopt suppressive measures forcing Thailand to follow the route.  In order to avoid this, Thailand should be more willing to participate in international legal negotiations.  This may later push forward such international legal drafting to be in consistent with Thailand’s best interests both at present and in the future.  If not, Thailand will always be faced with this sort of problem in every aspect of law, not only law on marine pollution.

The most significant problem at international law level for Thailand is to combat marine pollution in areas of overlapping claims.  For example, Cambodia claimed its maritime rights by reliance on its land boundaries which were delimited without any legal basis and extended into the Gulf of Thailand.  This has created many overlapping claims in the Gulf of Thailand.  Consequently, the adoption of (legal) rights and jurisdiction of Thailand according to UNCLOS (1982) has faced with many difficulties in areas of marine exploration and exploitation or even in prevention and elimination of pollution in the Gulf of Thailand.  In addition of problems in international law level, there are also many problems in domestic law which evidently hinder Thailand’s implementing legislation of UNCLOS (1982) in preventing, and eliminating marine pollution.  This will be further illustrated in the next section.
(ii). At the Domestic Law Level ​[752]​

Problems at the domestic law​[753]​ level for Thailand are resulting from the ambit of Thai law enforcement is still only limited to within land territory of Thailand.  By contrast, rights and duties of Thailand according to international law as Coastal State have been extended to some maritime territories where Thailand has sovereign rights and jurisdictions in only certain parts, and those territories are still not recognised as a part of the Kingdom of Thailand, e.g. Contiguous Zone, Exclusive Economic Zone and Continental Shelf etc.  Modern international law also stipulates rights and obligations of a State regarding marine pollution far beyond the zone of a State’s sovereign rights up to international waters or high seas.  Therefore, if a state is to enforce its rights and duties following international law in maritime zones far beyond its own territorial seas, it is very necessary to amend and review existing legislations or issue new implementing legislations for that particular purpose.  In such a case, amending the current enforceable law by correcting the definition of ‘Kingdom of Thailand’ to include all those new maritime zones will still not be enough to implement the international commitments because the ambit of rights and jurisdiction of a State regarding this topic is not always the same altogether.  Thus, a State is able to fully enforce certain types of principles and rules within its own boundaries but unable to enforce those in its maritime zones, especially it is certainly not able to enforce within the high seas.  For example, the right to inspect ship and arrest ship captain and crew in case of a violation of law on marine pollution, a state has no right to inspect or arrest foreign ship in the high seas, and bring those violators to justice.​[754]​  The criminal prosecution and punishment for ship captain and crew for this type of maritime law violation must be conducted by Flag State.  Ship inspection in the high seas can only be done as the scope of international law allows with very strict terms and conditions.​[755]​  This is to sustain the principle of freedom of navigation in the high seas.  Many important problems resulting from weaknesses of Thai domestic law is the scope of Thai government officials’ authority; this is complicated and overlapping, and the inability of certain government bodies to fully and freely carry out their duties is evident.  For example, the Harbour Department is insisting that it must be given responsibilities to oversee internal waters and port areas where the Department can specify how big and wide the areas will be, and navy officers will have authority and responsibility only for the seas beyond those port areas.  As a matter of fact, the Harbour Department is still very ill-equipped in budgets, workforce as well as necessary equipment, vehicles and technology, but it still does not allow the Navy force to help in overseeing and managing problems of marine pollution in port areas, if it does allow so, it will restrict its opportunities in expanding its work units, and will consequently be allocated less budgets and personnel, even though the Navy have better manpower, finance, technical knowledge and equipment to combat marine pollution more effectively.  For the part of navy officer, there are amendments and reviews of their authority, but still not cover all aspects, and not sufficient for the need required in preventing and eliminating marine pollution.  The review of such law has expanded authority of navy officer only to cover the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and Continental Shelf, but not to cover international waters and high seas.​[756]​

Apart from the problems mentioned above, Thai domestic law (e.g. Prevention and Suppression of Piracy Act (1991)) regarding State’s jurisdiction on marine pollution still lacks clarity in many aspects which has caused lots of difficulties for navy officers to carry out their duties.  For instance, in method and procedure to arrest perpetrators in the high seas, this is referred to as ‘rules of engagement’ according to international practice.​[757]​  The method has some distinct characteristics of international customary law which requires some study and consideration on international practice.  It can be summed that an arrest must not be done with brutal force, but if force is deemed necessary, it must be warned with a clear signal, which must be visible or audible, and the ship should stop and the crew give in.  But if the ship still does not stop, another warning will be given, possibly by signalling a flare or firing a canon across the ship.​[758]​  If the ship still resists an arrest, force may then be used by shooting at the ship, but this method must be carefully thought out and must employ all necessary measures to avoid any loss of life, and minimise injury and loss of property.​[759]​  The main objective here is to permanently disable the ship.  Anyway, Thai law does not stipulate that if the situation reaches such a point, but perpetrators still resist an arrest, then what else government officials can do to bring those down.  This is probably left to some discretion of the State and its officials.​[760]​

At present, Thailand has been very active and has launched a policy to promote maritime commercial activities to compete with its neighbouring countries.​[761]​ Therefore it is of the utmost importance for the country to pay particular attention to problems of pollution arising from high risk activities of these projects.  At present, it is very necessary to seriously study and analyse environmental impacts from these projects in order to adopt domestic legal structures as well as orders and regulations, not only for them to be in accordance with international standard, but also for them to be really and effectively enforceable within the country.  This type of implementation, thus, must be firstly and quickly executed to handle various rising activities from these projects in the future.  












5.2.2 THE CASE OF SOUTH-EAST ASIA

The South East Asian region in general is one of the most rapidly changing environments throughout the world.  The fast growing economies of the countries in the region together with production and transportation of oil within this area above all have produced pollution and pollution-related problems for these countries.  The main source of pollution in this area has been oil spills caused mainly in the course of oil transport.  The region, comprising the ASEAN member States​[762]​ lying at the centre, has gone through spectacular developments over the past 30 years, and many of these countries have been experiencing high rates of growth, and rapid population increase.  It is estimated that 70 per cent of the region’s population dwell within 50 km of the sea.  The speedy industrial growth and increase in population can be interpreted to reflect higher rates of depletion of natural resources, elevated damage to the marine habitats, and increased pollution of the marine and coastal environment.

Over the past few decades, there are initiatives set up to reduce marine pollution, both at the national and international levels.  The major force behind these initiatives is the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and more recently, the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED 1992).  Prevention and management of marine pollution are of the utmost importance to the South-East Asian countries, which are by and large maritime and facing increasing deterioration of their coastal and marine environment resulting from economic and demographic strains.  South-East Asia is going through rapid economic growth and the population is concentrated densely along the coast.  The region has long been a major centre for oil and gas production and has among the world’s busiest shipping routes.  Thus, the region is constantly under the threats of pollution arising from both land and sea activities.  Marine pollution causes grave threats to many valuable coastal and marine resource systems and the health of the coastal residents, with considerable socio-economic repercussions.  The high costs of oil spill clean-up (US$16 million) for the Torrey Canyon incident in 1967 and the Exxon Valdez incident (US$ 1 billion) are expensive lessons the region has come across.​[763]​

Considerable efforts have been made at the national and regional levels to reduce and prevent marine pollution in the seas of South East Asia.​[764]​  We shall observe that “prevention”, rather than “precaution”, is more widely employed in this context.  South East Asian regional initiatives, many of which, as a matter of fact, were established in and around 1970s before the emergence of the precautionary principle in international arena, hence there is no explicit reference to the exact concept.  Therefore, the author will argue that these efforts are based on principle of prevention and the precautionary approach, but not precautionary principle.​[765]​  Most South East Asian countries have passed legislation in order to curb marine pollution.​[766]​  Most South East Asian countries have ministries or departments of environment reflecting their determination to protect and manage the environment.​[767]​  There is larger co-operation among several environmental organisations and scientists in South East Asia.​[768]​  What is important is the existence of a formal regional ASEAN framework to deal with marine pollution problems.  The ASEAN environmental ministers and their senior officials will hold meeting regularly for joint discussion regarding environmental policy and management issues.​[769]​  As a result of major and persistent efforts made by various regional and international bodies such as ASEAN, IMO Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP), UNEP, International Oceanographic Commission (IOC)/Sub-Commission for the Western Pacific Region (WESTPAC), United Nations Education, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO), better understanding and knowledge of the marine environment and the impacts of marine pollution on the ecosystems are achieved.  

Another measure associated with the precautionary principle is research.  For an effective implementation of the precautionary principle, research is of the essence along the entire route.​[770]​  “It is, in particular, an indispensable tool to:
 (1) detect dangers in an early stage; 
(2) assess environmental impacts; 
(3) overcome or reduce uncertainties; 
(4) develop and examine alternatives to potential hazards; and to 
(5) monitor the effects of precautionary action taken.”​[771]​ 







There are many research and educational organisations founded in South East Asia, over the past 20-30 years.​[772]​  Many technical personnel were trained and educated locally or in foreign countries.  Some of these institutions have been equipped with basic technical capability to tackle marine pollution problems in their own countries.  A regional network of scientific institutions dealing with marine and coastal problems is in existence and marine scientists have now set up their professional associations, e.g. Association of South East Asian Marine Scientists (ASEAMS), to promote closer regional association at the individual level.​[773]​

Public awareness of marine pollution problems has definitely seen an increase, as well as public concern and growing pressure from citizens for a better and cleaner environment.  This is true in countries which have made significant economic progress.  Changes are also clear to notice in the manner and approaches of the governments and policy-makers to put more money for pollution control and management, particularly after UNCED.  Their understanding of the necessity for a “holistic integrated” approach in resolving multiple resource-use conflicts has indeed made a move from single to multi-sectoral planning and management approach in project development and implementation.

Many international conventions concerning marine pollution from vessels have been or are being ratified in South East Asia.  Some of these international convention that have direct importance to the region include the 1973 International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution From Ships as modified by the Protocol of 1978 (MARPOL 1973/1978), the 1990 International Convention for Oil Pollution Preparedness, Response and Cooperation (OPRC), the 1972 London Dumping Convention, UNCLOS, and the 1969 International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage.​[774]​  The 1989 Montreal Guidelines, on the other hand, provide the basic principles, rules and standards relating to marine pollution arising from land-based sources.​[775]​  However, the countries in South East Asia are usually doubtful of international conventions, especially when it relates to the management of ship-generated pollution.  This is because they feel that the costs involved in implementation and enforcement of the regulations outdo the benefits to be gained.  With rising economic development and simultaneous marine environmental damage, however, we may pose this question:  Is it now time for re-examination of the benefits and costs of each of the existing conventions?


The actions of the oil companies​[776]​ and the shipping sector​[777]​ in building up their own environmental protection measures and reinforcing co-operation amongst themselves and with the governments are key accomplishments worth recording in the history of marine environmental protection in the region.  This can be noted as another typical precautionary measure which involves with the employment of safety margins, as practical demonstrations of the general idea enshrined in the precautionary principle that errors in decision-making ought to be in favour of the environment.  A major problem of high cost involved in tackling the issues of marine pollution troubled the governments. Mitigating measures are very expensive and very frequently prolonged.  For example, the cost of cleaning up the Singapore River alone amounts to at least US$300 million over a period of ten years. This is paid for by the Singapore Government. Other large polluted rivers and bays such as the Chao Praya (Thailand), the Pasig River (the Philippines), Jakarta Bay and Manila Bay would also need as much money and efforts to clean up.  Installation of sewage treatment plants requires huge investments from the government.  This, as a consequence, will reflect the necessity to levy extra taxes on the citizen.  There are other options worth considering, which might help alleviating burden on the citizen, these include privatisation and shifting the burden to private sector.  

Despite the decrease of oil spill incidents in the 1980s as compared with the 1970s, there are significant concerns on the rising age of vessels beyond 15 years passing through the Straits of Malacca and other shipping lanes of the region.  Such old oil tankers might be susceptible to accident due to the rate of corrosion.  “About 75 per cent of the tanker tonnage lost over the years 1989-1991 was over 15 years old.”​[778]​ There could be more likelihood of spills, if the shipping companies do not replace the old vessel.​[779]​  

The signing of the Paris Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on Port State Control for the Asia-Pacific region​[780]​ in April 1994 in Beijing is a major move in the right direction in controlling the operation of sub-standard ships and the problem of disposal of slop oil and sludge.​[781]​  Singapore is the only State in South East Asia which possesses any capability to treat the waste material.  Malaysia has declared its intention to build such a facility which is required under MARPOL 73/78.  Lately, Indonesia has commenced its tank cleaning operation in the open seas in the hope of cutting down the cost of sending the sludge to Singapore.  However, the facility on Pulau Sebarok in Singapore is considered to be incompetent to cope with the inundation of the material that needs to be processed.  A new organisation is, thus, needed, and has later been established to deal with the problem.  However, for some of the Contracting Parties of the MOU, there is still requirement for skilled personnel, appropriate equipment and facilities.  In some cases, there are not many vessels put at the disposal of the Port State Control units.  Aircraft surveillance and other monitoring facilities are sadly insufficient.  At this moment, Port State Control is a helpful answer to the problem of control vessel-source pollution, but in the long-term the possibility must be placed on the Flag States.    

There is increasing awareness and concern among policy-makers on the rapid decay of the coastal and marine environment resulting from economic and population pressures.  However, their efforts, commitment are not enough to tackle long-term environmental issues which directly affect the sustainable development of economic programmes.  Expenses spent on pollution prevention are being considered by policy-makers as unrecoverable costs. Therefore, they rarely are placed in the priority list of government development programmes and budgets.

Despite having national legislations to prevent pollution, implementation of such regulations has been rather ineffective in many countries in the region.  Although national and regional oil spill contingency plans exist, the capability of the countries to efficiently implement them has not been very strong.  Many of the International Conventions relating to marine safety and pollution have, as yet, not been acceded to and ratified by many ASEAN countries.​[782]​  Indonesia has become a party to many, various international conventions, more than any other South East Asian States.  Brunei Darussalam and Singapore have acceded to some of the Conventions.  These ASEAN governments have met with difficulties in attempting to adopt the guidelines, and obligations of these treaties.  Difficulties encountered include the unavailability of technical knowledge, financial resources, and complex and inadequate domestic environmental laws and regulations that need to be tidied up before provisions in the Conventions can be incorporated in them.  Overlapping responsibilities and ambiguity exist as to which agency is delegated specific tasks of monitoring, control and enforcement of pollution.  There seems to be some unwillingness and a noticeable lack of urgency on the part of some ASEAN member States in accepting the provisions of some of the Treaties due to high costs involved and the doubt as to whether there are real benefits from adopting them.  National concerns may have been restrained by the view that more stringent pollution regulation may hinder economic development and that the value of protecting the nation’s marine resources may not be fully utilised.  
 
Precaution, Economic Interests and Future Prospects

As a matter of fact, the South East Asian countries have already formed close connections and cooperation under the ASEAN framework in many areas, such as economy, trade, transport, and communication, agriculture, tourism, manufacturing industry and the environment etc.  Marine pollution is one of the areas that has been considered when regional meetings take place, because it requires the collective strengths of the coastal nations to tackle.  Nevertheless, much more still needs to be done to reduce the level of pollutants in coastal waters already polluted by human activities.  Greater efforts are essential to prevent those unpolluted coastal ecosystems and the open sea from the threat of pollution resulting from existing and future economic development.  And these efforts will employ the concept of precautionary approach in order to protect the environment from any significant and/or irreversible harm. 

One reason that the precautionary principle has been criticised is for fear that its application may paralyse human societies by requiring comprehensive proof of harmlessness before permitting any activity.  Several rather fundamental questions are at stake here.  It is obviously not permitted to use uncertainty as a reason for postponing or failing to take action, but can the economic costs of such action perhaps be a valid reason to do so?  Or is the nature of the precautionary principle absolutist in the sense that environmental protection should by definition outweigh all other interests?  Should the objective of nature conservation not be balanced against such economic interests when deciding on precautionary action?  Is environmental protection always worth any price or should precautionary measures be fashioned so that they are cost-effective?  A related concern is raised by the prominent role of uncertainty in environmental management.  Mistakes in environmental decision-making are inevitable, which raises the question; who should pay for those mistakes, the human economy or the environment?  Supporters of traditional approaches have been inclined to stress the costs of wrongly taken preventive action, whereas proponents of a precautionary approach have tended to stress the costs of mistakenly lack of such action.  Much of the above revolves around the big question whether in determinations regarding precautionary action, account should be taken only of the proportions of the environmental risk at issue, or also of the costs of preventive or abatement measures.​[783]​  From whichever angle, the stakes in this matter are high and range from the fate of species and ecosystems to the fate of industries and human lifestyles.​[784]​  Some activities are directly (and all human activities ultimately) dependent on a healthy environment, whereas some activities (and there is overlap here) can only take place at the detriment of that same environment.​[785]​  The relationship of environment, society and economy is complex and symbolised by difficult choices that often go between instant and more lasting results.​[786]​  “The costs of preventive action are usually tangible, clearly allocated and often short term”, as the director of the European Environment Agency observes, “whereas the costs of failing to act are less tangible, less clearly distributed and usually longer term.”​[787]​  The outcomes of choices, in turn, are influenced by values which differ from society to society and from time to time,​[788]​ and by the bare fact that governments can spend the same euro, dollar, pound or yen only once.​[789]​

First in this analysis comes the acknowledgement that the relationship between economic considerations and the precautionary principle in international law is a nuanced matter.  Social and economic considerations, to begin with, are an integral part of the rationale of the precautionary principle.  Despite the fact that under international law it is undoubtedly the primary purpose of the principle to protect the environment, including for the sake of it, reasons of a socio-economic nature have influenced the choice of governments to adopt the precautionary principle.  In accordance with the concept of sustainable development, precautionary action is deemed necessary not only to protect the intrinsic worth of the environment but also its great and multiple value for humanity.  With an eye on this value and the fragility of the environment to harm inflicted by human activities, states have in adopting the precautionary principle judged it better to run the risk of overstating risks than understating them.  Cost-effectiveness is one of the ways in which the precautionary principle can be defined, as precautionary measures to prevent harm are thought to be more cost-effective than renovation after environmental damage has taken place—and even more so when restoration is not possible.  Cost-effectiveness in the strict economic sense, however, does not constitute a separate legal requirement to be met by precautionary measures.​[790]​  Evidence in state practice for the existence of such a requirement is just too scant and inconsistent.  This lack of support is in accordance with common sense.  Submitting candidate precautionary measures to a traditional cost-benefit analysis is an absurdity.  The mandatory performance of such analysis and the taking of precautionary action are mutually exclusive.

On the contrary, the precautionary principle is not “absolutist”​[791]​ either, since its application is not totally cost-oblivious.  This should be clear, if only from the fact that the principle does not incorporate any general rule which permits potentially harmful activities only upon delivery by their opponents of proof of harmlessness.  That would be absolutist.  Instead, the search for a pattern in the totality of state practice reveals that economic factors not only form part of the rationale but also of the very make-up of the precautionary principle as it has developed in international law.  The magic word at this point, recurrent in the state practice is proportionality, which is all about matching costs and benefits.​[792]​  In the context of environmental law and policy this notion is understood as: the greater the risk, the more rigorous the measures to counter it, and vice versa.  In concrete decision-making, this implies that when an environmental risk is negligible, social and economic interests are likely to pre-dominate the outcome.  Alternatively, when an environmental risk is great, social and economic considerations tend to take a back seat.  This purely describes what sensible governments have always done.​[793]​  Within the framework of the precautionary principle, this common conduct has been effectuated at different levels.  For one, proportionality is incorporated in the various thresholds.  From an economic perspective, these threshold levels are, to borrow the words of one commentator, “of decisive significance in relation to the degree to which balancing is permitted in the implementation of the precautionary principle.”​[794]​  When there are no ‘reasonable grounds for concern’ or threatened harm is not ‘significant’, the precautionary principle allows for an unlimited balancing of environmental, and economic interests; for contemplation of costs and benefits of any given kind.  When reasonable grounds for concern that significant harm may be brought about are present, States have a right to take ‘effective and proportional action to prevent and/or abate this harm.’  Naturally, states are free to decide whether to make use of this right, a decision which itself may well be influenced by socio-economic considerations.  In terms of cost-effectiveness, when the threshold of significance is crossed, then action to prevent the harm in question is presumed cost-effective.  Finally, when anticipated harm is also serious and/or irreversible, the right is joined by a duty.  In those circumstances there is no more free balancing;​[795]​ states are simply expected to take ‘effective and proportional’ precautionary measures.​[796]​  Furthermore, the role of the notion of common but differentiated responsibilities in the present context remains to be assessed.  The notion has been integrated in many legal systems beside the precautionary principle, whereas it is lacking in others.  With regard to the precautionary principle as such, the definition of Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration and some other formulations suggest that in the implementation of the principle, account should be taken of the limited economic and technical capabilities of developing countries.  

All forms of efforts must be strengthened in a harmonised manner in order to develop a collective strategy to slowly reduce pollution in the coastal areas and prevent it in the open seas.  This strategy must also uphold a holistic and integrated approach to plan and manage human activities in the coastal areas as well as the wise use of the coastal and marine resources.  Although previous efforts have been beneficial to the marine resources and environment of the region, new efforts should be aimed towards tackling the management issues.  While marine pollution has no certain boundary, it has an origin.  It is, therefore, imperative to address marine pollution from its source.  Within each country, it is advisable to deal with pollution at the local level, although in certain cases, regional cooperation beyond national boundaries is needed.

Marine pollution in the coastal waters is usually caused by either a single or combined effects of pollutants discharged from a single or a combination of land-based or near-shore activities, such as fishing, aquaculture, tourism, mining, processing and manufacturing industries, agriculture, shipping, port and harbour development.  In South East Asia, land-based pollution is generally caused by solid and liquid waste disposal from human communities and contaminated industries, including improper use of land and other coastal constructions.  As a matter of fact, a number of international conventions or protocols have been developed by IMO, UNEP and other UN agencies to regulate and alleviate marine pollution from both land-and sea-based sources.  The main ones applicable to South East Asia include MARPOL (1973/1978)​[797]​, OPRC (1990),​[798]​ CLC (1969),​[799]​ the 1972 LD,​[800]​ the Montreal Guidelines on Land-Based Sources of Pollution,​[801]​ and UNCLOS.  These conventions offer the legal measures to oblige the concerned coastal states which ratified them, to take the essential steps in preventing and mitigating marine pollution and to develop the response systems, facilities and personnel.  In reality, only a few South East Asian countries have ratified and implemented these conventions.  For example, only Brunei Darussalam, Singapore, Indonesia and Vietnam have ratified the MARPOL Convention since its enforcement in 1983, and not a single South East Asian country has ratified OPRC.  In relation to the MARPOL Convention, South East Asian countries have yet to obtain the necessary technical capability and financial resources to implement the provisions.  Regional efforts are required to elevate a better understanding among policy-makers of the consequences of these conventions, and a commitment to develop the required technical capabilities to implement them should be encouraged nationally.  However, International maritime organisations will keep on playing a crucial role in giving technical inputs and moving anti-pollution schemes forward. The IMO will also encourage cooperative efforts within the South East Asian region, and wider geographical area.  They could also work actively in promoting extra-regional cooperative schemes to make the most of the expertise and other resources of developed maritime countries.

Networking is also very important for promoting and strengthening cooperation among institutions and individuals.  Association of South East Asian Marine Scientists (ASEAMS) has already been established as an effective networking body.  Its main task is to promote and upgrade relationships among scientists in various branches of marine science.  A proper networking mechanism will be helpful for the strengthening of regional cooperation in many other areas, such as the area of legislative and financial arrangements, pollution checking and information broadcasting and human resource development etc.  

The diversity of legal systems in the region is hugely inspired by the American, Dutch and British forms of legislation.  Therefore, attempts to synchronise national legislation and legal practices in the region are advisable.  Domestic maritime laws need to be brought into line with international conventions, protocols and regulations.  An interaction of legal experts specialising in marine environment legislation should also be encouraged since this may bring about understanding and better interpretation of current legislature in various countries relating to environmental quality standards, enforcement of EIA, environmental principles and so on.  At the same time, it could also promote a better understanding of international conventions and provide advice and direction to assist national ratification and implementation.


CONCLUSIONS

Significant amendments to the environmental protection regime in Thailand were instituted in 1992.  Of particular note was the promulgation of a revamped National Environment Quality Act (NEQA) which established an influential National Environment Board (NEB) to oversee national environment priorities.  Amendments to the Public Health Act, and the Factories Act and the promulgation of the Hazardous Substances Act provide the government and the public with powerful means to control pollution and prevent environmental degradation.  It is clear from this analysis that the precautionary principle plays a role in Thailand’s environmental law and policy, but the principle is hardly articulated in the legislation, and until now no case law involving the precautionary principle has been summoned at the Supreme Court level.  Arguably, the precautionary principle is the basic principle in the country’s environmental policy; but we hardly found it in the policy and law of important social and economic areas that are the root causes of environmental degradation.  This fact limits its legal importance as well.  

Thailand is now slowly awakening to the need for environmental protection, and is starting to get serious about imposing controls on business operations.  Incentives are available to encourage environmentally sound practice, and there are heavy penalties for those who fail to heed the new attitude to environmental protection that prevails in Thailand today.  We have witnessed a development of the precautionary principle, although at a slow pace.  The legislation needs to be improved in order to make the principle work better within the legal system.  We need to see in time whether this development will continue and whether the principle will one day have enough power as a principle of law to set clear limits in larger areas of Thailand’s environmental law and policy.  



Several generalisations can be made about marine pollution in South East Asia.  First, the countries collectively concern about the threat of marine pollution in the region, in particular the threat of oil pollution by vessels.  Other sources of marine pollution are less focussed.  Second, concern about oil pollution is not totally matched by appropriate preventive and remedial legislation and enforcement.  Third, interest is apparent in various modes of regional cooperation for marine pollution prevention and control, perhaps even in the idea of an appropriate sub-regional convention, but diversity of the region limits the feasibility and desirability of bringing the national responses into accord.  The level of concern and the capacity to respond to environmental pollution vary widely from country to country.  Although all have some environmental provisions in their earlier laws pertaining to the safety, health, and welfare of the public, their more intense efforts to tackle pollution are recent.   Various regional initiatives have been established over the years with the aims to tackle specific environmental problems of the region.  On the surface, observations tell us that environmental measures and regulations employed tend to be preventive, rather than precautionary in nature.  However, it may not be wrong to argue, to some extent, that the precautionary principle and its approach apply in this context, albeit without any of its explicit provisions.

Whatever the status of preparedness of the Thai government to ratify the new Law of the Sea Convention of 1982, there appear to be countless problem areas requiring legislative measures and adjustments of existing regulations.  The attitude of the Thai government in preparation for the ratification of the Convention must be one of cautious optimism because the marine environment constitutes the common heritage of mankind.  As a law abiding member of the international community, Thailand supports all forms of co-operative efforts and measures to prevent, reduce, abate and minimise as much as possible marine pollution everywhere, especially, in the Gulf of Thailand and in the Andaman Sea, for which Thailand is directly responsible as a coastal State.  Furthermore, Thailand has followed certain provisions of global maritime convention such as MARPOL 73/78, by taking into consideration its customary law status, without ratifying the Convention at present. Therefore, it can be argued, according to the fact mentioned above, that Thailand implements the precautionary principle at the same time. 

CHAPTER 6

GENERAL CONCLUSIONS

In recent years, governmental organisations have been fighting with the inadequacy of existing environmental assessment and decision-making approaches, such as risk assessment.  The weaknesses of these scientific approaches become even more apparent in the face of new environmental challenges such as global warming and persistent organic pollutants etc.  Scientific knowledge concerning the potential impacts of these effects on human health and the environment is narrow in the extreme.  Scientific proof of cause-effect relationships (and their extent) may take several years or decades to come about and may never be established because of limitations in experimental design and the complication of natural ecosystems.  However, waiting for more evidence may be catastrophic and extend over generations.  As a result of the limitations of science to deal with emerging environmental problems, there is a significant need to develop new public policy approaches to anticipate and prevent harm to human health and the environment.  A number of policy analysts faced with these problems have recommended a concept called the precautionary principle or the precautionary approach.  In fact, the precautionary principle evolved in the international arena in the early 1980s, but traces its origins back to domestic legal systems, where it has been considered as a legal principle since the 1970s.​[802]​  Only recently, the precautionary principle has begun to play an extraordinary role in international proceedings.  At the heart of the precautionary principle is the concept of taking anticipatory action in the lack of full proof of harm, in particular when scientific uncertainty about causal links exists.​[803]​  The precautionary principle asserts that decision-makers should take action ahead of scientific certainty to prevent harm to humans and the environment.​[804]​  Environmental action in spite of scientific uncertainties, however, has been a crucial test for the precautionary principle for the last decade.  Lots of confusion encircling the principle’s interpretation involves with its distinction from more conventional preventive standards of environmental protection.  Generally speaking, the precautionary principle both in its conceptual core​[805]​ and its practical implications is preventive, but not all preventive standards are precautionary.​[806]​  More precisely, any particular preventive standard may be either non-precautionary or precautionary in various degrees.  By contrast, any given precautionary standard may be preventive in various degrees, but it cannot be unpreventive.​[807]​  “The precautionary principle can best be described by setting it apart from the preventive principle in which it finds its basis for tackling environmental matters in international agreements.  In essence, the preventive principle obligates states to prevent known or foreseeable harm outside their territory.  Parties to such earlier agreements discussed frameworks, which advised that legal action shall only be taken when proof that the proposed activity causes harm to the environment is present, whereas the precautionary principle calls for environmental action in advance.”​[808]​ 

The precautionary principle applies to almost all areas of human activity that might have an impact on health and the environment: states agreed upon a worldwide reduction of greenhouse gases, for example, on the grounds of this principle.”​[809]​  Furthermore, imports of genetically modified maize​[810]​ or hormone treated beef​[811]​ have already been banned by states invoking it.  In the area of the Law of the Sea, the precautionary principle has been called to restrict activities relating to fisheries, marine pollution and transports of radioactive and hazardous substances.​[812]​
The precautionary principle has been extensively incorporated, in various forms, in international environmental agreements and declarations and further developed in some national legislation.  Although most critics agree that the heart of the principle is best reflected in Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration of 1992, a single standardised understanding of the meaning of the precautionary principle has still not existed among states and various members of the international community.​[813]​  This is no surprise since there are various different versions and formulations of the precautionary principle presented.  

A few years ago, one commentator stated that “the international community is in a process of gradually accepting the precautionary principle in atmospheric and marine pollution issues at least philosophically.”​[814]​  After that, the evolution has taken place: a large body of international and national environmental law have been developed over the last decade, a broader concern for the global environment has materialised.​[815]​  This change (of concept) has also had a tremendous impact on the development of the precautionary principle as a rule of custom.  The debate about whether it is yet a principle of customary international law binding on all states still continues.  Currently, enough evidence of state practice can be found to back the conclusion that the precautionary principle has reflected a principle of customary international law.  Evidence comes in the form of national policy and legislation, international documents, and judicial decisions.  The model of discourse at the international arena, including state declarations, and involvement in international conferences and treaty negotiations points that a strong acceptance of the precautionary principle is present.  As for the area of pollution of the marine environment, the underlying meaning of the precautionary principle, as a rule of customary international law, is that States have a duty to act prudently and cautiously in cases of possible harm to the environment.  Policy-makers must not depend on scientific uncertainties to postpone environmental action.​[816]​  

As a matter of fact, the precautionary principle has been integrated into several domestic legislations.​[817]​  “Usually, it can be inferred that the extent of its implementation on the domestic level mirrors the state’s dedication to environmental awareness.”​[818]​  In Thailand, the precautionary principle has been put into operation by environmental standards, e.g. relating to emissions controls etc.  In Thailand, the domestic laws mainly compel both individuals and authorities to stick to pollution prevention under the precautionary approach.  There is no mention of the precautionary principle in the wording of the Acts in Thailand.  However, from this study, it can be confirmed that the precautionary principle, to some extent, and the preventive principles, as regulated in international mechanisms, have played some roles in environmental law and policy of Thailand.  It also seems reasonable to conclude that the precautionary principle has not yet been fully implemented.  Furthermore, it can be concluded here that Thailand has also applied the precautionary principle and precautionary approach into its marine pollution prevention programmes, by way of respecting and following certain provisions of global maritime conventions, such as UNCLOS, MARPOL 73/78, and London Convention etc, which constitute customary law status without ratifying any of such conventions at present.  

This thesis has also attempted to illustrate the various legal frameworks created to prevent and control marine pollution in South East Asian region and in Thailand. Some South East Asian countries e.g. the Philippines, Myanmar and Cambodia etc. still lack any domestic legislation to combat marine pollution.  They might not have paid adequate attention to environmental law.  This (legal) gap in those countries must be filled and the campaign to produce appropriate legislation for environmental protection should be encouraged.  However, through regional initiatives and environmental measures to combat marine pollution in South-East Asia, it can be deduced that precautionary approach, or rather preventive approach, has been employed in spite of having no explicit mentions.   Some countries which already have a code of environmental law, such as Thailand, do not act well enough to put in force these standards, consequently the law is generally violated without the polluter being prosecuted (either to answer a criminal case or pay any compensation).  The lack of skilled manpower to observe, control and enforce the law and the more pressing needs of the governments perhaps are the main reasons for this disappointing state of affairs.  Efforts made by the Coastal States at regional level to combat pollution in South East Asia should not only be encouraged, but effectively assisted by the appropriate world organisations, in particular UNEP and Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organisation (IMCO).  “As in all other malfunctions, prevention is better than cure.”​[819]​  In the face of the environmental challenges facing our future, one can only hope for what Judge Stein had already stated: “One thing is clear—the precautionary principle will not go away.  It is here to stay.”​[820]​
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http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/index.php?case=135 (​http:​/​​/​www.icj-cij.org​/​docket​/​index.php?case=135​)
http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/index.php?pl=3&p2=1&code=ecol&case=138&k=ee (​http:​/​​/​www.icj-cij.org​/​docket​/​index.php?pl=3&p2=1&code=ecol&case=138&k=ee​) 
(ICJ’s Website)

Convention on Biological Diversity:  http://www.biodiv.org/biosafety (​http:​/​​/​www.biodiv.org​/​biosafety​)
Centre for Biological Diversity Press Release:
http://www.biologicaldiversity.org/news/press.../aveda7-18-05.html (​http:​/​​/​www.biologicaldiversity.org​/​news​/​press...​/​aveda7-18-05.html​) 

London Dumping Convention:  http://www.londonconvention.org/main.htm (​http:​/​​/​www.londonconvention.org​/​main.htm​)

OSPAR Convention:  www.ospar.org/eng/html/welcome.html (​http:​/​​/​www.ospar.org​/​eng​/​html​/​welcome.html​)
                                    www.ospar.org/v_measures/get_page.asp (​http:​/​​/​www.ospar.org​/​v_measures​/​get_page.asp​) 

HELCOM:  www.helcom.fi/helcom/convention.html (​http:​/​​/​www.helcom.fi​/​helcom​/​convention.html​)
                    www.helcom.fi/stc/files/MinisterialDeclarations/MinDec/1988.pdf (​http:​/​​/​www.helcom.fi​/​stc​/​files​/​MinisterialDeclarations​/​MinDec​/​1988.pdf​) 
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www.hdr.undp.org/doc/publications/background.../Dias2000.html (​http:​/​​/​www.hdr.undp.org​/​doc​/​publications​/​background...​/​Dias2000.html​) 

IAEA:  www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/.../infcirc335.shtml (​http:​/​​/​www.iaea.org​/​Publications​/​Documents​/​...​/​infcirc335.shtml​) 

IOSC:  http://www.iosc.org/docs/IssuePaper1.pdf (​http:​/​​/​www.iosc.org​/​docs​/​IssuePaper1.pdf​)
            http://www.iosc.org/docs/2005_IOSC_Workshop_find_report.pdf (​http:​/​​/​www.iosc.org​/​docs​/​2005_IOSC_Workshop_find_report.pdf​)

Greenpeace International:  http://www.greenpeace.org (​http:​/​​/​www.greenpeace.org​)

Paris Memorandum of Understanding:  www.parismou.org (​http:​/​​/​www.parismou.org​)

Biotech Internet: http://www.biotech-info.net/uncertainty.html (​http:​/​​/​www.biotech-info.net​/​uncertainty.html​) 
                            http://www.biotech-info.net/science_and_PP.html (​http:​/​​/​www.biotech-info.net​/​science_and_PP.html​) 
                            http://www.biotech-info.net/precautionary_use-and-abuse.html (​http:​/​​/​www.biotech-info.net​/​precautionary_use-and-abuse.html​) 
                            http://www.biotech-info.net/handbook.pdf (​http:​/​​/​www.biotech-info.net​/​handbook.pdf​) 

MONRE (Thailand):  www.monre.go.th (​http:​/​​/​www.monre.go.th​)
http://warehouse.mnre.go.th/dnn/About/Ministry/History/tabid/420/Default.aspx (​http:​/​​/​warehouse.mnre.go.th​/​dnn​/​About​/​Ministry​/​History​/​tabid​/​420​/​Default.aspx​) 

ONEP (Thailand):  www.onep.go.th/eia/ENGLISH/Content_right/e_data_mean.html (​http:​/​​/​www.onep.go.th​/​eia​/​ENGLISH​/​Content_right​/​e_data_mean.html​)
                               www.onep.go.th/eia/ENGLISH/size/e_size_industry.html (​http:​/​​/​www.onep.go.th​/​eia​/​ENGLISH​/​size​/​e_size_industry.html​)
http://www.onep.go.th/onep_en/index.php (​http:​/​​/​www.onep.go.th​/​onep_en​/​index.php​)? 

Marine Department (Thailand):  www.md.go.th/asean-ospar-files/national_2oplan.pdf (​http:​/​​/​www.md.go.th​/​asean-ospar-files​/​national_2oplan.pdf​)
                                                    www.md.go.th/eng_page/int_aff/VTS.pdf (​http:​/​​/​www.md.go.th​/​eng_page​/​int_aff​/​VTS.pdf​)
                                                    http://www.md.go.th/law/anusanya.php (​http:​/​​/​www.md.go.th​/​law​/​anusanya.php​) 
                                     www.aerothai.co.th/shareholder/report/.../11613116150003.pdf (​http:​/​​/​www.aerothai.co.th​/​shareholder​/​report​/​...​/​11613116150003.pdf​) 

National Economic and Social Development Board (Thailand):
http://www.nesdb.go.th/Default.aspx?tabid=62 (​http:​/​​/​www.nesdb.go.th​/​Default.aspx?tabid=62​) 

Mahidol University (Thailand):  www.en.mahidol.ac.th (​http:​/​​/​www.en.mahidol.ac.th​) 

ASEAN:  www.aseansec.org/64.htm (​http:​/​​/​www.aseansec.org​/​64.htm​) 
                http://environment.asean.org/index.php (​http:​/​​/​environment.asean.org​/​index.php​)?  

COBSEA:  www.cobsea.org (​http:​/​​/​www.cobsea.org​)

International Petroleum Industry Environmental Conservation Association (IPIECA):
www.ipieca.org/activities/oilspill/downloads/conferences/workshop_march07/BrendaPimentel.pdf (​http:​/​​/​www.ipieca.org​/​activities​/​oilspill​/​downloads​/​conferences​/​workshop_march07​/​BrendaPimentel.pdf​)

International Tanker Owners Pollution Federation Limited (ITOPF):
www.itopf.com/country_profiles (​http:​/​​/​www.itopf.com​/​country_profiles​)

Centre for International Development at Harvard University (USA0
http://www.cid.harvard.edu/cidbiotech/comments/comments74.htm (​http:​/​​/​www.cid.harvard.edu​/​cidbiotech​/​comments​/​comments74.htm​) 

The Wildlife Trade Monitoring Network
http://www.trafic.org/briefings/precautionary.html (​http:​/​​/​www.trafic.org​/​briefings​/​precautionary.html​) 

Permanent Court of Arbitration:  http://www.pca-cpa.org (​http:​/​​/​www.pca-cpa.org​)

Joel Tickner’s website about Pesticide Impacts on Human Health
http://www.safe2use.com/data/precaut1.htm (​http:​/​​/​www.safe2use.com​/​data​/​precaut1.htm​).
Pollution Prevention and Control (POP&C)
http://www.pop-c.org/news/documents/RINA%20paper%202003.pdf (​http:​/​​/​www.pop-c.org​/​news​/​documents​/​RINA%20paper%202003.pdf​) 

Aspen Global Change Institute (Colorado, USA): Furthering Understanding of Earth Systems and Global Environmental Change
http://www.agci.org/publications/eoc95/sessionII/Bodansky.html (​http:​/​​/​www.agci.org​/​publications​/​eoc95​/​sessionII​/​Bodansky.html​) 

Lawlink New South Wales, hosted by the Attorney General’s Department of New South Wales, Australia:  www.agd.nsw.gov.au/sc/sc.nsf/pages/Stein_3 (​http:​/​​/​www.agd.nsw.gov.au​/​sc​/​sc.nsf​/​pages​/​Stein_3​)
www.lawlink.nsw.gov.au/lawlink/.../SCO_speech_stein_141099 (​http:​/​​/​www.lawlink.nsw.gov.au​/​lawlink​/​...​/​SCO_speech_stein_141099​)  

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Singapore
http://app.mfa.gov.sg/data/2006/press/land/order.htm (​http:​/​​/​app.mfa.gov.sg​/​data​/​2006​/​press​/​land​/​order.htm​) 
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https://oa.doria.fi/bitstream/handle/10024 (​https:​/​​/​oa.doria.fi​/​bitstream​/​handle​/​10024​) 
http://www.sussex.ac.uk/spru/environment/precaupripdfs.html (​http:​/​​/​www.sussex.ac.uk​/​spru​/​environment​/​precaupripdfs.html​)
http://www.treasury.govt.nz (​http:​/​​/​www.treasury.govt.nz​):  Treasury Publication, Government of New Zealand 
http://www.nature.coe.int (​http:​/​​/​www.nature.coe.int​)
http://www.seafdec.org/cms/index.php (​http:​/​​/​www.seafdec.org​/​cms​/​index.php​)
http://www.gefcoral.org (​http:​/​​/​www.gefcoral.org​)
http://www.pmbc.go.th/webpmbc/English/English/php (​http:​/​​/​www.pmbc.go.th​/​webpmbc​/​English​/​English​/​php​) 
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http://pygs.lyellcollection.org/content/50/1/5.abstract (​http:​/​​/​pygs.lyellcollection.org​/​content​/​50​/​1​/​5.abstract​) 
www.basel.int (​http:​/​​/​www.basel.int​) :  Regional Agreement on Transboundary Movement of Hazardous Wastes

www.dep.nl/md/html/conf/declaration/esbjerg.html (​http:​/​​/​www.dep.nl​/​md​/​html​/​conf​/​declaration​/​esbjerg.html​) : Declaration of the Fourth Ministerial Conference on the Protection of the North Sea

www.acap.aq (​http:​/​​/​www.acap.aq​) : Agreement on the Conservation of Albatross and Petrels 
www.i-sis.org.uk (​http:​/​​/​www.i-sis.org.uk​) : Institute of Science in Society: science society sustainability 
www.nda.gov.uk (​http:​/​​/​www.nda.gov.uk​) :  Nuclear Decommissioning Authority (UK) 
www.kodmhai.com (​http:​/​​/​www.kodmhai.com​) 
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